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ABSTRACT
NATIONAL PARTIES AND EUROPEAN LEGISLATORS
Andrea Stephanie Aldrich, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2015
This dissertation examines the relationship between members of the European Parliament
(MEPs) and national political parties by investigating how variation in party organization,
in conjunction with the political goals of parties and individuals, affects European legislation
and the representation of national interests. I examine the relationship between MEPs and
their national parties through the methods and strategies parties use to select and supervise
their party members serving in the European Parliament (EP). I identify patterns in candi-
date selection and supervision and determine how the electoral goals of parties in European
elections lead them to make specific strategic choices for candidates and encourage specific
behaviors in the EP. I argue that these choices, and the structure of party organization,
influence the level of congruence between MEPs and their parties in European legislation. I
determine that the single most important influence on both how a party organizes for Euro-
pean elections, and who they choose to represent them in the EP, is the national environment
in which the party was founded and within which it was designed to function. The structure
of national legislative institutions, and party systems and experience with the European
Union (EU) and the Eurozone predict patterns in variation across party organizations with
respect to their centralization of selection and supervision of MEPs. Similarly, European
electoral goals are the result of domestic factors such as the position of the party in national
government, party ideology for Europe, party system stability, and salience of EP elections.
These goals determine the types of candidates, experienced in Europe, at the national level,
or not all, that parties select to serve in the EP and how these MEPs view their role as a
iv
party representative. In addition, both organization and goals influence legislator behavior
in a variety of ways. MEPs in policy seeking parties that centralize the selection of MEPs,
and also include them in their party leadership provide the most congruent behavior to their
parties.
v
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
In a plenary session of the European Parliament (EP) on December 17, 2008, British Mem-
bers of the European Parliament (MEPs) split a vote 17 in favor and 43 against a legislative
amendment that would phase out the United Kingdom opt-out of the Directive on the Or-
ganization of Working Time.1 While it is expected that MEPs within a national delegation
may often split on a vote since they usually contain politicians from multiple parties, this
vote was particularly peculiar because the British Labour Party was also split 13-5 in favor
of removing the opt-out. What is even more peculiar is that those Labour members voting
in favor of the abolition of the opt-out, the majority of 13, were rebelling against the Labour
Prime Minister and party leader, Gordon Brown.2 They were speaking publicly against their
leader even though European elections were right around the corner (BBCNews 2008b).3 In
the end, twelve incumbents were re-elected in 2009, one that had been loyal to Gordon
Brown, ten that had not, and one MEP that had been absent.4
Just before the 2014 EP elections in Denmark, MEPs from the Danish liberal party
(Venstre) were also called out in the media for undisciplined behavior. This delegation
was attacked for their divided behavior in the EP and its leader, Jens Rhode, was heavily
criticized for publicly expressing his opinions (Skaerbaek 2013). After a few particularly con-
demnatory public comments expressing views contrary to the values of the Venstre party,
1Directive 2003/88/EC, which modified a directive originally passed in 1993, Directive 93/104/EC. Vote
ID 5115, Organisation of working time - Recommendation for second reading : Article 22 16, 27.12.2008.
2For further information on the directive and the politics of the working time opt-out in the UK see
BBCNews (2009); DailyMail (2010); Guillot (2008).
3The term "European elections" throughout the document refers specifically to elections for the European
Parliament which occur every five years at various dates within the same month in all European Union
member states, not to be confused with any domestic election that simply takes place in Europe.
4Arlene McCarthy was re-elected but had been absent on the day of the vote (according to
www.votewatch.eu).
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Mr. Rhode lost his position as the delegation leader for the 2014 European election and a
more loyal party member was chosen instead. She had served previously as party spokesper-
son and national member of parliament. Party leaders believed she would be a uniting force
for the party in the lead up to the election.5
These two examples illustrate instances where national party delegations in the EP have
spoken out against their national parties and publicly disagreed with their party leaders
in the media. In the case of the Labour party, this issue was seen as a test of Gordon
Brown’s leadership within the party and his ability to control his MEPs (BBCNews 2008b).
In Venstre, the issue was one of public image. The party was viewed as being unable to
control even this small delegation.6 While the problem of discipline is apparent in both
situations, the consequences for this behavior were mixed. In the UK, many of the rebel
MEPs remained at the top of their constituency lists and were re-elected to the EP. In
contrast, the Venstre party was able to remove and replace the leadership position on the
electoral list. While Rhode did get re-elected, the other two Venstre MEPs did not return
to the EP. Why was there variation in the experience of these MEPs? Why was one party
able punish their MEPs and not the other? Are other parties able to avoid situations like
these completely or do they face similar challenges? Examples like these two situations, as
well as variation in the treatment of MEPs by their national parties, can be found across
parties and individuals in the EP. In addition to highlighting different experiences in both
party behavior and electoral strategy, these experiences also call attention to how parties
deal with MEP-party relationships. How are some parties better able to control their MEPs
than others? What are the consequences of political party treatment of MEPs for legislative
behavior? What does this mean for party representation in the EP?
This dissertation argues that party organization is one answer to these questions of
legislator control and party discipline in the EP. I argue that the centralization of MEP
organization, in particular that of candidate selection and supervision, is one way national
parties are able to enforce discipline within their EP delegations. For instance, the experi-
ences described above can be explained, in part, by the candidate selection strategies and
5Interview 9.17.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.
6At the time there were three Danish Venstre MEPs in the EP.
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procedures used by each party. The Labour party uses a decentralized method of selection for
its candidates for the EP where potential MEPs are selected for the ballot by their regional
constituency. Incumbents are especially privileged in this process because they only need
the approval of a majority of constituents to be re-selected for the top position of their list.7
There are twelve constituencies in the UK that are relatively autonomous in this process so
the national leadership has very little control over candidate selection. In addition, candi-
dates are elected from these constituencies on closed lists, solidifying the electoral advantage
associated with the top position. In contrast to the Labour party, Venstre uses a highly
centralized selection process. The leadership of the Venstre party selects all candidates and
chooses the list leader, exercising absolute control over the content of their list. In this
particular party, the top spot is identified by the party while the remainder of the list is
ordered alphabetically. The number one position is a clear signal of the party preference to
candidates and voters alike.8 These differences in party organization provide a foundation
for understanding why the UK Labour Party was limited in its ability to discipline MEPs
through electoral means by its decentralized selection process, while Venstre was not. By
centralizing selection, Venstre leadership was able to use its power to replace its divergent
MEPs.
These contrasting examples highlight how the organization of candidate selection is one
avenue for national political parties to create and maintain the accountability of their EP
delegations. In this dissertation, I examine national party accountability in the EP through a
framework that links party organization and a party’s electoral goals to individual legislative
behavior. The analysis makes three novel contributions to our understanding of legislative
politics in Europe. First, I show that both a party’s organization and its electoral strategies
for the EP are determined by institutional and electoral conditions on the national level,
illustrating how differences among member states of the EU can lead to inequalities in the
representation of national parties. Second, I also show that these electoral goals define the
strategies a party employs with respect to the type of legislator chosen to serve. Finally,
7This process is called a trigger ballot, where all district members have the opportunity to vote to approve
or not approve an incumbent’s return. A majority is required for an incumbent to keep their position at the
top of the list.
8Interview 9.17.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.
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I provide evidence that suggests the way a party is organized to select and supervise their
MEPs has profound effects on how a legislator behaves with respect to party cohesion across
different policy areas. In sum, this dissertation highlights how the centralization of party
organization, in concert with the goals of each chosen legislator, provides for more or less
congruent policy making at the European level. In order to reach these conclusions, I revisit
classic theories of party organization and apply them to the unique context of the EP to con-
tribute to our understanding of how parties can shape political outcomes. By investigating
party control in the EP, I offer a comparative piece of research that highlights and explains
the implications of these key differences for the most fundamental EU democratic process,
parliamentary representation.
1.1 POLITICAL PARTY ORGANIZATION AND THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT
The majority of the literature examining parties in the EP have been either studies of
the internal workings of the legislature (Coman 2009; Hix, Noury and Roland 2005; Hix
and Marsh 2007; Klüver and Spoon 2013; Kreppel 2001; Mühlbock 2012) or studies of the
Europeanization of internal, national party politics and electoral competition (Ladrech 2002;
Poguntke et al. 2007; Pridham 2011). A large scale study of how parties are organized for
Europe is absent from the literature, but we do know a lot about how and why political
parties organize generally. Typically, studies of political parties fit into one of the following
three areas:. First are studies examining parties as institutions; second, parties as the result
of electoral systems; and third parties as systems themselves (Aldrich 2006). Of these three
approaches, the study of parties as institutions, and more specifically as organizations, is
the least explored in the literature (Mair 1994; Katz and Mair 1992a; Tavits 2013). One of
the reasons it is still a relatively small area of study is a “lack of comparable knowledge,"
of organizational features across a large number of countries (Enyedi and Linek 2008, 455).
There are simply not many studies that investigate party organization systematically across
countries (for an exception see Katz and Mair 1992b).
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Large scale studies of party organization are sparse because it is difficult to conduct large
cross-national studies of party organization and its consequences due the endogenous nature
of party development. Parties are institutions created and shaped by political actors already
participating in the very system that constitutes the party’s operating environment (Aldrich
2006). Political factors such as the design of electoral systems (Duverger 1954; Mayhew
1974), the structure of the party systems (Krouwel 2009; Panebianco 1988), and the political
environment all influence the way parties are organized. For instance, many cross national
studies are restricted to comparisons of parties and party systems across both electoral
systems and legislative institutions. In contrast, within country studies are restricted to
comparisons within one electoral system and a unicameral or bicameral legislative institution.
Hence, comparing the effects of party organization on legislative behavior either creates too
much variation at the electoral and institutional level (cross-national) or no variation at
the electoral or institutional level (within country). While this is no fault of party scholars
and excellent work has been done both within and across countries, it has thus far been
incredibly difficult to isolate either the effects of electoral and party systems or the effect of
institutional incentives. Hence, there is still a wide range of questions about the effects of
parties and their organization on political outcomes that remain unanswered.
In this dissertation, I examine party organization in the EP to begin addressing some
of these unanswered questions. I chose the EP because it presents a rare opportunity to
explore the consequences of organization in an institution that did not create nor currently
structures a large majority of the work of political parties. National political parties have
developed simultaneously with national institutions, not the EP (with the exception of a
few, rare parties formed solely to contest European elections). National political parties are
structured to select and supervise national politicians. They pursue policy and seek to govern
at the national level. While I expect national political goals, experience, and organization to
structure the treatment of MEPs within their national parties, I also expect such treatment
to have profound effects on legislative behavior in the EP. Regardless of where or how a
party developed, it’s organization is aimed at holding its members accountable. Parties
choose different strategies to ensure accountability. Different parties are more or less able
to do so effectively, determining the quality of representation they receive at the European
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level. Questions of accountability within parties and legislatures have often been central
to studies of representation and the quality of democracy (Blais and Bodet 2006; Budge,
Robertson and Hearl 1987; Dalton, Farrell and McAllister 2011; Dalton and Wattenberg
2000; Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Thomassen 2005; Thomassen and Schmitt 1999; Wessels
1997). The importance of these questions is equal, if not more important, in the politics of
the EP given the complexity of its institutional structure, its relationship to national politics,
and its connection (or lack thereof) with European citizens.
National parties selecting and supervising MEPs and MEPs themselves face several ac-
countability dilemmas. Parties are organized to perpetuate their own existence and maximize
their influence in government and most parties are specifically constructed to do so at the
national level. As national parties, they seek to grow and/or maintain their parliamentary
presence, maximize their role in coalition governments, and gain control over their govern-
ment for themselves. In order to do such things, they must first maximize their electoral
success. The addition of EP elections creates another layer that parties must incorporate
into their organization and often the role for a politician in EP office in the national party
hierarchy is not very clear. Unlike traditional democratic systems, the politicians holding EP
office do not form a government and the building of legislative coalitions occurs on a much
larger scale. Legislation in the EU is much more complicated and involves several layers of
institutions. Given these complexities, the gains from placing a party member in the EP are
not immediately clear. Parties must learn how to extend their influence to the European
level and will have different incentives to do so based on their European electoral and policy
goals and their experience in the European legislative process.
The EP possesses many of the same features as a national legislature but a few key
differences exist that make the relationships between national parties and their members in
the EP unique. First, MEPs are agents in a dual principal environment where they must
answer both to the party groups of the EP and to their national parties (Hix 2002). European
party groups (EPGs) in the EP are the essential building blocks of legislative coalitions. The
increase in parliament’s power within the institutional structure of the EU in the past 25
years led to an increase in party groups’ ability to influence policy, provide leadership benefits
to their members, and increase the strength of party influence on individuals when voting
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on European issues. Given that party influence grows with the ability of parties to provide
benefits and sanctions to individuals (Rhode 1991; Smith 2007), and the role of the EPG in
policy making and assigning power positions within the EP has increased (Kreppel 2001),
the importance of the EPGs has grown over time. Since 1979, the EPGs have grown to
resemble the traditional party structures of a national legislature, making them the main
organizational force in the EP instead of national parties. This means the role of national
parties in supervising and influencing MEPs is shared among two different groups. Since the
party groups are comprised of national party delegations, preferences of the groups and the
national parties often coincide so many of these functions work simultaneously towards the
same outcome. However, this may not always be the case. National parties and their MEPs
must learn to manage the competing influences of European, national, and constituency
politics.
Another large difference between legislating in the EP and in national parliaments is the
separation of powers across EU institutions and the technical nature of lawmaking in the EP.
In the EU, the parliament is a lower chamber legislative body that works with the Council
of Ministers (CoM) to pass legislation and create law. The European Commission has been
assigned monopoly power over legislative initiative and introduces all legislation to these
bodies (EuropeanUnion 2010). This makes the EP a more reactive body than a traditionally
proactive legislature like the U.S. Congress, where agenda power is high. Their position as
a veto player is important to legislating in the EU, but it creates a unique situation where
MEPs must react to all measures proposed to them and parties cannot avoid facing certain
untenable issues. Legislation in the EP is also often very technical and specialized. Some
legislators may not prefer work in the EP because of this. It is technical and complicated
lawmaking that requires large coalitions and working with interests that vary across many
parties and countries.9 Politicians experienced in national politics may not have the skills
or experience necessary to work at the EP and, conversely, those that are experienced at
the EU may not have immediately transferable skills for national parliaments. In addition,
many of the committees also require specialized and technical knowledge, which can make
9Interview 6.19.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.
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it impossible for a novice to adequately participate.10 High investments in learning may be
required, but it may take years to enjoy dividends from these investments. Finally, working
in the EP requires individuals to be away from both their constituencies and the national
political scene for the majority of their time, making it virtually impossible to stay involved
in local or national politics if they would like to.
1.2 POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
The extant party organization literature is a starting point for a theory on national party
organization for European politics, but it should not be assumed that national organization
applied to the European level will function the same way. It also cannot be assumed that the
an MEP will be valued like an MP in a party’s organization or that the electoral strategies of
national parties will resemble those utilized in national elections. This dissertation will fill a
gap in the parties and EU literature by offering a categorization of the parties in the European
Parliament on the basis of the centralization of party organization, specifically leadership
organization and candidate selection that spans both Western and Eastern Europe. This
represents a major step towards understanding the differences in parties across EU member
states and provide motivation for exploring the organization of these parties further and
understanding how representation in the European Parliament may differ across member
states.
Investigating the influence of national parties, I argue national parties may hold several
goals which can be categorized as office seeking, vote seeking, and policy seeking.11 These
goals are defined by national political experience and climate, but they manifest themselves
differently in European elections than we would generally see in national elections. National
parties are well-versed in national electoral competition and certain features of this national
competition define and constrain the strategies available to parties in European elections.
Specific strategies reveal patterns for the way candidates for the EP are selected and su-
10Interview 9.17.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.
11Adapted from Strom (1990).
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pervised within their parties. Given the goals of a party and its experience in organization
at the national level, parties are more or less competent at choosing the specific types of
politicians needed for European elections. These chosen politicians exhibit different types of
representative styles based on their level of supervision from their party, their skill set, and
their career ambitions. Each of these representative styles encourage more or less congruence
with party wishes, and parties that are better able to transfer their national experience to
the unique challenges and opportunities in the EP are better able to encourage congruent
behavior from their MEPs.
In addition to linking national politics to internal work in the EP, this research also
contributes to the broader literature on political parties in the EU. For example, the literature
on party change in the era of the EU has begun to address the impact of EU politics within
national parties, but remains highly divided between research on parties in Western European
democracies and the transitioning parties of Central and Eastern Europe. This division is
a result of the largely introspective nature of the literature that has limited it to studies of
internal party dynamics or competition (Ladrech 2002; Poguntke et al. 2007; Pridham 2011;
Raunio 2002). These studies mainly focus on analysis of programmatic or ideological change,
the emergence of Euroskeptic parties, internal party division over the issue of integration,
or intra-party competition within a country (Ladrech 2007). Literature studying Eastern
Europe points out a trend in programmatic change that can be attributed to the reduction
in competition among parties. This change produced a moderating effect on ideology as well
as a democratizing effect on organization (Pridham 2011). In Western Europe, the academic
consensus is that parties have been unable (or unwilling) to seriously consider what role EU
politicians have in their parties or in relation to domestic governance as a whole. These
parties have not taken steps to increase the accountability of their members serving on the
European level, nor have they created an internal discourse around European issues (Ladrech
2007; Poguntke et al. 2007).
A large body of work has also addressed MEPs and their behavior in the EP directly, but
has yielded mixed conclusions with respect to party effects. While valuable in understanding
the internal working of the EP, these studies have been restricted to analysis of national
delegations and EPGs (Hix, Noury and Roland 2005; Hix and Marsh 2007; Coman 2009;
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Mühlbock 2012). Beginning with studies of overall voting cohesion among EPGs and national
parties (Hix, Noury and Roland 2005; Hix and Marsh 2007) and progressing to studies of
contested voting in the EP and among EU legislative institutions (Coman 2009; Mühlbock
2012), this research has shown that MEPs are subject to a variety of influences from within
the EP. Different circumstances dictate the strength of parties in maintaining unity. While
these studies produce differing results in the debate over who controls the MEPs, they all
share a desire to explain how party resources interact to influence the behavior of individuals.
Each of these authors approached the relationship between the MEPs and their respective
parties as one of dual principal, single agent. In doing so, the aforementioned studies identify
how each party, either the national or the European group, offer different incentives to MEPs
for loyalty and have different goals for pursuing unity among their ranks.12 This dissertation
continues in this vein by arguing that both the parties and individuals must engage in a
decision making process where they balance competing demands in consideration of their
own goals for the future, buy in contrast to these studies, I am interested in understanding
the impact of influences exogenous to the EP (i.e. exogenous national party structural and
electoral influences).
In addition to testing classic theories of party organization and political behavior, the
analysis also contributes to debates on the democratic legitimacy of representative govern-
ment both in Europe and more broadly. The EU has often been viewed as an elite driven
process where bureaucrats and government leaders have been the most important actors
(Curtin 2007). Because the EP added public participation to the EU, it is sometimes viewed
as an institution that was created to extend the legitimacy of the Union (Rittberger 2007).
Governments are often considered both legitimate and representative when they are elected
in free and fair elections with high levels of participation. Elections create accountability
mechanisms within democracy and should ensure than the preferences of the people are
represented in institutions (Manin, Przeworski and Stokes 1999). Studying the quality of
elected representation in the EU is imperative because ongoing debates about its democratic
legitimacy, or lack thereof, abound in public, political, and academic circles. On one side
12For instance, see Hix and Marsh (2007) and Hix, Noury and Roland (2007) for research suggesting MEPs
are more likely to side with national parties when conflict arises between their principals, but see Coman
(2009) for a counter argument.
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of the debate, those who deny a democratic deficit claim the election of governments and
legislatures (both national and EP) implicitly ensures a high level of democracy (Moravscik
2002). Alternatively, others argue the institutional relationship between parliaments (both
national and EP) and the other institutions of the EU (the Commission and Council of Min-
isters) may prohibit the functioning of democracy entirely (Thomassen and Schmitt 1999).13
While the role of the EP and parliamentary democracy appears in a large amount of work
addressing this debate (Follesdal and Hix 2006; Hooghe and Marks 2001, 2009; Kohler-Koch
and Rittberger 2007; Moravscik 2002; Papadopoulos 2007), the role of national party rep-
resentation and MEP accountability has largely been limited to internal examinations of
party strength in the EP or the role of European elections in European societies (Coman
2009; Evans and Maarten 2012; Farrell and Scully 2005; Hix 2002, 2004; Hix and Noury 2009;
Hobolt and Høyland 2011; Kreppel 2001; Lindstadt, Slapin and Weilen 2011; Mühlbock 2012;
McElroy and Benoit 2009).
1.3 MAPPING THE DISSERTATION
After identifying the European electoral goals of parties and measuring the empirical reality
of party organization in Europe at the beginning of the dissertation, I conclude that electoral
goals are linked to party organization to the extant that parties with a higher stake in
European elections are more likely to centralize their selection and supervision procedures.
I then link goals to candidate type and show that national politicians are likely to enter
the EP only with vote seeking parties. Policy seeking parties tend to select politicians with
previous EP experience and office seeking parties use the EP as a training ground for new
politicians. In the final chapter I combine goals, organization, and candidate type to offer a
theory of when MEPs are most likely to provide congruent behavior for their parties. The
chapter concludes that organization is a more important indicator of congruence than MEP
type and that the most loyal MEPs are those that are centrally selected and included in
13These scholars argue that lack of power of the EP in decision making compared to the other, non-elected
institutions increases the democratic deficit.
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leadership. In order to reach these conclusion, I examine MEPs from parties with five or
more members from across 17 member states.
To reach conclusions outlined above, I use data from a sample of parties in the European
parliament across most member states, supplemented by extensive fieldwork at the European
Parliament and in selected member states. This project empirically tests the implications of
internal, national party controls dictated through formal party rules on candidate selection
and legislator behavior. By focusing on the link between national parties and the EP, this
project produces innovative results that speak to the nature of multi-level politics in Europe.
Specifically, I directly compare individual MEP behavior to that which would be expected
given the preferences of their national parties. The main analysis of the dissertation uses
the population of parties that have five or more members in the European Parliament.
Restricting the analysis to parties with multiple members in the EP ensures there can be
comparison on both the party and the individual level. Attempting to isolate the effects of
individual goals or experience on party and legislator choices become increasing difficult as
the number of MEPs per party drops to only a few. The parties included in the analysis
are chosen from those serving in the EP in the seventh session (2009-2014) and thus all
references to the European Election are in reference to the 2009 European election unless
otherwise noted. Complete descriptions of the data can be found in each individual chapter
and their appendices.
All of the chapters also incorporate qualitative research from extensive fieldwork. The
purpose of this work is to both corroborate the large N findings and add validity to the
theoretical foundations used to derive hypotheses about the national party MEP relation-
ship. This fieldwork includes interviews with party officials and MEPs mostly from, but
not restricted to, Germany, the UK, and Croatia and who are members of the major par-
ties belonging to the following EPGs: the Party of the European Socialists (PES), the
European People’s Party (EPP), the Alliance of Liberal sand Democrats (ALDE), and the
Greens. These data were collected over several months of fieldwork that included interviews
of MEPs, their staff, party leaders and other political elites between January 2013 and June
2014. These countries represent party systems that maximize variation in levels of experience
with the EU in terms of years of membership (with one accession country/new member),
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variance in federal/unitary structures, interest representation, and size (number of members
in the EP). This helps ensure that patterns presented and analyzed are the result of the
organizational structures of parties instead of specific or unique features of each case. While
conducting the fieldwork, I investigated the way MEPs were selected to run for the office
and their motivations, as well as the level of discretion given to individual party members
that work in the EU and their level of communication with domestic parties.
1.3.1 Chapter 2: A Theory of Political Parties and European Politicians
The next chapter explicates a theory of political party organization and individual behavior
centered around the selection and supervision of politicians for elected office. First adapting
Strom (1990)’s conceptualization of office, vote, and policy seeking electoral goals to Euro-
pean elections, I provide a foundation for understanding what parties can gain in a Europe
election. I argue these goals dictate the choices they make for the type of politician they
wish to serve them in the EP. Party organization plays an important role in determining how
likely it is a party is able to choose their preferred type of politicians and how well they can
maintain accountability once a candidate is in office. Subsequently, the individual ambition
of each politician and national party organization work together to encourage or discourage
cohesion in representation. The theory develops the expectation that nationally ambitious
politicians from parties with centralized selection methods and policy and vote seeking goals
will provide their parties with the highest level of policy congruence.
1.3.2 Chapter 3: Party Organization
Chapter three investigates patterns in party organization across member states. I examine
the centralization of political parties through candidate selection mechanisms for national
and European office and the construction of executive party leadership. I argue that the
centralization of these two choices have important implications for legislator behavior be-
cause they allow the party to control politician’s careers and the power base within the
party. Using classic theories of party development and organization, I argue that organi-
zation at the European level is the result of national institutional traditions and national
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electoral experience. The chapter uses party statutes to compare the selection and supervi-
sion procedures across parties and compares European organization to that of the national
level. Incorporating data on national level institutions, and unique party characteristics, I
use logistic regression to test for the determinants of centralized selection for the EP and the
inclusion of MEPs in their party’s leadership. I find that parties are more likely to central-
ize than decentralize the management of their MEPs under a variety of national institution
conditions, which highlights the strong role national politics and party experience play in
determining their treatment of MEPs.
1.3.3 Chapter 4: Electoral Goals and Candidate Selection
Chapter 4 investigates the relationship between European electoral goals and the composition
of the EP with respect to personnel. It argues these goals dictate the choice made for
candidate selection for the EP and are able to explain why variation exists among MEPs
with respect to their past political experience, party service, and European institutional and
party group leadership experience. The chapter highlights existing variation in politician type
among member states and raises questions about the quality of representative democracy
in the EU. A series of logistic regression models test under what conditions certain types
of politicians are likely to serve their parties in the EP. The data originates from MEP
curriculum vitae, parliamentary service records, and personal websites that are publicly
available. I constructed a single comprehensive database recording the experience of MEPs
with respect to local, regional, national, ministerial, and prime ministerial service at the
national level. It also includes executive party service at the regional and national level
as well as experience in the EP (years of service), EP leadership, and EPG leadership. In
addition to this political service, the database also features educational achievement, area
of educational and professional expertise, and the original data source. The results of the
analysis reinforce the second order elections model of European elections. The conditions
under which experienced national politicians and party leaders enter the parliament are rare
and most likely to occur in vote seeking parties. The EP is found to be an institution
for new and upcoming politicians and policy experts from office and policy seeking parties,
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illustrating an evolutionary change in the role of the EP in a party’s hierarchy from a
retirement home to a training ground.
1.3.4 Chapter 5: Electoral Goals, Organization, and Legislator Behavior
Chapter 5 explores the relationship between domestic parties and their MEPS by investigat-
ing how party leadership can influence their members outside of the legislative process. This
chapter explores the link between party organization and personal ambition in strengthen-
ing programmatic representation in the EP. It adds to the current literature on MEP-party
relations by offering insight into individual and party goals and how these interact within
the structure of European elections and policy making. The effects of variation in party
structures, individual political goals, and electoral systems on legislative behavior are tested
utilizing an exogenous measure of national party congruence that allows for a comparison
across parties and members states. This measure is constructed using data from voting
records for MEPs in the seventh session and party ideology from the Comparative Man-
ifestos project (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2014). I focus
specifically on differences in electoral goals, candidate selection, formal MEP supervision,
and individual career experience as the main determinants of policy congruence. The data
on party organization introduced in Chapter 3 and electoral goals and individual experience
of Chapter 4 are combined with qualitative research in the European parliament to test
the hypotheses of the chapter. I conclude that centralized candidate selection procedures in-
creases an MEPs congruence with their party’s preferences in parties that hold policy seeking
or vote seeking electoral goals.
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2.0 A THEORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND EUROPEAN
POLITICIANS
In early 2013, Ingrid Antičević Marinović gave a speech at the European Parliament plenary.
At the time, she was one of 12 observers in the Parliament representing Croatia.1 The speech
quickly made waves across social media and the Croatian press for the alleged poor quality of
her English. The Croatian media criticized the speech for its scripted nature and questioned
her competence as a European politician. The speech was viewed as embarrassing Croatia
in the EP and Ms. Antičević Marinović’s decision to speak English instead of Croatian was
perceived as arrogance (Ciglar 2013).2 The media also broadened its criticism to her party,
the ruling party, and questioned the pary’s decision to send her to the EP. As a member
of the SDP, Ms. Antičević Marinović had been chosen by the party leader and then prime
minster, Zoran Milanović, to join 4 others as observers in the EP.3 After the speech, Prime
Minister Milanović publicly addressed the criticism, defending his choice of Ms. Antičević
Marinović and his perceived understanding of her ability to speak English. This happened
nearly simultaneously with the preparations for Croatia’s first European election and when
it was time for Milanović to select new candidates for EP office, Ms. Antičević Marinović
was conspicuously absent from the new electoral list (Dnevnik.hr 2013a).
The example above illustrates three challenges parties face in European elections: who do
we choose for Europe? How do we choose them? How do we treat them? First, the backlash
of the media and the public against Antičević Marinović’s English underscores a requirement
that parties choose candidates for the EP that are perceived to be qualified. Second, the
1Prior to their entry as a full member in June 2013, Croatia only had observer status in the EP.
2Each member state’s native language is an official language of the EU and simultaneous translation is
available in the plenary sessions. It is most common for MEPs to speak their native language.
3SDP-Socijaldemokratska Partija Hrvatske.
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relative power of this party president in choosing the observers and subsequent candidates
is reflected in the personal appeals to him to justify his decision. Finally, the absence of this
observer from the following electoral list is an example of one tool parties have to manage
the behavior of its MEPs. In this case the tool was the removal of an incumbent, but not all
parties have the same tools or even the same goals in these elections. Some parties may be
much better at avoiding situations like the one described above because they are organized
differently, but all parties must be able to select good agents and manage them effectively.
Some do not succeed. Political parties have many different tools available to them to manage
European elections so what explains the variation in the organizational choices they make?
What are the consequences of these choices for policy making and representation?
2.1 NATIONAL PARTIES AND EUROPEAN LEGISLATORS: AN
INTRODUCTION
Many of the strategic choices parties make are dependent on their office, vote, and policy
seeking goals.4 Parties form to win elections and electoral success is necessary for survival,
but parties organize differently given their strategic goals and resources (Tavits 2013). Many
different combinations of goals exist given the different national, electoral experiences of
parties. These combinations and their effects on organization is the starting point for the
theory of presented here. Strom (1990) identified three main models of party behavior: vote
seeking, office seeking, and policy seeking. Vote seeking parties try to simply maximize the
number of votes won in an election, office seeking parties seek to gain votes in order to
maximize their control over political office and power, and policy seeking parties want to
maximize their influence on political outcomes (Downs 1957). While each of these three goals
are interconnected, parties behave in patterned ways to manage the trade-offs between each
goal. When considering their electoral goals, parties choose a mix of behaviors constrained
by their organizational structure (Strom 1990).
There are three important components structuring the relationship between parties and
4These come directly from Strom (1990) and will be discussed in great detail in what follows.
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MEPs: party organization, party electoral goals, and the goals of individual politicians.
Organization is the first important piece of this relationship and varies across parties in both
it’s structure and strength. In examining the relationship between MEPs and their parties, I
look at variation in formal organization for the selection and supervision of MEPs. A party’s
electoral experience can contribute to the choice over strong or weak organization (Tavits
2013). Whether a party organizes more or less formally on the national level determines
the choices parties make for the organization of their European level politicians. With
exception of only a few parties that organized for the sole purpose of contesting European
elections, national parties are organized to contest elections and govern (or seek to govern)
at the national level. Organizational choices made by these parties are the result of the
structure of national legislative, executive, electoral, and party systems. Therefore, electoral
and governing experience at the national level is the greatest predictor of European level
organization and the choice to centralize or decentralize the selection and supervision of
MEPs.
The organization of selection and supervision provides an innovative way to compare
the MEP-national party relationship across member states of the EU. The centralization
(or lack thereof) of the selection of candidates and the supervision of MEPs in office is the
main source of variation in the organizational strategies of parties that allows for this com-
parison. National parties in Europe have many different strategies for selecting candidates
for European elections that vary in their level of centralization and formality. Similarly,
supervision choices vary with the level of involvement party leaders have with the MEPs and
the role of an MEP in party decision making. The consequences of the choices parties make
in organization are reflected in party loyalty and the congruence of MEP actions to party
preferences. For instance, a party that values the seat of an MEP above one in local or na-
tional government will want to place their best politicians at the EP level. In order to ensure
that these politicians run for EP office, they have a large incentive to centralize candidate
selection in order to have control over the nomination process and their electoral list. As a
result, potential candidates in centralized parties must be aware of the party leaders’ power
to exert direct control over their political futures(Hazan and Rahat 2010). Because one must
be selected to run for office, this centralization of power will extend a party’s control over
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its politicians to policy making activities (Riker 1975; Hix 2010).
In March of 2013, both the ruling Croatian socialist party (SDP) and the conservative
party of the opposition (HDZ) needed to build electoral lists to determine the very first class
of Croatian politicians to enter the EP.5 The construction of these lists was largely a balance
between creating lists that were thought to be both electorally successful and provide for
the parties’ broader goals. The SDP made an effort to extend the ideology and policy of the
ruling coalition by picking politicians that had played a major role in Croatian international
politics and provided these candidates with directions and goals for their position once
elected. These goals included mostly reputation building in the short remainder of their
term and the desire to build Croatia’s strategic importance with other members of the EP.6
The HDZ chose their candidates for similar reasons but appeared to be much more focused
on gaining more seats than the SDP as they were interested in discrediting the current
coalition. The HDZ party leadership entered a coalition list which included Ruža Tomašić.
This member of a right-wing political party is often controversial and the move was seen as a
way to shore up votes from some of Croatia’s most conservative voters, even at the expense
of appearing willing to cater to the extreme right. In the end, the tactic proved useful as
Ms. Tomašić won the second most preferential votes of any candidate in the election and
the HDZ won the most seats overall (Dnevnik.hr 2013b). When asked about policy goals in
their first year of office, most of the HDZ candidates (and eventually elected MEPs) simply
mentioned following the European People’s Party, in contrast to the specific goals mentioned
by the SDP. This situation highlights how each party had overlapping behaviors for different
goals, but also used different techniques to guide the action of their members. Each party
also had clearly centralized selection methods that placed the majority of power with party
presidents and also chose members from the upper strata of their parties to serve in the EP.
The example of Venstre in Denmark illustrated in the introduction showed how candidate
selection can be an important tool for a party in achieving its goals. The move to replace
the delegation leader can be interpreted as an attempt to strengthen party unity within
the liberal party. By choosing the party spokeswoman and a well-known party member, it
5HDZ-Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica.
6Since the seventh term of the EP was set to end in June 2014, these MEPs would serve one year before
new elections would take place with the Europe wide election of 2014.
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also appears to be an attempt to encourage a unified voice for the liberals at the EP that
was lacking in the previous term and raise awareness for the election. Venstre also lacked
any formal inclusion of their delegation leader in the party leadership and there were no
formal lines of communication between the MEPs and the national party. One of these
MEPs thought the lack of formal ties could be one of the key reasons they are consistently
blamed for mistakes made in Brussels in the media. By replacing the leading candidate
with the party spokesman, it ensured that a member of the party leadership would lead the
delegation in the next term.7 This example illustrates how MEP supervision and selection
can be, and have been, used as tools for sanction, as well as tools for promoting party goals
at the European level. Candidate selection and supervision, electoral goals, and individual
ambition are the main elements this theory uses to hypothesize about the composition of
the EP and MEP congruence with their national parties.
In order to determine the impact of selection and supervisory choices on European leg-
islative outcomes, the analysis begins with the simple assumption that these choices are a
direct result of the structure of party organization and its electoral and/or policy making
goals. Different organizational structures produce different strategic incentives for party and
individual behavior at the European level and parties and individuals must adapt to the
mult-level incentives and constraints created by the EP. The organization of power within
parties reflects these incentives (Riker 1975). Individual behavior affects the desirability
of different outcomes. I define a party’s preference for individual behavior as policy con-
gruence, or the level to which a MEP’s legislative output matches his/her national party’s
preferences. Conceptualizing the relationship between MEPs and their parties as the result
of variation in organizational choices and electoral goals provides the dissertation’s hypothe-
ses. Centralized parties with nationally ambitious politicians will generate the most policy
congruence between the EP delegation and the national party. The following sections first
outline the European electoral goals of parties, then describe the role of party organization
and individual ambition in determining congruence.
Previous Research has identified the potential effects of party organization on cohe-
7In this particular party, the party spokesman is an official role and is statutorily included in the executive
leadership, Interview 9.17.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.
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sion within the EP. Hix (2004) examines the distinction between Party-centered electoral
systems and Candidate-centered electoral systems, including consideration of candidate se-
lection procedures within the electoral system (emphasis in original). Hix argues the main
determinants of electoral system effects on legislator behavior to be district magnitude, the
electoral systems, and candidate selection rules. He expects parties to have the most power
over individual careers, and thus their behavior, when electoral systems are party-centered;
namely in closed list proportional representation systems where party leaders determine who
serves in legislative institutions. In contrast, candidate-centered electoral systems are those
with open list proportional representation or single transferable vote systems. Here candi-
dates can appeal directly to voters and thus the party leadership has less control over their
careers. Similarly, the more centralized selection procedures within parties, the more control
over legislator behavior. Therefore Hix (2004) expects parties with centralized selection in
closed list proportional representation electoral systems to have the highest level of control
over their legislators and finds evidence in support for this hypothesis in the paper. Hix uses
a decision theoretical model in the EP to test his hypothesis that considers an MEP to be
the agent of two principals. First, the national party controls the future careers of MEPs
and determines their policy goals. Second, the EPG determines access to office within the
EP and the ability of a MEP to reach his/her policy goals. A MEPs voting decision (which
determines party unity and cohesion) is a result of the incentives for voting with, and the cost
incurred by voting against, each principal and the level of existing conflict between the two
party levels. Using voting records, descriptive variables for electoral systems, and candidate
surveys asking how each respondent MEP was selected, Hix is able to test for congruence
under various party and electoral conditions.8 His results show that national parties have
most congruent MEPs in when they are in party centered electoral systems with centralized
candidate selection.
While this work is one of the only studies that explicitly addresses the link between party
organization and legislative behavior in the EP, it has been preceded and followed by a few
other works that incorporate candidate selection in studies of legislative decision making.
8The survey data is taken from Raunio (2000). Hix tells us that this includes 195 MEPs but does not
comment on the number of national parties represented.
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Faas (2003) argues that national parties are able to maintain strong ties to MEPs because of
a high level of centralization and strong monitoring. Also using the data provided by Raunio
(2000), Faas find that MEPs in centralized candidate selection parties are more likley to de-
fect from their European Party Groups, thus concluding that national parties are strong for
these MEPs. Gabel and Scheve (2007) argue that candidate selection methods can be used
to hypothesize about intra-party conflict in European integration as well. In order to use
the centralization of candidate selection as an instrumental variable for testing intra-party
dissent as an independent effect on mass opinions for European integration, they make a
compelling case that candidate selection is a measure of leadership power within parties.
Parties that centrally select candidates will be more representative of leadership views than
parties that mass select candidates. Decentralized selection is more likely to represent ac-
tivists within a party because there is less control over these candidates by the leadership. In
addition, Whitaker (2005) shows how national parties influence committee decision making
and Lindberg, Rasmussen and Warntjen (2008) extend the analysis of candidate selection
beyond the EP and provides an examination of all decision making bodies of the EU. They
conclude that because national parties are also the key selectorate for members of the Council
and the European Commission, they play a large role in determining policy outcomes at the
European level. This dissertation compliments this existing work my expanding the scope
of the empirical study of party cohesion to more parties and across more policy areas. It
also builds on the research by investigating the origins of party organization at the EU level
and how party organizations interacts with short term party electoral goals to encourage or
discourage congruence.
2.2 NATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND PARTY ORGANIZATION
Political parties in EU member states originated to contest elections, influence policy, and
govern at the national level. Party experience and expertise in national politics greatly
influences their organization for EU level politics and their treatment of MEPs. When
examining the organization of parties for EP level politics, I consider the centralization
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of the party with respect to the selection and subsequent supervision of candidates and
legislators. I argue the level of centralization around MEPs is determined by three aspects
of the national party experience: the party’s ideology, the institutional history of the party,
and the national environment in which the party originated and operates. Each one of these
aspects determines the way political parties are organized to select and supervise politicians
at the national level, which greatly influences the way they choose to select and supervise
politicians at the European level.
The way a party organizes is largely determined by the electoral conditions it faces and
the resources it had at its origin. The main distinction between parties that centralize and
those that do not is based on whether they need resources from a mass membership versus a
few wealthy benefactors, businesses, or the state itself. Parties relying on mass membership
for funding will remain decentralized while those that are state financed or control resources
from a few elites will not. Without the need to gather funding from many different sources,
parties will not see it beneficial to maintain large, decentralized membership organizations.
They will instead centralize power and keep the control within the elite leadership of the
party (van Biezen 2003). Resources available to parties at origination are also dependent on
the ideology and societal sector the party represents. For example, center right parties rely
more on business for resources while center left parties rely more on rural or low income voters
for resources (Enyedi and Linek 2008). Thus center left parties are more likely to maintain
large decentralized party organizations in order to reach and engage their electorate (Tavits
2013). Large, decentralized organizations are also expected when parties face tough barriers
to entry in their national electoral systems. If the party is decentralized it can reach many
more individuals to gain support than if it is centralized around only a small elite. These
parties generally do not have the reputation or the resources that the main governing and
opposition parties have and thus need to work on a more grassroots level to build the party
(Tavits 2013). Each of these factors influence the initial scope and size of party organization
at the national level. Because these institutions are structured under specific circumstances
to work strategically in a specific electoral environment, it is likely that party organization
will not be altered for European elections if it is working well on the national level. Given
the second order nature of European elections, I expect the centralization (or lack thereof)
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of party organization at the EP level to closely resemble that of the national level.
2.3 THE GOALS OF PARTIES AND POLITICIANS IN EUROPE
The electoral goals of parties dictate certain party behaviors and require certain tradeoffs
among the priorities and the resources of parties (Strom and Muller 1999). In order to
measure and empirically account for the possible goals of each party contesting a European
election, a framework that bridges the literature on party goals and behavior from national
elections to European elections is necessary. Because important differences exist between
national and European elections, each of these goals will manifest themselves differently on
the European level. The spoils of an election for the EP are quite different from those for
national office and party goals must be redefined to account for the unique nature of the
EP and its parliamentarians. In this section, I introduce each type of electoral goal and its
application to European elections and then introduce the range of possible party types to
differentiate parties by the goals they may pursue.
2.3.1 Office Seeking
Office seeking parties maximize the number of politicians they can place in important offices
in order to be able to govern. Governing or being part of a governing coalition brings concrete
benefits to parties and politicians. The goal of an office seeking party is traditionally that
of gaining executive power because once a party enters a governing coalition, it is able to
place its members in influential cabinet positions and enjoy the rewards of office. As a result,
most studies of the electoral strategies of parties and coalition politics have been restricted
to the pursuit of legislative office in order to enter executive politics (Riker 1962; Austen-
Smith and Banks 1988; Laver and Schofield 1990; Laver and Shepsle 1996). These rewards
include personal benefits to those holding office (cabinet positions) as well as power over
those positions in which these politicians hold (cabinet portfolios)(see Laver and Schofield
(1990) and Riker (1962)). In order to maintain the recruitment of loyal and experienced
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party members to serve, the party must offer incentives to individuals who contribute labor
and often these incentives are the prestige, power, and sometimes lucrative salaries that
governing ministers enjoy (Norris 1997a). Thus party leadership plays an important role in
determining the value of office for the party’s goals. Because office provides many valuable
positions to the party, the leadership can use these positions to reward themselves and loyal
party members (Strom and Muller 1999). Entry into the European legislature lacks this
governing capability since no executive body is formed from the EP. National parties enter
the EU executive by gaining governing status at the national level. The institutional function
and structure of the EP thus creates a new situational regime that must be addressed to
understand if, and when, parties contesting EP elections may be office seeking.
There are two key features of the institutional framework of the EP that make the pursuit
of office, as it is currently understood, relatively unlikely in European elections. First, the
lack of opportunity to build a governing coalition or executive body means that European
governing positions for national parties cannot be reached through winning legislative seats in
the EP. The executive body of the EU, the European Commission, consists of commissioners
that are appointed by member state governments and the ministers that meet in the Council
of Ministers are those currently serving in national government cabinets. Therefore, gaining
legislative office in the EP is not the way to access the benefits at the European level that
are usually associated with executive office. In addition, the candidates for the president
of the Commission are formally proposed by the European Council and then elected by the
EP (but not from the MEPs). The EP, therefore, has little power beyond the approval or
denial of a Council nominee to determine the composition of the executive bodies of the EU.
Seeking office in order to gain executive power is therefore not a feasible goal in EP elections.
In addition to gaining lucrative cabinet positions, gaining office can also mean partici-
pating in majority legislative coalitions (Strom 1990). One of the benefits of a legislative
majority, beyond building executive power, is agenda control. Control of the legislative
agenda often implies that parties can push the legislative docket closer to their preferred
areas of policy and keep those areas which they do not wish to participate off the legislative
floor (Cox and McCubbins 1993). This provides benefits in terms of future office seeking
goals as parties that perform well in the legislature are better poised to perform well in the
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next election (Strom and Muller 1999). However, the EP does not have agenda power in
the current institutional arrangement granted by the Lisbon Treaty (nor did it have this
power in any previous treaty) and a party’s ability to create its own legislative majority is
non-existent. Since the legislature consist of 750+ legislators and the largest national dele-
gation is Germany with 99 MEPs, no one party, even if it takes all of the EP seats available
to its country, in any given election, can make a legislative majority. While the EPGs do
create large groups of MEPs that build legislative coalitions together, no rational party will
prioritize office seeking to enter the majority because they have no control over the parties,
voters, or elections in other member states.
Given that parties cannot gain executive office or majorities on their own, there are only a
few conditions under which office seeking parties may exist in European elections. Returning
to the discussion of the benefits of office, one concrete benefit of office holding is allowing
parties to reward party activists and leaders with government positions. Therefore office
seeking goals may be part of a party’s strategy to recruit and maintain valuable political
capital because it offers private benefits to the party’s members (Norris 1997b). The ability
of the party to provide these private benefits to individuals allows parties to maintain a
professional core of members that is ready to do its bidding and support its governmental
and electoral goals (Clark and Wilson 1961; Wilson 1962; Strom and Muller 1999). Without
such incentives for individuals, parties would experience great difficulties in sustaining willing
labor to maintain its organization and work for its electoral success. When considering
the party goals of national parties in the EP, this presents a dilemma. On one hand, the
empirical difficulty of establishing the goals of parties in any given real election has led
scholars to assume that office seeking goals are purely those of seeking executive office (Strom
and Muller 1999). If we restrict our theoretical understanding and analysis to this goal
alone, there cannot ever be an office seeking party contesting European elections. Under
no circumstances would a party pursue a pure office seeking strategy defined as accessing
executive power because it simply is not possible. However, if by refining our definition
of office seeking to include access to legislative positions, there are conditions under which
parties may hold office seeking goals.
Office seeking parties in European elections are those with limited national opportunities,
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either having just lost an election or a limited history of national representation. The United
Kingdom’s Independence Party, for example, had nine members in the EP in the seventh
term, but had failed to gain any seats in Westminster prior to the 2009 European election.
Thus, they should view EP office as a priority, simply as an opportunity to reward a few of
their members with office. Parties like this, that have little to no history of representation
in their national legislature, or new or small parties that cannot pass national electoral
thresholds, will seek office in European elections. Parties also seek European office when
denied access to national legislative institutions. These conditions are likely to occur when
EP elections follow national parliamentary elections and a party has experienced a significant
loss in votes, and subsequently, seat share. This means several of its best members have lost
their legislative and government positions. For example, when speaking about seeking re-
election in 2014, a current German liberal MEP expressed a muted concern that he may
not have a choice if his party performed poorly in the upcoming German federal election.
If his party were to lose a significant number of seats in the Bundestag, it was implied that
an ousted Bundestag member may be nominated in his place.9 His concern proved to be
well deserved given the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) experienced their worst electoral
showing since they entered the Bundestag in 1949. In September of 2013, the party failed to
reach the 5% threshold for Bundestag representation and subsequently, 93 members of the
chamber lost their seats (FinancialTimes 2013).
On one hand, an national loss may encourage party leaders to view EP office as a holding
ground for these politicians until the next national election allows them to regain their
national office, much like regional or municipal elections may function. Depending on the
length of time between the last national election and the EP elections, many politicians may
be looking for a home to tide them over for the interim governing period. On the other
hand, the party may also wish to punish their “unelectable" politicians and place new, fresh
faces in the European campaign. Given that EP elections are generally low stakes elections,
they could be an opportunity to refresh the party image while preparing for another national
election. Therefore, some parties may use the EP elections as a way to place their newest,
but rising, politicians in office until the next national election comes along.
9Interview 9.19.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.
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2.3.2 Vote Seeking
Vote seeking parties use their organization and policy programs for the sole purpose of
winning votes and winning more votes than any other party (Downs 1957). It is not generally
believed to be a goal that parties will singularly hold (Strom 1990). Because vote seeking
parties are ultimately seeking to win the majority of seats available in their district, it is
hard to distinguish the goal of vote seeking from office and policy goals. Ultimately the
goal of any politician is to win an election or be reelected because neither of the other
goals can be accomplished without first winning votes (Mayhew 1974). This has led many
scholars to consider vote seeking a necessary strategy for either of the other electoral goals
(office or policy seeking) instead of considering what observable behaviors exist when parties
deploy this strategy (Strom 1990). This is intuitive in national elections. Parties that are
pure vote seekers likely do not exist, but we can identify vote seeking behavior in modern
political parties in concert with other goals. For example, the emergence of the catch-
all parties in post-war Europe is one example of vote and office seeking strategies. These
big parties had broad policy agendas that appealed to the greatest number of voters in
order to maximize electoral success. Catch-all parties professionalized their organizations
and tamed their ideological views to become more inclusive and attract a large portion
of the electorate (Kirchheimer 1966; Panebianco 1988; Krouwel 2012). Parties originally
organized to deal with societal, ideological, and environmental concerns began to evolve
into organizations focused on the goal of survival. Electoral candidates were often selected
because of professional experience and their ability to win an election (Ware 1996).
By addressing the difference between first order and second order elections that exists
between national and European elections, we can determine if conditions exist to observe
vote seeking behavior in European elections. National elections in Europe are first order
elections because they are won and lost on national affairs and policy. European elections
are contested by national political parties in the shadow of domestic level concerns and
strategies are formulated accordingly (Reif and Schmitt 1980). Domestic politics are the
single biggest predictor of European electoral outcomes, hence scholars continual reference
to its second-order nature (van der Brug et al. 2007; Norris and Reif 1997; Reif and Schmitt
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1980).10 In light of this, it is feasible to consider the existence of purely vote seeking parties
if European elections are viewed as referendums on governing coalitions rather than a choice
for Europe on policy. Domestic constituencies still view European elections as second-order,
choosing to punish or reward domestic parties for their current behavior instead of voicing
their preferences for Europe. These elections are used to protest the current government
and minor parties often gain protest votes from otherwise mainstream voters (Norris and
Reif 1997). Therefore, large parties or coalitions, that are governing or serving as the main
opposition, may care more about winning votes than about pushing policy or placing its
members in the EP. A ruling party wants to win an election to maintain its status as the
preferred party of the public. Opposition parties wish to maximize votes in order to discredit
current ruling coalitions. A victory achieved by a wide margin can be ammunition for the
opposition to call for new national elections or votes of confidence.
Contributing to this second order effect is the fact that major European parties have
rarely needed to compete on European issues, instead they can gain broad support for their
party in the elections by focusing on general domestic issues (van der Brug and van der Eijk
2007b). Issue debates in European elections have rarely revolved around integration or its
consequences because it has rarely been strategic for parties to raise these issues (van der
Eijk and Franklin 2004). Regardless of the electoral goals of a party, keeping European
integration out of public debate may be advantageous for parties if this debate highlights
views that are unfavorable in the public’s eye or to its future potential coalition partners. It
also may be an issue that is divisive for a party and therefore would only create problems
if candidates in parties had to discuss these issues publicly (Steenbergen and Scott 2004).
Therefore vote seeking parties avoid drawing attention to European issues all together and
instead use their national presence to garner support.
The European election in Croatia in April 2013 is a prime example of this phenomenon.
Throughout the campaign, analysts of both party’s campaign efforts continually highlighted
the internal political nature of the debates, arguing that neither side participated in a discus-
sion on the real “European" issues. Instead, each party leader used the elections for domestic
10A large literature exists addressing the second order nature of European elections. For a comprehensive
analysis of this phenomenon see (Hix and Marsh 2011; Marks and Steenberen 2004; van der Brug and van der
Eijk 2007a).
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gains. At the time the opposition, HDZ, was continually leading a media campaign against
the ruling coalition on all aspects of government. The media also alleged the SPD leader was
using various events to promote candidates for the local elections (Moskaljov 2013). In this
example, both parties have vote seeking goals. The ruling party SPD wants to win the most
votes to support their ruling coalition and HDZ wants to win the most votes to legitimize
their attacks on the ruling government. Vote seeking parties are exactly these two kinds;
ruling and opposition that specifically want to maximize votes in the second-order election.
2.3.3 Policy Seeking
Parties that seek, and are successful in satisfying, policy goals are able to change public
policy so that it is congruent with their preferred policy positions (Strom and Muller 1999).
In national electoral politics, policy seeking is conceptualized as a goal inherent in the leg-
islative or executive coalition formation process and is thus inseparably tied to the pursuit
of office. A party simply cannot influence policy until it has gained office, and in most cases,
has entered into the government and gained hold of cabinet portfolios (Budge and Laver
1986). Thus, policy seeking has most often been treated as a complement to office seeking
and characterized by behavior where parties seek ministerial positions with an appropriate
coalition partner (Strom and Muller 1999). Party leaders in parliamentary systems know
that they must work together in order to pursue policy and are willing to join coalitions for
both the office and policy benefits these coalitions bring. In order to do this, leaders think
about the potential coalitions that can be made in any give system and pursue the strategy
that best suits their goals. Policy pursuit leads parties and their leaders to form coalitions
with partners that are ideologically similar to them. This type of coalition formation should
reduce the ideological distance between a party’s preferred positions and those that they
are likely to obtain given the constraints of the legislature and government (Axelrod 1970;
Budge and Laver 1986; Strom and Muller 1999).
Identifying the pursuit of policy through European elections also provides a stark con-
trast from domestic elections. The structure of policy competition in Europe, the nature
of policy making, and the structure of competition within the EP and between the EP and
30
the Council of Ministers, all influence the way parties are able to pursue policy goals in
the EU institutions. First, the competitive policy space in Europe is two-dimensional. On
one dimension, policy preferences and concerns follow the traditional left-right, greater vs.
less regulation dimension that contains the majority of competition over European issues.
The second dimension represents competition over “new politics," which include areas like
environmental concerns, cultural policy, etc. (Hooghe and Marks 2002). This means that
when contesting European elections, national parties should be able to draw a great deal of
their campaign and policy pursuits from the concurrently pursued goals of domestic politics.
Given the legislative structure of the EU (described above) and the dimensionality of EU
politics, most policy preferences are already pursued at the national level. Competition at
the EU level may be seen by national parties as more of a nuisance than an advantage when
their resources are already being used to pursue policy elsewhere.
In addition, policy areas related to European integration (i.e. market integration, cohe-
sion, and enlargement) do not present large ideological differences across major parties in
most European states (Hooghe and Marks 2002). This means that even in elections, the
choice between pursuing office at the expense of ones ideological goals is mitigated by the
centrist nature of competition. Parties that are likely to view European Elections as an
opportunity to pursue policy are likely to be those on the extremes of the first dimension,
which are typically parties that are Eurosceptic, highly nationalist, or opposed to market
capitalism (or communist) (Hooghe and Marks 2002). Policy seeking parties can also be
those more active in pursuing policies that fall on the second dimension of “new politics,"
which can be ordered as a dimension stemming from green/alternative/liberal ideology to
traditional/authoritarian/nationalist ideology (Hooghe and Marks 2002).
In addition to policy competition, the structure of EU policy making also changes tra-
ditional strategies of policy pursuit. The previous section, which described the structure
of executive authority in the EU, also touched on agenda control in the legislature. Since
the EP lacks this type of authority, pursuing specific policies or attempting to avoid the
implementation of others is largely out of the control of MEPs. While the EP can ask the
Commission to submit certain types of legislation, the EU has many different institutions
seeking to define its political and economic priorities. While the EP is still important in
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the passage of policy because it must write and approve legislation, it is likely parties do
not see this as the most efficient track through which to pursue their policy goals. Instead,
parties will opt to use their power in national portfolios and heads of state to set the agenda
in concert with other European leaders. National parties are also able to use their national
legislatures to define European policy within their national borders. While EP regulations
passed by the EP and the Council of Ministers must be implemented according to the proto-
col set forth in the legislation, EP directives are transposed by national legislatures. Thus,
parties also have the outside option of defining exactly how policy will take shape within
their own states without needing to consult their MEPs. However, despite all of the alterna-
tive paths to policy influence available to domestic parties, MEPs can still play an important
role through the co-decision procedure.
Every new treaty passed by EU member states has increased the power of the EP through
the use of the co-decision procedure. The co-decision procedure requires that legislation pass
both the council of ministers and the EP in order to be written into law. So while the EP
may not be able to control its own agenda or the implementation of all legislation, the
institution is still important to legislative decision making. Domestic parties seeking to
pursue policy at the European level must consider how the EP and its members can work to
its advantage or disadvantage in the co-decision process. In order for any party or group to
get its prerogatives through the legislative process (or keep others from being successful), a
legislative coalition must be built across the council and the EP that supports its position.
In order to do so, politicians and parties must have the ability to connect to MEPs across
many member states and other parties to create legislative majorities in both institutions.
In the EP, these majorities are often created through the EPGs. Parties that have strong
preferences for policy made at the European level will value the relationship with these party
groups more than parties that do not. Therefore they will seek candidates that are able to
work within these groups and have the capacity to work with other international politicians.
In contrast to vote seeking, policy seeking parties view the salience of European elections
for how they relate to their goals for EU policy. Parties with very strong preferences for
European policy (either pro or anti-integration) or those that are single issue parties, are
likely to view European elections as an opportunity to pursue policy at yet another level.
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Parties that are more active in pursuing policies that fall on the European level also view
European elections as an opportunity to pursue policy. That is, these parties hold strong
views on integration and seek to impact the evolution of the EU at the EP level. For instance,
environmental policy at the European level is more progressive than it is in member states.
Therefore, green parties look toward the EP with their policy goals because it is the most
appropriate level for which to pursue those policies. Also, parties that seek to represent
substantive issues that are salient in their constituency may also seek policy at the EP level
if these issues are competences of the EU. MEPs can easily identify examples of policy areas
that are most effectively handled at the EP level. It should not be surprising that most of
these areas deal with the single market, the environment, or agriculture. For example, a
MEP from a social democratic party representing a coastal region explained that the fishing
industry was very important to the people of her constituency and her party. She reported
that this issue was more European (as opposed to national) because fisheries policy is a
regional issue and requires cooperation across many member states. She feels this issue
is better represented at the EP level because the EP has more control over the issue and
therefore more power.11 Policy seeking parties are parties like this that have an electorate
where EU policy and elections are salient.
Parties competing in any elections will have multiple overlapping goals and European
Elections are no different. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the behaviors associated with the
goals of office, vote, and policy seeking strategies occur simultaneously. This provides seven
different combinations of electoral parties: office seeking, vote seeking, policy seeking, office-
policy seeking, office-vote seeking, policy-vote seeking, and office-policy-vote seeking. Each
of these types of parties exhibit different types of behavior and have different empirical
indicators of their goals. These indicators are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
11Interview 6.18.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.
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Figure 1: Electoral Goals
2.4 SELECTION AND SUPERVISION IN THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT
The selection and supervision methods used by parties determine candidate behavior once
elected. Selection choices, who parties choose to put on candidate lists, are the result of a
party’s office, vote or policy seeking goals. Most parties seek to win seats in an election and
must decide which members of their parties to put in which seat. They may also have policy
goals that they would like to see implemented by their office holders. Finally, to achieve
either one of these goals, or any other instrumental goals they may hold, they need votes.
Each of these goals requires parties to consider the type of candidate to place on a list given
their beliefs about the expected behavior of these individuals in office and the preferences of
voters. These goals define the recruitment strategies of parties and recruitment and selection
strategies regulate what types of people and agents will represent a party in office. Once
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in office, these agents are supervised by their parties. The type of supervision parties use
determines what style of representation these politicians supply.
The internal decision making structures of political parties hold many implications for
party unity and the relationship between party members and leaders (Best and Cotta 2005;
Hazan and Rahat 2006; Öhman 2002). Different intra-party institutional structures create
different incentives and pose different constraints on elected politicians and members. When
parties are highly centralized, elections and behavior are largely party centered. When parties
are highly decentralized, elections and behavior are largely candidate centered (Hazan and
Rahat 2006). Party members serving in office are often motivated by career aspirations and
are thus more likely to promote the interests of those that have the most power over them.
If the party is party-centered, they are more likely to adhere to the party line to maintain
favor with party leadership. If the party is candidate centered, then politicians cater more
to the desires of the constituency that is most clearly linked with their reelection. The
difference in the incentives to cater to one group or the other create differences in party
unity in legislatures (Depauw and Martin 2009). Thus the cohesion of a party’s legislative
group is directly dependent on the selection methods a party uses. Empirical work has
found that parliamentary party groups, where candidates were selected trough centralized
party leadership, tend to make decisions based on party discipline. In contrast, those in
groups selected through more decentralized, and inclusive groups, tend to make decisions
through deliberative processes producing more variance in outcomes with respect to party
unity (Cordero and Coller 2015). Variance in party unity is also greater when legislators
are faced with competing principles (Carey 2007). Examples of competing principals include
parliamentary leaders vs. presidents, party leadership vs, constituents, or party delegations
across different levels of government (i.e. National and EU). Parties that centralize control
of candidates can control the composition of their parliamentary party and better enforce
unity (Sieberer 2006).
The incentives and the internal structures of parties also cause variation in citizen control
of, and access to, political parties. The amount of power held by party leaders directly effects
the ability of citizens to control their elected officials. When parties are centralized, they tend
to reflect the interest of national level politics rather than regional or local politics (Narud,
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Pedersen and Valen 2002). Centralization also influences access to parties because the level
of democracy within a party influences party membership participation levels (Pennings and
Hazan 2001). Decentralizing party decision making procedures increases the number of party
members participating in the process of selecting representatives and party leaders. With
more people participating in these processes, parties experience higher levels of volatility
among candidates and leadership. Party elites are less able to control who gets elected
or who is in charge (Hopkin 2001; LeDuc 2001). Cenralization can even effect a party
members’ willingness to participation in elections, albeit in an unexpected way. Precisely
because the decentralization of candidate selection procedures increases the number of party
members participating in decision making, it can lead to factionalization within parties and
greater intra-party conflict (Katz 2001). When this occurs, the presence of conflict can
actually discourage participation in campaigns. When members are empowered to control
the selection process, it can lead to intra-party divisions that discourage campaign support
overall (Kernell 2015).
Many other scholars have also examined centralization or decentralization within a party
organization with respect to internal democratization, leadership control, and candidate se-
lection (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Hazan and Rahat 2010; Ramney 1981; Scarrow, Webb
and Farrell 2000). Overall there is evidence that parties are trending toward decentraliza-
tion. Between 1960 and 1990, parties in Western Europe moved toward more decentralized
procedures for selection processes. However these changes have been modest and slow mov-
ing, as to not effect the stability of parties (Bille 2001; Mair 2013). However, this has not
meant that party membership is increasing. In contrast, party membership has been declin-
ing over the last few decades and parties have been unable to recruit many new members.
This means party memberships are stagnating and are aging, reflecting a smaller subset of
the population and making if difficult for parties to reach a large portion of the population.
They also have increasing difficulties finding quality candidates to run in local and regional
elections and no longer have large populations to supply them with resources (Scarrow and
Gezgor 2010). Hence, the trend toward decentralization is one way parties are attempting
to reach out the broader population but it is unclear if it is working. Complementing this
research, Field (2013) found that this decentralization is more likely to occur in institution-
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alized democracies like those of Western Europe which are experiencing this type of decline.
Parties in Eastern Europe that are younger and more volatile are less likely to decentralize. If
parties are trending toward decentralization and decentralized parties experience less party
unity, are parties becoming less unified over time? The literature presented above would
suggest this, but some scholars argue that the effects of decentralization are not as clear cut
as those of centralization.
The consensus in the literature is that centralization of party power entails greater party
control of legislators and candidates. In contrast, decentralization increases competition
among candidates and opens the party up to many lower level constituency or non-party
interests (Hazan and Rahat 2010). Party candidates elected at the local level cater more to
local interests. This encourages them to behave independently and be more individualistic.
This independence can sometime lead to a lapse in party unity (Tavits 2009). The organiza-
tion of a parties power structure therefore implies trade-offs with respect to representation.
More inclusive organization leads to the representation of greater number of interests, but
at the expense of party unity. More exclusive organization encourages more party unity.
Hence the effects of decentralization with respect to intra-party democracy seems clear, but
not all scholars agree that this a straightforward relationship. Increasing the role of party
members at the lowest level may at first seem as a clear democratizing step, but it does not
always translate into empowering the party base to make important decisions. Many lower
level party groups or non party interests may be representing their own interests through
participation in party decision making, but it is also possible that they are simply cued by
party elites. Thus increasing access to decision making simply increases the access points for
party leadership influence. In essence, allowing party leaders to control the party base and
therefore bypass any mid-level competition they may face (Katz 2001).
In addition, even if parties are trying to create greater intra-party democracy, it is not
clear that more party members will actually choose to participate in the process. Evidence
exists of participation inertia, party members that have previously participated in internal
party elections will continue to do so, but those that have not are not likely to begin doing
so (Wauters 2010). In fact, one study showed that such expansion in Germany proved
ineffective in either increasing participation in elections or increasing membership. This
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prompted the scholar to conclude that while changes to institutional rules can be rather
effective in excluding or decreasing participation, it is not sufficient to increase inclusion
or participation (Scarrow 1999). Parties have tried to increase their draw for membership
but the structure of state institutions and tax payer funded parties have not created strong
enough incentives to push for more public participation. Parties simply don’t need the
resources of the public enough to truly pursue full participation (Whiteley 2011).
Building on the work of Gallagher and Marsh (1988), Hazan and Rahat (2010) also offer
an extensive discussion of the effects of party organization on political representation and
policy making. Hazan and Rahat focus on candidate selection as an important determinant
of the quality of democracy. They offer both a complex discussion of the categorization of
candidate selection within parties and a discussion of its potential consequences for represen-
tation, competitiveness, and responsiveness. The book underscores the importance of party
organization as a political influence but, like the literature presented above, they conclude
that the the immediate effect of centralization vs. decentralization or inclusive vs. exclusive
party structures is far from clear. Trade-offs among democratic norms are inherent in the
choices party make over organization. It is these trade-offs that this dissertation considers in
developing testable hypotheses about the selection and supervision of MEPs within national
political parties.
2.4.1 Selection
Electoral goals determine the demand for candidate types that exists within a party and
the selection method determines how these candidates are chosen within the party. From
the discussion above, parties that value European elections are going to demand a range of
candidate types depending on their electoral goals. Some parties may simply want to win
seats to reward loyal party activists for their service and choose veterans of the national
party or newcomers. Others may value the policy benefits of a seat in the EP and seek to
choose candidates with proven legislative skills or those well versed in European politics,
like incumbents. In either situation, selection serves as a way for parties to reward and
sanction their members because the party has control over a politician’s career and their
38
likelihood of being elected. In turn, politicians choose to behave in a way the party finds
acceptable in order to further their personal career goals. Incentives created through the
selection mechanism for EP elections encourages or discourages certain behaviors because
potential candidates almost always need some form of party support to run in an election
(Carey 2007; Tavits 2013). This support may be in resource only, as is the case in many
elections in the United Sates where parties provide electoral campaign support but do not
initially choose candidates, or it may be as total as requiring a nomination (and a good
position) on a party’s list. This is most common in closed list proportional electoral systems
like national elections in Bulgaria, Poland, and Portugal for example. Once the support of
the party has been received, the candidate is ensured at least a nominal amount of the vote
from the party’s strongest supporters and parties often work tirelessly in elections regardless
of their electoral goals.
When considering their office seeking goals, parties consider the number and stature
of all offices available for the party to contest. The size of the party and the number of
seats available to its members determines the number of opportunities parties have to offer
electoral benefits to party members (Ware 1996). Each member state in the EU has a
different configuration of local, regional, and national legislative institutions to which they
can nominate candidates. The number of elected offices available in each state depends on the
nature of the national legislature (bicameral or unicameral), a federal vs. unitary structure of
government, the frequency of elections, and legislative turnover (Norris 1997b). The number
of EP seats open to each member state varies in the EU and the structure of each national
electoral system determines any potential barriers to entry (electoral thresholds, number of
constituencies, etc.). In the 2014 European election, the number of seats available to any
member state ranged from 99 (Germany) to six (Estonia, Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta).12
In most countries, the number of willing and qualified candidates wishing to hold elected
office outnumbers the number of offices that can be held (Ware 1979). The relationship
between those that are chosen for election and the party is one of mutual benefit, that
reinforces certain behavioral commitments on both sides. Parties provide electoral benefits
12Due to changes included in the Lisbon Treaty, Germany will lose 3 seats in this election and the following
countries lose one: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,
Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, and Romania.
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to legislators and legislators provide policy benefits to parties. The more benefits a party
can offer or withhold, the more loyal the politician.
The ability of party leadership to control party benefits is imperative for enforcing dis-
cipline and encouraging unity in policy making. One of the most effective ways to control
these benefits is through the selection of candidates. Hazan and Rahat (2010) argue the level
of democracy within a party, mostly considered through candidate selection procedures, is
a key variable in determining party unity with implications for, “the fundamental nature of
modern democratic politics and governance” (10). Candidate selection determines the the
composition of legislatures, the government, and the opposition. Reflecting both the char-
acter of a party and its internal power hierarchy, candidate selection is a tool parties use to
determine both the type of legislator that serves them in parliament and their behavior in of-
fice. Centralization reduces intra-party competition and increases legislative responsiveness
to the central party needs and interests (Hazan and Rahat 2010). The level of centraliza-
tion of power in this process and the inclusiveness of party members provides the best way
to compare selection mechanism across parties (Hazan and Rahat 2010). Candidates are
usually chosen through a process whose structure lies somewhere between completely decen-
tralized, mass membership selection to completely centralized with all decisions being made
within the party leadership or by the party leader (Ware 1996). In addition, the selection
of candidates also requires parties to make choices over who can become candidates (Hazan
and Rahat 2010). Hence selection procedures can be categorized by both the selectors that
choose candidates and the rules that include or exclude possible contenders.
Hazan and Rahat (2010) offer an extensive categorization of selection procedures that in-
cludes many levels. First, variation exists among parties with respect to the rules put in place
to define the pool of potential candidates. Some parties place some restrictions on contenders
for candidacy such as requirements for age, party membership or party membership length,
monetary commitments, or membership in special groups (quotas, etc.). Some parties treat
incumbents like any other potential contender but others have preferential treatment for
their renomination. However a party chooses to restrict the pool of potential candidates, the
rules can be placed on a spectrum of most inclusive–anyone can be a party candidate, even
non-members–to most exclusive–candidates must fulfill a variety or strict requirements. Lax
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requirements lead to more variation among electoral lists where strict requirements create
more cohesive lists. These requirements create different incentives for the behavior of party
members, both those elected and those desiring to be, that interact with selection procedures
to produce different expectations of party unity (Hazan and Rahat 2010).
Hazan and Rahat (2010) compare selection procedures in terms of the inclusiveness and
exclusiveness of selectorate. The selectorate is the group of party members or leaders that
are chiefly responsible for choosing electoral candidates (Borchert 2011; Schlesinger 1966).
Moving from most inclusive to most exclusive, Hazan and Rahat categorize selectorates
that include voters (for instance, open primary elections) as the most inclusive followed by
those that include only party members (closed primaries), those that include party delegates,
then those restricted to party elites. Finally those involving only the leader of a party are
the most exclusive. Selectorates may vary across the level of constituency they encompass.
For instance, a party may utilize an elite party leadership selection mechanism but select
candidates at the sub-national constituency level (decentralized), therefore the selectorate is
exclusive, but the leadership in control is the sub-national, decentralized leadership. Also,
candidates may face more than one selectorate. For instance, they may need to meet the
approval of party leadership to become a potential candidate but then be subjected to a vote
by party members to make an electoral list. Therefore selection often occurs as a multi-stage
process.
It is the relationship between the inclusiveness of a selectorate and the responsiveness
of politicians discussed by Hazan and Rahat (2010) that is of paramount interest here.
The authors consider responsiveness to be akin to accountability and to be a measure of
the relationship between candidates and the various influences they encounter in political
life. Candidate selection methods, it is argued, produce variation in the selectorate that
directly impacts the ability of party leadership to enforce discipline. The authors identify
two conflicting approaches to the relationship. On one hand, the the relationship between
the inclusiveness of candidate selection and responsiveness is thought to be linear. The more
inclusive the selectorate, the more responsive candidates are to multiple sources of influence–
party leaders, party members, individuals in their constituencies and other non-party actors.
The more exclusive the selectorate, the more candidates are only responsive to party leaders
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(or those that make up the small, exclusive selectorate). Politicians wish to get elected or
reelected, so when facing exclusive selectorates they cater to the small group that controls
their fate and party unity increases (Bowler 2000). If they must cater to many diverse
interests for reelection, then party unity will suffer (Tavits 2009).
A competing explanation argues that while increased inclusiveness may be a necessary
condition for decreased party unity, is not sufficient. Decentralization of party decision
making can be used as a tool for cartel parties to buffer the leadership against the pressures
of mid-level activism (Carty 2004; Mair 1997). This views argues that empowerment of the
party base or membership actually serves party leadership because this selectorate will take
cues from party leaders and reinforce their dominance. In this case, decentralization and
the increased inclusiveness of the seletorate can actually exclude influence from ideologically
divisive factions within the party and hence bolster unity (Hazan and Rahat 2010). In
the end, both approaches highlight the impact of party leadership power on unity. If party
leaders control selection, either by restricting the selectorate to themselves or controlling their
membership, they can enforce party unity. When party leaders control selection, legislators
are more unified (Benedetto and Hix 2007; Crisp et al. 2004; Hix 2004; Sieberer 2006)
Given the arguments of the literature above, if candidate selection and list placement
are the privilege of elite leadership then we are more likely to see candidates selected that
represent the interests of the elite and thus are more accountable to them. In contrast, when
candidate selection is left to mass membership (like the primaries of U.S. parties), we are
more likely to see personalistic candidates that appeal to a much broader base or special
interests than simply the party elite (Bowler 2000; Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Hazan and
Rahat 2010; Ware 1979). Parties with centralized control are better able to choose candidates
that will behave loyally in the EP, but do so at the expense of voters who feel less connected
to the electoral list. Decentralized parties are able to appeal to wider audience but lose some
control over how their elected officials behave.
In most cases, with so few seats open to each party in the EP election and perhaps
only slightly more available in national office, patterns have emerged to explain how parties
allocate their personnel resources to the European office. I expect office seeking parties to
nominate those that have recently been displaced by a national election and new politicians
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to the EP list in order to maintain or provide office benefits to loyal members. I expect
vote seeking parties to place national politicians or well known figures on electoral lists in
order to increase their vote share. Finally, I expect policy seeking parties to be interested in
candidates with either expertise in “European" policy or those that already have experience
(incumbents). The electoral goals of the party will determine what type of candidate a
party wishes to place on its list and increasing control over the selection process increases
the probability that each party will select the “right" candidate. While formal hypotheses will
be stated in the empirical chapters, the expectation is that MEPs selected under centralized
organizational structures and with national ambition will be the most congruent with their
parties.
2.4.2 Supervision
Supervision of EP delegations by their national party leaders is costly, but so is disunity. It
damages both the delegation in parliament and the face of the party in the electorate (Kam
2009). The number one cited cause for disunity among EP delegations and incongruity with
their national parties was the lack of information exchange and understanding between levels
of government.13 The organization of leadership and the requirements for communication
are some of the most important tools parties have to increase MEP congruence with their
policy preferences.
The tools available to national parties to supervise and constrain their European politi-
cians are similar to those used in national parliaments but become more complicated at the
European level. Here, politics are often much more technical and it is impossible for national
politicians to keep up with the nuanced nature of the legislation. In addition to a lack of
technical knowledge and information, national politicians often do not know how the the
legislative process of the EP works.14 In addition to difficulties with technical information,
legislating at the EP level often requires a different kind of political skill and strategy. MEPs
at the EP must be better at working in coalitions and reaching across party and national
13Nearly every MEP I interviewed mentioned the lack of information exchange and its problems when
asked about the nature of communication between themselves and their national party.
14Once again, this was a common thread through all interviews at the EP.
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lines.15 Also, politics often take place on different cleavages than in national parliaments,
especially if something is in the national interest and will garner support from all national
MEPs. Sometimes MEPs even deliberately avoid communicating with the national party al-
together if they know it will cause problems and disagreement.16 For instance, Tonino Picula
and Davor Ivo Stier were both heavily criticized by their parties for intense cooperation on the
EP’s work in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Krasnec 2014).17 With Picula representing the SDP
and Stier the HDZ, these two politicians would never cross party lines in national politics.
The opposition between the two parties and their leaders, Zoran Milanovič and Tomislav
Karamarko, respectively, remains healthy. So much so that this cooperation is thought to
have cost Picula the leading spot on the 2014 SDP European electoral list (Dalje.com 2014).
In the EP, each party will have a different way of managing their communicative rela-
tionship with their EP delegation and there are several ways parties have chosen to supervise
their MEPs. Parties are able to sanction members that perform poorly or diverge from the
party line. The strongest tool for sanction available to national parties is the aforementioned
selection and the use of the media to condemn the actions of a MEP to signal disapproval.
Many parties also choose a head delegate from among their MEPs. This delegate serves as
the main link between national parties and their EP delegations. This role is mostly for the
purposes of sharing information but, for some parties, this person can act as a whip for the
party members and ensure party unity. Providing direct instruction to parliament members
on specific legislation is another way parties can ensure their politicians vote as they wish;
however, direct instructions are rare in the EP. Most EP delegations have some flexibility to
work on legislation on their own, but this varies in degree across parties. Those MEPs that
expressed an ability to work freely without specific constraints from their national parties
were often from German or Nordic Parties and often contrasted their experiences with their
colleagues from Southern Europe, who do not experience this kind of freedom.18 Finally,
any tactic that makes sure MEPs are fully informed about their party’s positions on policy
matters helps increase the congruence of MEPs and their parties. The more an MEP is
15Interview 6.18.2013(3). European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.
16Interview 5.30.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.
17Interview 6.10.2014. Zagreb, Croatia.
18Interview 6.4.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium. Interview 9.17.2013. European Parlia-
ment. Brussels, Belgium.
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aware of the position of their party, the better they can represent it in any representative
body. Information sharing that flows both to EP and from the EP to the party will help
MEPs better understand their party’s preferences and will help national parties determine
what is at stake at the European level and what it means to them. One way to ensure com-
munication occurs is to formalize it in the organization of the party. Formalizing positions
for MEPs within the party leadership promotes communication between EP delegations and
their parties.
The formal structure of executive leadership within parties is one way to compare na-
tional parties. All parties have executive leadership, but the composition of leadership varies.
Just as centralization of selection determined the ability of a party to select its most pre-
ferred candidates, centralization of leadership allows parties to better supervise their MEPs.
In this dissertation, I consider two types of leadership and measure how they impact the
policy congruence of an individual with their party. I distinguish supervision of MEPs as
either inclusive or exclusive based on whether or not an MEP is formally included in a
party’s leadership. I consider executive leadership to be any party body that is the main
source of power between party congresses. For most parties, this body is comprised of a
party president, vice president, perhaps a few party secretaries, and representation from the
national legislature. For some parties at least one MEP, usually the head delegate, is also
automatically included in this select group, but for most parties this is not a requirement.
This inclusion is an important link for MEPs because it creates a direct connection with the
leadership through which information can flow.
Information sharing between MEPs and their party leadership should work in one of two
ways. First, inclusion in executive leadership can provide MEPs with valuable information
about the party that allows them to make the most accurate decisions in the EP based on
their knowledge. It also allows MEPs to share information with the leadership, which is
especially important given the complexity of EP legislation. On one hand, I expect parties
that have this type of inclusive leadership structure to have MEPs that behave more as
trustees in their representation and be granted the discretion to make decisions on legislation
as they see fit. Alternatively, I expect MEPs that are excluded from the leadership to behave
more like delegates and attempt to cater to the party when faced with decisions. Trustees
45
make decisions based on their own knowledge and personal beliefs and have the insight
and power to use their own expert judgment. Delegates will attempt to be loyal party
members and behave in whatever way they feel the party would find most acceptable (Fox
and Shotts 2009). Parties that have policy seeking goals are more likely to include MEPs
in their leadership because they hold stronger preferences and are willing to make policy at
the European level.
2.5 INDIVIDUALS AND THEIR CAREERS
The final part of the MEP-party relationship and its consequences is the motivation of the
individual MEP. Party goals are important for the choices parties make when selecting can-
didates for and supervising politicians in the EP, but the MEP’s personal goals also play
a large role in determining their behavior. Each EPG and each national party offers indi-
vidual politicians many different rewards and opportunities while also imposing their own
constraints. One way to begin hypothesizing about how individuals react to both their
party group and their national party is by addressing personal political ambition. While
national parties provide individuals with the opportunity to seek and maintain office, the
EPGs provide tangible benefits of office holding in the EP like leadership positions, commit-
tee assignments, and the assignment of reports (rapporteurships). The way an individual
responds to the opportunities given to him or her is, in part, a product of his or her per-
sonal goals. Political ambition determines what politicians will desire for the future, which
influences their behavior in the present.
The seminal work of Schlesinger (1966) on political careers in the United States provides
a foundational theoretical account of how ambition is affected by several institutional and
structural variables within a political system (Borchert 2011). Reviewing this work provides
insight into the way political ambition can influence behavior in the EP because national
parties in the EP work in many different political and institutional structures. Schlesinger
(1966) identifies four major types of structural variables that determine the attractiveness
and accessibility of public office in political systems. Structural factors that contribute to the
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attractiveness of office include the hierarchical organization of the political system (federal
vs. unitary) and the institutional arrangement of power. Schlesinger (1966) also identifies
the structure of representation and political organization as determinants of the accessibility
of public office. In terms of representation, Schlesinger’s main theoretical argument is that
differences exist across political systems in terms of who is instrumental in getting politicians
in office. He argues that for some offices, the electorate is essential in getting into office, but
for others it is the selectorate. The determination of which sector is most important in
gaining office is often the result of the electoral laws in each state and the organization of
the parties. Finally, consideration is given to the organization of interest representation.
Similar to selectorate representation, interest groups are another system of recruitment for
politicians and can open (or close) opportunities for politicians depending on their preference
(Schlesinger 1966; Borchert 2011).
Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard (2009) implicitly use the structure of opportunity model
to draft a causal explanation for the differences in MEP behavior. First, they argue that
across member states, activity and work in the EP is more or less conducive to returning
to domestic politics. In some states, the work in the EP is too far removed from that of
the domestic system and politicians have a hard time connecting to both their parties and
their voters after spending time in Brussels. These types of states should be those where
large parties compete for national office because not only is EP office more accessible, it
may be more attractive if there are limited opportunities at home (Meserve, Pemstein and
Bernhard 2009). These authors use age as a proxy for ambition, arguing that those MEPs
that are older are less likely to continue to forge domestic careers and will therefore seek
to maximize benefits gained by working with the EPGs. These politicians may be close to
retirement and/or have worked through domestic politics already. On the other hand, young
politicians in the EP are likely beginning their careers and may be more inclined to work
towards national party favor, and the EP can be the first stop on a long domestic career.
If personal ambition is linked to legislative behavior, it should also influence party unity.
We can ask, how do individual career aspirations affect the “party in public" in the EP? Under
what conditions does political ambition help or hinder party goals in the EP? The literature
on personal ambition in the EP presents relevant hypotheses to answer these questions.
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Nationally ambitious MEPs are likely to be delegates of the party and exhibit a higher level
of policy congruence between national party preference and EP legislative outcomes because
they need to protect and prolong their national careers. Individual based electoral systems
(i.e. ranked higher in personal vote) will produce more trustees and have a lower level of
policy congruence between national party preference and EP legislative outcomes because
they are less dependent on the party. Older, but less experienced, MEPs will also have a
lower level of policy congruence because parties have less leverage over their careers. Finally,
parties with professional MEPs (e.g., incumbents) will have lower levels of policy congruence
simply because they have created trustee relationships with their MEPs. These parties have
opted to send these people to Europe to get the job done however they themselves see fit
and leave them alone to do so.
2.6 CONCLUSION
My main objective is to analyze and explain the variation in party organization for European
elections with respect to national party electoral goals and the consequences of organizational
choices for MEP behavior. In order to do so I examine not only how parties are organized to
select and supervise their MEPs, but also how the intersection of these choices and electoral
goals impacts who is chosen for the EP and how they serve their party in office. In addition
to further theoretical development, Chapter 3 summarizes and analyzes the organizational
choices of national parties with respect to the EP. Chapter 4 investigates which candidate
types are selected under a variety of electoral conditions. Chapter 5 provides the summary
test of the theory by investigating the congruence of MEP behavior with their party’s pref-
erences given the organization and goals of each party and individual MEP ambition.
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3.0 PARTY ORGANIZATION
Scholars of democratic institutions have identified party organization as an important factor
for explaining party attributes and actions including, but not limited to, a party’s connec-
tion to individuals and society, the choices a party makes in elections, and a party’s electoral
success, sustainability, and evolution (Duverger 1954; Gunther and Diamond 2003; Krouwel
2012; Kitschelt 1989; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Sartori 1976; Tavits 2013; Ware 1996, 1979).
National parties in EU member states are organized with national elections and institu-
tions in mind. Previous work has claimed these national parties have not yet adapted their
organization to incorporate MEPs and the European-level elections and institutions that
come with them (Poguntke et al. 2007). In this chapter, I revisit this claim and examine
the centralization of party organization for the European level, which I define as candidate
selection and the composition of executive party leadership. These two aspects of organiza-
tion are important because they define how parties select and supervise their MEPs, which
in turn structures incentives for MEP behavior. I find that party experience, in national
elections and national institutions, is the most influential predictor of EP level organization.
In particular, the institutional structure of member state legislative institutions, the nature
of the national party system, and past experience with EU membership and the Eurozone
all predict the centralization of organization.
Parties are a basic institution of representative democracy, allowing for the aggregation of
many interests in society with the goal of gaining office and influencing policy (Strom 1990).
Parties are directly involved in the formation of national government and actively seek to
influence the individuals they put in office to further their own goals (Ware 1996). Parties in
Europe have been organized to gain office and influence policy at the national level. Their
organization structure is the result of national dynamics like their access to resources (Katz
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and Mair 1995), their founding ideology (Enyedi and Linek 2008), the competition within
their national electoral systems, and the evolution of their electoral experiences (Tavits 2013).
Given that party organization has profound effects for electoral success and performance in
office at the national level, it should also affect performance in European elections and in the
EP. However, for many parties, the national party institutions have simply been extended
to the European level instead of adapted to it. Therefore, patterns in the organization of
MEP selection and supervision should be based on the structure of national organization.
Understanding the origins of party organization at the national level should tell us when and
why parties will centralize control of these two functions.
In this chapter I present and analyze party organization for European legislators. I com-
pare the formal treatment of MEPs to that of national legislators and investigate patterns
in the centralization of power within parties, determining how parties have dealt with the
addition of European level elections internally. I find that most parties have simply central-
ized their treatment of MEPs at the expense of broad, member participation. Most selection
procedures are undemocratic, with a few elite leaders choosing candidates in the majority
of parties. Furthermore, most parties do not incorporate current MEPs into their formal
leadership structure. Thus I conclude that although the influence of European politics has
grown immensely over the last few decades, and the EP continues to gain power and promi-
nence, national parties are still not utilizing MEPs in the most representative way. In the
next section I review relevant literature for party organization and its impact on expected
patterns in the treatment of MEPs. Then I turn to the empirical reality of organization for
European elections and its determinants.
3.1 POLITICAL PARTIES AS ORGANIZATIONS
Literature focused on the development and evolution of party systems in Europe identifies
five common types of party organizations. These five types are cadre or elite, mass, catch-
all, cartel, and business-firm. Each type is defined by its origins, its goals in terms of
office, and its relationships with citizens and the state (Katz and Mair 1995). Each type
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of party provides a different expectation for politician behavior based on two dimensions of
organization. The first dimension identifies parties by the distribution of power within the
party, differentiating centralized vs. decentralized decision making processes. The second
dimension is the professionalization of the organization, categorizing parties as professional
vs. amateur organizations (Krouwel 2012). These two dimensions allow us to understand
many differences across political parties including the internal distribution of power in the
party, leadership selection, and the use of party resources (Krouwel 2012).
Party leadership, in its scope, the way it is selected, and they way it is organized,
influences many different party functions and outputs. Duverger (1954) identifies the classic
distinction between parties as the difference between centralized and decentralized leadership.
Choices over how to organize this basic feature of a party delineate parties into two categories:
power stemming from the top leadership or power vested in mass membership. This has
lead scholars to identify several categories of parties. First, centralized parties have a small
number of leaders who have control over the basic and most important functions of the
party, the organization of elections and campaigns and communication with the candidates.
Restricting control of these functions to a small number of people means that power remains
in a tight circle of leaders who make most of the choices for the parties. Centralized parties
have been designated as cadre, cartel, and business firm parties in the literature (Duverger
1954; Katz and Mair 1995; Krouwel 2012).
All party types work to promote their own survival and thus have goals and structures
in place to achieve this. Mass parties incorporate large numbers of people into the party
through hierarchical membership structures. Members pay dues to help finance the party
and volunteer to help in campaigns. Since many people are brought together to work towards
party goals, hierarchical organizational structures emerge to coordinate party activities with
a small, democratically elected leadership (Michels 1962; Krouwel 2012). Catch-all parties
seek to attract many voters from a broad ideological spectrum and thus depend less on
traditional membership structures for support. Instead, they will look to interest groups and
various sectors of society for voters and recruits. They incorporate professional politicians
both into their ranks and into their candidacy opportunities. They have an incentive to
centralize candidate selection to ensure the appropriate candidates are chosen for electoral
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lists. Similarly, cartel parties resemble oligarchies and centralize their power to work in
connection with the party in government to secure resources for the future. They seek to
place members of their elite circle in office and will thus centralize selection to keep outsiders
off the ballot. The most centralized party is the business firm party, where a political
entrepreneur creates and maintains a party using his/her own resources and seeks only to
contest elections solely for his/her personal benefit.
While placing national parties in Europe into these different categorizations is both
beyond the scope and purpose of this dissertation, I can identify those parties which we
would expect to centralize given their relationship to state or private resources. All parties
need resources (funds) to contest an election. One major characteristic of a cartel party is
their dependence on state resources (Katz and Mair 1995). Political parties that can depend
on state resources generally do so in place of resources from mass membership or grass roots
funding (van Biezen and Kopecky` 2014). Similarly, leaders from business firm parties that
can rely on independent wealth do not need resources from member organizations. As the
need to pander to multiple funding sources disappears, parties are more likely to centralize
their power. Especially in the case of public funding, dependence on, and control of, public
party funding promotes centralization and elite control (van Biezen 2003). This leads to
the first hypothesis linking national organization to treatment of MEPs. If state funded
parties are more likely to centralization at the national level, we would expect the same at
the European level; thus:
H1: State financed parties are more likely to centralize the selection and supervision of
MEPs.
3.2 IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION
In addition to identifying party types based on institutional development, political parties
are often divided by ideology and/or party family for the purpose of scientific study. Ideology
is almost always an explanatory factor when scholars attempt to explain party or individual
political behavior. While ideology is present in nearly all studies of political phenomenon,
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the link between organization and ideology is not quite clear (Enyedi and Linek 2008).
The pioneering scholars of party organization discussed above would argue that ideology
is simply one factor in the historical trajectory of parties that helps determine the way a
party is organized. For example, a party’s ideology can also imply a specific type of preferred
organization based on its ideological beliefs. For example, Bündis90/Die Grünen is a German
green party that has direct democracy as one of its founding principles and explicitly commits
to decentralized and grassroots democracy in its party organization.
At the time of their creation, different party groups had different resources available to
them in terms of the support they received from the public. The distribution of resources was
similar across party types (ie. center-right or center-left) and thus parties belonging to the
same party family resemble one another in organization (Duverger 1954; Enyedi and Linek
2008; Panebianco 1988). For example, Enyedi and Linek (2008) posit that since center-right
parties tend to rely more on donations from business groups relative to center-left parties,
this gives more autonomy to their politicians because they are less reliant on their public
membership. They do not have the need for strong organizational structures to maintain
a large, decentralized membership base. Tavits (2013) also links ideology to organization
through the types of electorates parties seek to reach. She argues that parties seeking rural
and/or poor voters will need more extensive networks to reach their electorate. These parties
tend to be leftist parties that need organizations the cover large geographic areas of a state
and focus on personal interaction between party members and citizens. In contrast, parties
representing rich and/or urban voters do not need such extensive networks because it is
easier for these parties to reach their potential voters (Tavits 2013). In some ways, this is
an extension of the state vs. private financing argument since we expect parties appealing
to broad membership bases, especially in rural communities, to decentralize their activities.
Thus center-left parties should be more likely to decentralize party organization on both the
national and European level.
H2:Parties of the left are less likely to centralize the selection and supervision of MEPs.
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3.3 INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATION
As a point of caution, both Enyedi and Linek (2008) and Tavits (2013) avoid making strong
causal claims between ideology and specific forms of organization. Determining whether
or not holding certain ideological beliefs actually causes parties to organize their selection
and supervision of MEPs certain ways is difficult since the majority of the national parties
represented in the EP exist mainly to contest national elections and many originated before
they needed to select MEPs. Instead, it is likely the organizational choices of parties with
respect to European elections are largely dependent on the structure they have in place for
selecting and supervising those in national office. The persistence of institutions and their
structures is a common element of institutional theory.
Both historical istitutionalism and rational choice institutionalism predict the persistence
of nationally structured party organization even in European elections. Historical instution-
alism argues that absent a major, exogenous shock or critical juncture for an institution,
change will be rare and path dependent (Mahoney 2000; Peters 1999; Pierson 2000; Streeck
and Thelen 2005). Given that the EP was realtively powerless in its creation and has slowly
developed more importance over time, its creation does not merit “critical juncture" status.
Therefore, the organization of the party will not change much, if at all, when expanding
to the European level. Similarly, rational choice institutionalism also fails to predict much
change in the organization of the party for European elections. Given this theory argues
that choices made, and action taken, by actors within institutions are the result of strategic
considerations of the expected of behavior of others (Hall and Taylor 1996; Shepsle 2006).
Since European elections are still second order, and national parties are organized to be
successful at the national level, there is no reason to change their organization for Europe. If
it works at one level, it should be expected to work on another give the actors and expecta-
tions remain largely the same. Thus, I also hypothesize that decisions taken at the national
level will influence decisions at the European level. Institutional memory should be a large
determinant of European organization.
H3: Parties that centralize at the national level will be more likely to centralize the
selection and supervision of MEPs.
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3.4 ENVIRONMENT AND ORGANIZATION
Finally, there are also important aspects of the political environment that can encourage
or discourage centralization within a party. Electoral hostility, electoral outcomes, and the
structure of national institutions can affect the strengthening and expansion of organizational
networks that promote decentralization. Tavits (2013) argues that organization building is
one strategy parties use to strengthen themselves when faced with harsh environmental
conditions. Creating expansive organizational networks is one tactic that parties can use to
increase vote share since dense and decentralized organization can reach many more people
than small, centralized groups. Building and maintaining large networks and organizing
large scale party elections and the like at the local and regional level is costly. Parties that
use this tactic are those that believe alternative, and less costly, strategies are unlikely to
win them votes. In addition, new parties organizing at the grass roots level may be parties
that faced difficult barriers to entry when the party was founded or when it first contested
an election (Tavits 2013).
Difficult barriers to entry stem from many different sources. Electoral thresholds may
prevent the electoral success of new and small parties and constrain the number of parties
within a system (Moser 1999). Electoral systems also play a role in determining the ease of
entry and the level of competition parties face. Proportional systems foster multi-partism
while majoritarian systems do not (Duverger 1954). While the EU does require that all EP
elections be conducted under rules of proportional representation, the level of multi-partism
varies across countries. This means that parties contesting European elections experience
different levels of competition given the number of parties within their electoral system. The
more parties in a system, the easier it is for any one party to gain at least some share of
the vote, so each party in a multiparty system has a greater chance of success (Jackman
and Volpert 1996). This is due in part to the fact that more active parties means that
each party simply needs to gain a plurality of votes. They can focus their resources on a
smaller groups of people. If only a few parties exists, each one must try to gain many votes.
This requires them to spread their resources over a larger section of society (Chhibber and
Nooruddin 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2000). Thus, I expect multi-partism to encourage
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centralization as parties will likely face less electoral hostility.
H4: Parties in larger and more diverse party systems are more likely to centralize selec-
tion and supervision of MEPs.
Party competition is often influenced by the structure of national legislative and electoral
institutions. Access to office for parties is, in part, defined by the absolute number of
offices available to win. This number of opportunities is dictated by the nature of the state
(federal vs. unitary) and the legislature (unicameral vs. bicameral)(Norris 1997b). The more
opportunities a party has to gain office, the less competition there is for any given position,
especially in the EP. In addition, the decentralized nature of federalist government implies
a higher tendency to decentralize since politicians are more likely to be more loyal to their
local groups (Morgenstern 2003). Therefore, I hypothesize that decentralized parties are
more likely in multi-level political systems.
H5: Multi-level systems will be less likely to centralize selection and supervision of MEPs.
3.5 FORMAL ORGANIZATION IN NATIONAL PARTIES: THE
EMPIRICAL REALITY
In order to examine the organization of parties with respect to the EP, I analyzed party
statutes and collected data from elite interviews, paying special attention to, and inquiring
about, the processes of candidate selection within parties for both European and national
elections and the inclusion of MEPs in executive party leadership.1 I use these two measures
as proxies for the centralization of MEP organization, which I have defined as centralized
selection and inclusion in the executive leadership. I do so because candidate selection
within parties is very easily delineated into centralized vs. decentralized processes since the
selectorate for candidate lists is specified explicitly in most party statutes. Decentralized
selection involves a greater proportion of party members in the process while centralized
1A list of parties for which I had access to party statutes is in Table 24 in Appendix A. As stated in
the introduction of the dissertation, the parties interviewed included the center-right, center-left, and liberal
parties from Germany, the United Kingdom, and Croatia.
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selection restricts it to a few elites. I also consider membership in the leadership as an
action that brings MEPs into the inner circle of the party, therefore making them part
of the party elite and centralizing control and communication. There are obviously many
other measures that could be used to assess organizational centralization, but these two are
easily identified in party statutes and also unambiguous enough to compare across many
statutes. The main dependent variables are indicators for candidate selection procedure and
the inclusion of MEPs in the executive structures of parties. The data contain 45 parties from
17 countries. The largest group of parties are social democrats, which belong to the group
of the European Socialist (PES) in the seventh EP. This is followed by an equal number of
liberal (the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE)) and conservative parties (European
Peoples Party (EPP) and the European Conservative and Reform Group (ECR)). Just over
half of the parties use some form of executive selection, but just under half include MEPs in
their leadership, while about 30% do both.
The experiences of these parties in European elections also varies across many indepen-
dent variables. Because I argue that European organization is most likely to be an extension
of national organization, I identify variation across different party, legislative, and electoral
systems at the national level. First, I identify party system and party characteristics because
these will influence the level of centralization within a party (Hazan and Rahat 2010). This
includes those parties that have executive selection for national elections because I hypoth-
esize that these parties are more likely to centralize both selection and supervision at the
European level as well. Just under 50% of the parties fall into this category, which is less
than I find centralize for European selection.2 In addition, I identify left parties as social
democratic parties, green parties, or post-communist parties , which account for about 40%
of the data. Parties that are given state funds for European elections are identified as state fi-
nanced and federal systems are identified. The final measure of the analysis is multi-partism,
for which I use the effective number of parties (Laakso and Taagepera 1979).3 I expect that
2 A description of each party’s selection process, along with a comparison to its national process is
available in Appendix A in Tables 27 and 28.
3The effective number of parties is first calculated using Rae’s national fractionalization measure (Frac-
tionalization = 1−∑Mi=1 t2i where ti is the proportion of the national votes for the ith party) from the EES
contextual data (Rae 1967). The measure of the effective number of parties is taken as ENP =
∑M
i=1 t
2
i
(Laakso and Taagepera 1979).
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as this measure increases, parties will be more likely to centralize because competition will
be lower.4
Table 1: Party Centralization for European Organization
Independent Variable  Hypothesis Hypothesized Effect  
State financing in European Elections  H1 + 
Left Parties H2 - 
National Executive Selection H3 + 
Multi-partism H4 - 
National Multi-Level Systems H5 - 
 
3.6 ORGANIZATION FOR CANDIDATE SELECTION
Candidate selection practices for the EP vary across national parties. The coding of the
statutes identifies those parties that did not mention formal procedures for candidate selec-
tion (no formal designation),5 those that select their MEPs at the constituency level (mass),
those that have voting delegates (in a national congress or elected committee/council con-
vened for this purpose) that select the list (delegate), and those that have completely central-
ized selection (executive). Executive selection is defined as selection that took place solely
within the executive body of a party, where the executive body is defined as the highest
level decision making authority that meets between party congresses. Figure 2 presents the
level of centralization of national parties in the selection of candidates for European elec-
4The contextual data on party family, state financing, electoral competition, bicameralism, and federalism
comes from the European Election Studies contextual data (EES 2009a; Czesnik, Kotnarowski and Markowski
2010). The contextual data from the EES does not contain Croatia since they did not participate in the
2009 election. Therefore, I calculated fractionalization using data from the European Election database for
the 2011 Croatian parliamentary election and the information on state party financing come from Smilov
and Toplak (2013). The state is unitary and unicameral.
5Of the parties in the analysis, only eight fail to mention MEPs at all. These parties are listed in Table
25 in Appendix A. In these eight, there does not appear to be many statistically significant patterns or any
specific determinants of the failure to formally recognize MEPs except for bicameralism. The results of a
preliminary test of association are available in Table 26in Appendix A.
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tions throughout the data.6 There are 330 MEPs in the data that represent parties with
centralized selection versus about 161 MEPs that come from non-centralized parties.
Not only do these different types of selection represent different levels of centralization
within the party, they also impact the way candidates themselves view their position. This
was most notable in the way MEPs and candidates described the selection process that
they experienced. In Croatia, the most centralized case, candidate MEPs often referred
to their candidate status as one that was selected for them. Nearly all the MEPs and
prospective MEPs I interviewed spoke about the selection process as a process outside of
their jurisdiction. For example, I was often told things like, the president decided this, the
president had the power to, the president had these criteria, and the president asked me to...
When I asked current MEPs about their desire to remain in the EP or European politics,
I was told things like, “I will do whatever the party thinks is useful,"7 and, “I did not plan
on it, but the party thought I would be a good, loyal name on the list."8 In contrast, UK
MEPs used language like, I was interested in, I decided to, I thought, and one MEP said
she thought she would, “have more influence and input in the EP than as a backbencher
in Westminster."9 The UK processes are largely unique in the EP, with only a few parties
characterized by decentralized control over selection. In the UK, the parties use a mass
selection procedure where candidates can self-nominate and their party constituents choose
among them. All of these examples show that MEPs are aware of the role of leadership in
their careers and may be subjected to different incentives for their actions and their careers
given the structure of their parties. The most centralized parties are those in Croatia. Most
of the German parties tend to use some sort of delegate selection, and the UK is the least
centralized with selection occurring through the mass membership at the regional level.
6The source documents are available upon request and party abbreviations are in Table 38 in Appendix
A.
7Interview 4.4.2013. Hrvatski Sabor. Zagreb, Croatia
8Interview 9.25.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.
9Interview 6.26.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.
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Figure 2: Candidate Selection Procedures in National Parties
3.6.1 Centralized Selection: Croatian Political Parties
Croatian political parties are good examples of centralized selection with selection processes
taking place within the party leadership. In these parties, the presidents have almost com-
plete power to choose candidates for both European and national parliamentary elections.
Croatia elect MEPs in one constituency and held their first election in April of 2013 before
they became full members of the EU in July of 2013. Also, in contrast to the parties above,
Croatian lists tend to be coalition lists so parties must also be aware of the needs or demands
of potential coalition partners and list order is decided with partners in mind. European
elections also introduced a new electoral system. In addition to having only one electoral
district (vs. 12 in national elections), EP elections also introduced preferential voting. Prior
to 2015, national elections lists were closed and there were no preferential votes. These par-
ties claim to try to represent the different regions of Croatia in the construction of their lists
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but there is no formal requirement to do so.
The statutes of the HDZ, the conservative party, explicitly grant power to the party exec-
utive to select possible candidates for national and EP elections and the party president has
final approval power. When selecting candidates for the 2013 election, the county organiza-
tions (Županija) were asked to provide the names of up to three possible candidates. These
candidates were chosen by the county presidents in consultation with the national president,
the party executive, and political secretary. After these names are identified, the process
becomes much less transparent,10 as the final list and ranking is decided within the execu-
tive. The HDZ presented a list with two additional parties, the party of peasants (Hrvatska
Seljačka Stranka) and a right party, the Croatian Party of Rights (Hrvatska Stranka Prava
Dr. Ante Starčević).
The SDP, the social democratic party, has a similar selection process to the HDZ. The
statute explicitly grants power to the party president to select the candidates. Here the party
president makes a proposal for the top spots on the list to the executive who can discuss
the list and vote on it,11 but in practice the list rarely changes from the party president’s
original proposal.12 In the 2013 election, the SDP created a list in coalition with the liberal
party (Hrvatska Narodna Stranka-Liberalni Demokrati) and the pensioners’ party (Hrvatska
Stranka Umirovljenika).
While the Hrvatska Narodna Stranka-Liberalni Demokrati, the liberal party, is not in-
cluded in the analysis given that it did not place any members in the EP during the 7seventh
session, it is worth noting its selection processes in order to get a complete picture of Croat-
ian political parties. The president of the liberal party is granted statutory power to propose
candidates for the European parliament to the national party board. This proposal generally
entails representation of the Croatian regions, each of which can recommend 2 candidates
to the president.13 In the 2013 election, the HNS held the sixth and ninth position on the
coalition list with the SDP but this list won only five seats.
10Interview 5.22.2013. Hrvatski Sabor. Zagreb, Croatia.
11Interview 5.22.2013. Hrvatski Sabor. Zagreb, Croatia; Interview 5.24.2013, Hrvatski Sabor. Zagreb,
Croatia
12Interview 3.1.2013. Hrvatski Sabor. Zagreb, Croatia, Interview 3.8.2013. Hrvatski Sabor. Zagreb,
Croatia
13Interview 3.28.2013. Trg Josipa Bana Jelečića. Zagreb, Croatia.
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3.6.2 Mixed Selection Methods: German Political Parties
German political parties provide examples for both executive selection and delegate selection.
The CDU and the FDP, the center-right and liberal parties respectively, use party delegates
to select their MEPs. These parties explicitly identify this process in detail in their statutes.
The center-left SPD uses executive selection while the green party does not specify a formal
selection procedure. In each German party incumbents do not receive any type of privileged
status and must compete for nomination with the rest of the party members. Germany elects
their MEPs in a single constituency, closed list, proportional vote.
The CDU, the conservative party, uses a federal convention to finalize a list that is
proposed by the party of each federal state (the Länder). This differs from the national
process only in the level of government that decides the list. In federal elections, local
constituency level assemblies decide the list, but at the EP level, districts compile the lists
for the state party convention. In order to construct the list, local party organizations choose
candidates through secret ballot, then district lists are constructed before delegates to state
congresses vote on the state lists.14 In this party, lists are constructed for each Länder even
though there is only one constituency in German EP elections. The number of MEPs taken
from each list is decided by the federal party. While Germany has a closed list European
election, the order of the lists can be debated and changed at the congress. Thus the CDU
differs in candidate selection procedures across the national and European levels.
Candidate selection in the FDP, the liberal party, is similar to the CDU. The statute
states that a national party congress votes on candidate lists in both European and national
elections.15 This is a delegate form of selection since party delegates are chosen from sub-
national units to attend the congress. Before the national congress, you must get approval
from your regional (presumably the state party organization) and then compete for a list po-
sition at the party congress. The FDP offers just one list for all of Germany and prospective
candidates compete in an election process for a specific position on the list.16 For example,
14The description of the procedure in the statute does not specify the procedure before the state congress,
this information comes from MEPs. Interview 6.18.2013.(2) and Interview 9.17.2013. European Parliament.
Brussels, Belgium.
15The remainder of the selection information stems from Interview 9.19.2013. European Parliament.
Brussels, Belgium.
16It appears that in Germany the parties have the option to offer one complete list for the election, like
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three possible candidates may wish to be placed third on the list.17 These three candidates
compete for the third spot and the congress votes on their preferred candidates. The candi-
date with the most votes gains the third spot on the list and the remaining candidates are
free to continue to compete for any lower spot (4th, 5th, etc). The only exception to this are
the first and second spots on the list. While these can technically be contested in the same
manner, the leadership chooses their preferred candidates for these spots and they generally
go unchallenged, as it is assumed unwise for another member of the party to compete with
these leadership choices.
In contrast to the CDU and FDP, the party leadership selects candidates in the SPD,
the social democratic party. While the party statute clearly lays out the process for selecting
national candidates, it does not do so for MEPs.18 In federal elections, the party lists are
determined at the constituency level. At the European level, selection is far more centralized
because it is controlled by the federal party leaders and the SPD has only one list for the
elections. Each regional party determines candidates by secret ballot for proposal to the
party but the chairperson of the federal board decides which candidates from each region
make the list (if there are multiple candidates recommended from the region). There is
then a formula that decides which regions are represented and how many candidates from
each region make the list. They do not guarantee that all regions will be well represented,
representation is based on the strength of the party in a given area. The only requirement
is that at least one member from each region is among the first 30 places on the list.19 Even
though the procedure is not formally specified in the party statute, it is nonetheless relatively
complex and structured.
the FDP does, where candidates appear on a list ranked from 1 to however many candidate they choose to
put forward. The CDU is the only party that offers different lists to different Länder, and constructs its
delegation post-election. The CSU (Christlich Soziale Union in Bayern-the Bavaria sister party of the CDU)
naturally only offers a list for Bavaria.
17Given the previous electoral success of the FDP in European elections, it is generally believed within
the party that only the first five spots on the list have a high likelihood of gaining seats in Brussels.
18The selection information presented here and incorporated into the data is from Interview 6.6.2013,
Interview 6.12.2013, and Interview 6.8.2013, European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.
19In the 2004, 2009, 2014 elections the SPD averaged about 23 seats so being among the top 30 does not
necessarily mean each region will have a sitting MEP.
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3.6.3 Mass selection: Political Parties in the United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the Conservative party, the Liberal Democratic Party, and the
Labour party all use decentralized methods of candidate selection. In addition the UK
elects MEPs in twelve regional constituencies with a closed list proportional representation
system. In contrast, National elections in the UK are conducted in 646 local constituencies
using a single member district with majority rule. Therefore, it follows that the selection of
MEPs in these parties occurs at the regional level. Each party uses a form of pre-approval
for its candidates as a screening process before regional party membership decides the final
composition of the list.
The conservative party uses an election board to create a list of approved candidates.
Those wanting to run for EP office must submit a cv to this board to demonstrate basic
competence.20 A list of approved candidates for each region is then sent to all members in
the region. These members rank the candidates, which determines the order of the list by
the number of votes each candidate receives.21 In this party, incumbent are placed on the top
of the list as long as they receive a high approval rating from the party leadership.22 Unlike
their center-right colleagues in Germany, this party belongs to the European Conservative
and Reform Group. This is a conservative group formed under the leadership of the UK
Conservative party after the 2009 election.
The Liberal Democratic Party employs a procedure for candidate selection similar to
the Conservative party. The party selects at the regional level where it puts out a call
for candidacy to which potential candidates can apply. The party also has a pre-approval
process to screen potential candidates. Those that are deemed acceptable can then request
to be considered for the lists in up to two regions. A party panel then makes an alphabetical
list of candidates which is then sent to all party members with a one page biography and
CV of each candidate. There are also meetings where the candidates appear before members
20The definition of basic competence will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.
21Interview 6.5.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium, Interview 6.18.2013. European Par-
liament. Brussels, Belgium, Interview 6.25.2013(1). European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium, Interview
6.25.2013(2). European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.
22In the 2009 election this was 50%, but in 2014 it jumped to 60%. If there is more than one incumbent
in a region, the regional party membership will vote to determine the order of these incumbents on the list
(Interview 6.18.2013(3). European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium).
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so that the members can ask them questions before they vote and can encourage votes on
their behalf. Incumbents in this party must go through the same procedure as everyone else,
except their incumbency means they are already approved as candidates. In the end, the
party sends the membership votes to a third party service to tally the count that decides
the final order of the regional lists.23
The Labour party also allows members to self-nominate for the election and also con-
structs regional lists. Lists are limited to four candidates that are chosen from the self-
nominations by a regional party board. This list is then distributed to all party members
of the region who rank the candidates. The candidate with the most first place votes wins
the top spot, the most second place votes gets the second position, and so on. Incumbents
in this party must seek approval from their constituency in a process called a trigger ballot.
If a majority of the constituency votes to approve their current MEP, then the MEP retains
the first position on the list.24
3.6.4 Centralized Selection: Assessing the Empirical Relationships
In order to test the centralized selection hypotheses in this chapter, I begin with a χ2 test to
examine the relationship between the dichotomous variables of the analysis and centralized
selection. The results of the χ2 tests are reported in Table 2 and show that several of the
hypothesized relationships are significant. The variable for left parties is the only variable
not significantly related to centralized selection. Therefore there is no evidence in support
of H2, which predicted that parties of the left would be less likely to centralize. In order
to examine the remaining hypotheses, I constructed a logistic regression model and these
results are reported in Table 3.
In addition to the substantive variables of interest, this model includes a variable captur-
ing membership in the Eurozone and length of membership in the EU (in years) to account
for the depth of a party’s experience in the EU. I also include a few more party level variables
to account for each party’s experience with the EU. This includes a measure of the party
age (number of years a party has been active) and a measure of the relative size of the EP
23Interview 6.17.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium
24Interview 5.30.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium
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delegation. Relative size is the proportion of MEPs relative to party politicians at national
and EP level (in 2004-2009 term). The average of this term is about 14% but some parties
only had members in the EP (UKIP, GERB).
Table 2: χ2 Test of Association for Centralized Selection
Centralized Selection  Χ2 
Left Party 0.930 
National Executive Selection 8.259*** 
Bicameral Legislature 4.160** 
Federalism 3.441* 
State Financing 3.441* 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results in Table 3 show that several of the party and government characteristics are
significantly related to centralized selection for the EP.25 Examining the party variables first,
the results support H3, executive selection on the national level is a significant, and positive,
indicator of centralized selection on the European level. Parties are more likely to remain
centralized if they are already structured as such. Party age and the relative size of the EP
delegation are also significant and positive indicators of centralized selection. As parties gain
more experience with the EU (both in terms of time and personnel in the institutions), they
are more likely to centralize their procedures. Table 3 reports the marginal effects of each
variable, and although significant, these three effects appear to be relatively small. In order
to examine these effects more closely, I calculated predicted probabilities which are available
in Table 4.26 These results show these party factors have very little effect on the likelihood
of executive selection and the national factors are much more important.
In terms of national characteristics, these results support the relationships between ex-
ecutive selection and multipartism and multi-level government as predicted in H4 and H5
25The results reported are the marginal effects with country fixed effects. The results of analysis using
country random effects are reported in the Table 31 in Appendix A. The results remain consistent with the
fixed effects model reported in text.
26Predicted probabilities were calculated using Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2003). Unless oth-
erwise noted, all simulations were conducted with the auxiliary independent variables set at their mean or
modal category
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Table 3: Logistic Regression for Centralized SelectionMarginal Effects and Executive Se ection 
 
 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Centralized 
Selection 
  
Executive National Selection 0.195*** 
 (0.060) 
Party Age 0.001** 
 (0.001) 
Relative Size of EP Delegation 0.405*** 
 (0.154) 
Effective Number of Parties -0.080* 
 (0.045) 
State Election Financing 0.320 
 (0.202) 
Federalism -0.439*** 
 (0.089) 
Eurozone Member 0.839*** 
 (0.166) 
Membership (length in years) -0.009** 
 (0.004) 
  
Observations 45 
Wald chi2 297.3 
Prob > chi2 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.508 
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses 
Marginal effects reported 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
respectively. Federalism has the largest effect on the likelihood of executive selection but it
is negative. Parties in federal systems are almost 17% less likely to centralize their selection
procedure than their unitary peers.27 Membership in the EU also decreases this likelihood
as the length of membership grows. As membership length moves from its minimum to
27Bicameralism also has a significant relationship with executive selection. While analysis with a χ2 test
of association (see Table 2) showed that bicameralism is significantly related to centralized selection. I was
unable to test the strength or direction of the relationship in the logistic model. Among the parties here,
all of the parties using decentralized selection are at least weakly bicameral so there are no decentralized
observation in unicameral systems.
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maximum the likelihood of executive leadership decreases. This highlights a potentially in-
teresting variation between old and new member states with respect to party organization.
The strongest relationship presented by the model is that of Eurozone membership. Coun-
tries in the Eurozone are much more likely to centralize selection at the European level. The
predicted probabilities show that this difference is close to 80%. The only hypothesis that
I did not find support for in the model was that of state financing. This variables is not
significant at the 90% level so I cannot conclude that the origin of party financial resources
for European elections influences organization in this case.
Overall the model predicts that centralized selection is highly likely under a variety of
circumstances. The structure of government institutions has the largest effect on party
organization with respect to the selection of their MEPs. This suggest that the experience
of parties on the national level is the most important indicator of what parties will do at the
European level. National parties appear to be merely replicating the national procedures or
centralizing their procedure. The existing consensus in the literature claims that national
parties in Europe have been unable or unwilling to seriously consider the role of an MEP
in relation to their broader structure. Because of this reluctance to consider how best to
deal with MEPs, national parties have not been able to increase the accountability of their
politicians who are working at the European level (Ladrech 2007; Poguntke et al. 2007).
While I find no specific adjustment in the majority of parties with respect to their candidate
selection procedures, which supports this claim, I find contrasting evidence with respect to
accountability. I find that accountability, at least through selection for candidacy, is at least
as strong as it is in national elections if not stronger. The tendency to centralize means
party leaders have significant control over these MEPs in their placement and removal.
3.7 LEADERSHIP COMPOSITION IN NATIONAL PARTIES
I consider the composition of party leadership to be another aspect of centralization because
it brings agents of the party together with the leadership. In national politics, the party
in office is almost inseparable from the party leadership itself. For example, in governing
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Table 4: Predicted Probability of Centralized Selection
No Executive National Selection 98.53% 
Executive National Selection  98.80% 
∆ in probability  (min to max) 0.27% 
  
Party age minimum 97.25% 
Party age mean 98.53% 
Party age max 99.20% 
∆ in probability (min to max) 1.95% 
  
Relative size of delegation minimum 97.42% 
Relative size of delegation mean 98.53% 
Relative size of delegation max 98.56% 
∆ in probability (min to max) 1.13% 
  
Effective number of parties min 99.56% 
Effective number of parties mean 98.53% 
Effective number of parties max 86.16% 
∆ in probability (min to max) -13.40% 
  
Unitary 98.53% 
Federalist 81.85% 
∆ in probability  -16.68% 
  
Non Eurozone Member 19.68% 
Eurozone Member 98.53% 
∆ in probability  78.85% 
  
Membership min 99.64% 
Membership mean 98.53% 
Membership max 83.58% 
∆ in probability  (min to max) -16.07% 
 
parties, it is very likely that the government leader is also the leader of the party. This is
certainly true in Croatia where Zoran Milanović holds both positions. Tomislav Karamarko
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is the head of the opposition in the Sabor and the leader of the HDZ. It is also true with
David Cameron and the UK Conservative party, as well as Angela Merkel and the CDU.
In fact, the very definition of cartel party is that the party in office has total control over
the functioning of the party (Katz and Mair 1995). Therefore it is only natural that at
least some of the party members in elected office at the national level are also included
in the party leadership. However, leadership selection varies across parties. Many of the
parties in this analysis have some combination of both ex-officio offices and elected members
in their executive leadership. In national parties, gaining elite status within the party and
high status positions within the government usually go hand in hand, so I would expect
that this link between elected officials and the leadership is maintained even in the absence
of formal rules. However, if parties really are not addressing the treatment MEPs and not
incorporating them into their organization, I would not expect it to follow that MEPs will
naturally enter the executive leadership. Some may be included due to the nature of their
personal careers and ambition, but others may not. Therefore, I see the inclusion of an MEP
as a centralizing tactic that maintains a link between the national party and the European
delegation. I consider a party to have inclusive leadership if there is a statutory requirement
that assigns a place in the executive leadership to at least one MEP. In the data, 25 parties
have inclusive leadership (∼ 44%). The parties including at least one MEP in their leadership
have almost 260 MEPs in the legislature, while those that do not have about 230. Some
parties include all of their MEPs, while others assign a delegation leader that assumes this
position. In Germany and the United Kingdom, parties have formal delegation leaders but
this role is undefined in Croatia.
3.7.1 Inclusive leadership: Germany and the United Kingdom
German parties all employ national delegation leaders but they are used in different ways
and have different roles within their party. All of the German parties included in the larger
analysis have inclusive leadership except for the Green party (Bündis90/die Grünen) and the
SPD. The CDU includes both the president of the EP delegation and the chairman of the
EPP group in the EP in their federal leadership. They include the EPP chairman from the
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Figure 3: The Organization of Party Leadership
EP as long as the position is held by a member of the CDU. The president of the delegation
is selected every two and one half years when the current MEPs elect both a leadership board
and the president.28 The FDP also includes a member of the EP group on their federal board.
Unlike the CDU they do not appear to specify a particular MEP to serve this role. Instead,
the MEP that is doing the work most topical to the subject of the party meeting will attend
but they will also provide a briefing of the remaining MEPs work.29 The SPD includes a
member on the board that is responsible for issues in the EU but the origin of this person is
somewhat ambiguous and it appears this position is not statutorily required to be held by
an MEP.30 Within the parliamentary delegation, there is a leader who coordinates the work
of the MEPs. This role is meant to ensure that the delegation covers all of the necessary
political sectors and has balance in committee representation. The leader represents the
group in public and serves as a link between the delegation, the Bundestag, and the party
28Interview 6.18.2013.(2) and Interview 9.17.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.
29Interview 9.19.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.
30The exact wording of the SPD statute is as follows: “Er (der Parteivorstand) besteht aus....dem order
der Verantwortlichen des Parteivorstandes für die Europäische Union," which literally translates into the
leader or leaders of the executive for the European Union.
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executive.31
The parties in the United Kingdom also select delegation leaders, but vary with respect
to the inclusion of these leaders in the party executive. In addition to the parties of the
qualitative analysis, UKIP is also included in the data. This party is unique in the United
Kingdom because all of its elected officials (national or higher) hold seats in the EP.32 In
the seventh term it had eleven MEPs in office and it sends at least two MEPs to executive
meetings. These MEPs are selected by the delegation leader. The Conservative party has
delegation leaders that are included on its party board. The role of this leader is described
as more of a technocratic role than a political one. Committee leaders are also invited to
ministerial meetings so this role appears to be much more important when the party is
governing.33 The Liberal Democratic Party requires the inclusion of a member of the EP
delegation that is elected by the MEPs. This member serves as a liaison between the MEPs
and the party, and the party also has two permanent staff members that are based in London
and paid for by all of the Liberal MEPs. This is meant to provide daily contact between the
MEPs and the national party.34 In contrast to its counterparts in the United Kingdom, The
Labour Party does not require a MEP to be included among the members of its executive
board. In addition to its executive officers, the board elects six other members but none of
them are required to be an MEP. The EP delegation does have a delegation leader. The role
of leader is that of a liaison between the party and MEPs.35
3.7.2 Exclusive Leadership: Croatia
None of the three parties in the analysis for Croatia have inclusive leadership. Some of the
new MEPs were members of the party executive by virtue of their standing in the party, but
there was no formal requirement for ex-officio inclusion. The HDZ does require a number
of members in other offices to serve in the presidency and then has 10 at large members.
31Interview 6.6.2013, Interview 6.12.2013, and Interview 6.8.2013, European Parliament. Brussels, Bel-
gium.
32This true for at least the 2004-2009 term. At this time UKIP had not won any elected seats in the House
of Commons but it acquired one upon the defection of a Conservative MP in 2008 (BBCNews 2008a).
33Interview 6.18.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium.
34Interview 6.17.2013. European Parilament. Brussels, Belgium
35Interview 5.30.2013. European Parliament. Brussels, Belgium
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The SDP has an executive that is elected at the party congress and the HNS includes many
offices (even local party leaders), but do not require an MEP to serve (although they have
not yet had any MEPs).
In addition to investigating the inclusion of a MEP in party leadership, I also noticed
patterns in communication between MEPs and their parties. While this will be discussed at
length in Chapter 5, the parties of the UK and Germany appear to have specific patterns
in communication with their national parties through the delegation leaders and ties with
specific EP committees and national ministers. On the other hand, the Croatian parties do
not have any structure in place and at the time of my last interviews at the EP (September
2013), had no regular communication. While these observations are split between parties
with inclusion (UK, Germany) and parties without (Croatia), further analysis is needed since
Croatia had only a few months experience in the EP at the time my interviews.
3.7.3 Centralized Leadership: An Additional Assessment of Centralization
Measuring the centralization of EP organization as inclusion in party leadership, I again
use both χ2 and a logistic regression model to test the relationship between centralization
and party and institutional factors. Highlighting differences across centralized selection and
inclusive leadership, Table 5 shows that national executive selection and federalism are no
longer significant predictors of centralization, measured as inclusive leadership. However,
left parties and leadership composition are significantly related so I am able to further test
the strength and direction of this relationship using logistic regression.
The results of the logistic regression model are reported in Table 6. 36 These results show
that only one party factor but several institutional factors significantly affect the likelihood
of inclusion across parties. In contrast to the model for executive selection, left parties have a
significant, but negative, relationship with the likelihood of including MEPs in the leadership.
Parties that belong to the socialist, post-communist, or green party family are almost 29%
less likely to require that MEPs belong to their leadership. The predicted probabilities of
the model are reported in Table 7. A quick glance through the statutory composition of the
36The results reported are the marginal effects with country fixed effects. The results of analysis using
country random effects are reported in the Table 32 in Appendix A.
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Table 5: χ2 Test of Association for Inclusive Leadership
Inclusive Leadership Χ2 
Left Party 3.305* 
National Executive Selection 1.969 
Bicameral Legislature 6.178** 
Federalism 1.285 
State Financing 3.679*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
leadership in these parties indicates that many of these parties have elected leadership so no
single spot is reserved for any particular elected office.37 This supports H2 which stated that
parties of the left will be less likely to centralize given both their party ideology and their
characteristics of their membership.
While only one of the party characteristics is a significant predictor of inclusion, the in-
stitutional factors are all significant. In contrast to the model of centralized selection, these
results find that state financing of parties for European elections is significant. However,
given that the relationship is negative, the result does not support H1 and the presence
of state financing decreases the likelihood of inclusion. The predicted probabilities of the
model also suggest that this variable has the smallest substantive effect on inclusion. Simi-
larly, bicameralism, though significant, does not support H5, which predicted that multi-level
systems will be less likely to centralize. There is an inverse relationship between the presence
of bicameral legislative institutions and inclusion. Contrary to the hypothesis, bicameral in-
stitutions are nearly 67% more likely to include MEPs in their leadership. Perhaps parties in
multi-tiered systems have decentralized selection but include specific offices in its leadership
to keep tabs on elected officials at every level. Similar to the selection model, the results
show that relationships between the effective number of parties, eurozone membership, and
the length of EU membership are consistent across models. The relationship between the
37For a description of all parties’ formal leadership structures, see Table 29 and Table 30 in Appendix A
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Table 6: Logistic Regression for Inclusive Leadership
 (1) 
VARIABLES Inclusive 
Leadership 
  
Party of the left -0.302** 
 (0.148) 
Party Age 0.000 
 (0.001) 
Relative Size of EP Delegation -0.137 
 (0.331) 
Effective Number of Parties -0.272** 
 (0.137) 
State Financing of Election -0.380* 
 (0.199) 
Bicameral 0.576*** 
 (0.092) 
Eurozone Member 0.397** 
 (0.182) 
Membership (length in years) -0.014*** 
 (0.005) 
  
Observations 45 
Wald chi2 21.89 
Prob > chi2 0.005 
Pseudo R
2 
0.308 
Country clustered standard errors in parentheses 
Marginal effects reported 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 ENP and inclusion is the largest of these effects in this model. As the ENP increases from
its minimum to its maximum, the likelihood of inclusion decreases by nearly 60%. As multi-
partism increases across states, parties become less likely to assign a leadership position to
an MEP.
Overall, the results of the models of inclusion of MEPs in the executive leadership of
their party are consistent with that of centralized selection. Parties in countries that have
bicameral legislatures, are members of the Eurozone, have multi-party systems, and are
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Table 7: Predicted Probability of Inclusive Leadership
Not party of the left 78.31% 
Party of the left 49.60% 
∆ in probability  (min to max) -28.72% 
  
Effective number of parties min 93.02% 
Effective number of parties mean 78.31% 
Effective number of parties max 33.82% 
∆ in probability (min to max) -59.20% 
  
State financing in European election 78.31% 
No state financing in European election 92.18% 
∆ in probability  -13.86% 
  
Unicameral 12.27% 
Bicameral 78.31% 
∆ in probability  66.04% 
  
Non Eurozone Member 37.93% 
Eurozone Member 78.31% 
∆ in probability  40.38% 
  
Membership min 94.33% 
Membership mean 78.31% 
Membership max 53.98% 
∆ in probability  (min to max) -40.35% 
 
relatively new to the EU are more likely to include MEPs in leadership. The results of
both models, taken together, show that national institutional structures are very influential
in shaping how parties treat their MEPs. This likely implies that variance across national
institutions and party systems will also affect MEP legislative behavior.
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3.8 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This chapter investigated the determinants of two important organizational choices parties
make with respect to their MEPs, the selection method for candidates in EP elections and
the composition of a party’s executive leadership body. I argue that these two choices can
be used to measure centralization (or decentralization) in a political party because they
manage two important functions. Candidate selection determines who represents the party
at the European level and the composition of the leadership determines a party’s power
base. I found that parties are more likely to centralize than decentralize the treatment of
their MEPs, even if they do not do so at the national level.
The chapter also highlights how differences across member states can have important
consequences for the treatment of MEPs. Not all states view EP elections with the same
level of importance and not all parties take the same level of care to consider their role
of MEPs in their parties. Two of the strongest predictors of organization for the EP are
membership experience in the EU and the Eurozone. These two predictors, along with
many of the other country level independent variables, are largely bifurcated by Eastern and
Western Europe. Obviously Western European member states have been members of the
EU much longer than their Eastern peers. Most of them are also members of the Eurozone
(with the exception of the United Kingdom) and their Eastern counterparts are not (with
the exception of Slovakia). Almost all Eastern European parties are highly centralized,
with a higher percentage of both centralized selection and inclusive leadership than Western
European parties. This confirms that analysis across regions in the EU is still very important
as these member states contain systematic differences that cannot be ignored.
In sum, these results confirm that national experience is a strong predictor of the treat-
ment of MEPs. Variance across member state experience at the national level and with
EU membership creates variance in the incentives MEPs face with respect to their national
parties. The theory of the dissertation argues that parties have an incentive to centralize
selection to increase their ability to select the appropriate candidates given their electoral
goals. This chapter supports this claim and highlights the strong role national politics still
plays in EP decision making. The next chapter will build on the insight offered here and
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investigate how national electoral goals determine what type of politicians get chosen to
serve in the EP.
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4.0 ELECTORAL GOALS AND CANDIDATE SELECTION
Organization determines how parties select and supervise their MEPs, but electoral goals
determine what kind of candidate a party chooses. This chapter continues the story of
electoral goals, organization, and MEP behavior by examining the choices parties make
for candidate selection as strategic choices of a goal seeking framework. National parties
contesting European elections have office, vote, and policy seeking goals that are shaped by
the national conditions under which they are accustomed to acting. Achieving these goals
requires parties to think strategically about what type of candidate they wish to nominate
for European elections and serve in the European Parliament.
Using a unique data set coding national party electoral goals and MEP biographic in-
formation, combined with insight from interviews with MEPs, this chapter considers how
variation among legislator type is produced across member states given the competing elec-
toral goals and demands of national parties. It also addresses the scarcity of work examining
how and why national parties choose their MEPs. I argue when political parties control
electoral lists, parties can choose the type of legislator representing their interests in the EP
and do so according to their national electoral goals. I conclude that office seeking and policy
seeking parties choose new and inexperienced politicians but vote seeking parties choose ex-
perienced, well known politicians from national government or EP incumbents. The analysis
also confirms that national politicians and party leaders are rare in the EP, appearing as
candidates only when parties are seeking to maximize votes in the spirit of a second order
election. Newcomers are much more likely to be chosen by parties that are seeking to fill
seats in the EP after an electoral loss. These conclusions support existing literature on Eu-
ropean elections by confirming the dominance of the second order election atmosphere for
legislator choice, but also highlight new trends in EP candidate selection and career choice.
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This chapter provides not only an empirical glimpse into representation in the EP, but also
a foundation for exploring the causes and consequences of variation in representation for
future work. The results continue to support the premise that national politics dominate
party strategies in the treatment of their MEPs.
Individuals are chosen by political parties and the public to represent their interests and
work towards their policy goals. However, these individuals have private interests and per-
sonal goals that influence behavior in office and the quality of representation they choose to
provide. Therefore considering the impact of individuals who serve in governing institutions
is a fundamental task in the assessment of effective representation. Whether individuals
adhere to a strict constituency or party mandate or pursue their own goals is, in part, de-
pendent on the structure of the institutions in which they serve and the incentives that are
created by their parties, their constituencies, and their political systems (Manin, Przeworski
and Stokes 1999). Political parties play a pivotal role in determining who is placed on ballots
and in office and the incentive structure through which politicians choose their behavioral
strategies. Parties control selection procedures and, given the previous chapter’s conclusion
that parties are highly likely to centralize candidate selection for the EP, party leaders are
able to act as gatekeepers for individual careers. Individual ambition and party goals in-
tersect in electoral contests, determining the set of available politicians from which citizens
choose their EP representatives. Thus, the examination of who gets chosen to participate
in government and why is an important piece of research that allows us to assess how the
quality of representation varies across politicians, parties, and states.
Examining this interaction of party and individual electoral goals in the dynamic setting
of the EP once again allows for analysis across many electoral institutions and political
environments. Not only does the EP contain a large amount of variation in who serves–
legislator experience in government and party politics, age, gender, etc.–but it also contains
many different nationalities from several member states and several national parties. Unlike
national legislatures, this creates variation across groups of legislators in term of the political
institutions and the environments that elect these politicians. Many different aspects of
life at the EP influence individuals’ choices to run for office and their party’s choice to
nominate them. Using the goal seeking framework for European elections, this chapter
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argues that certain domestic conditions and party goals make it more or less likely that
specific types of politicians (or non-politicians) are chosen by their parties to serve in the EP.
These types include politicians highly experienced in national government or national party
leadership and inexperienced politicians with no government or party experience. Explaining
the choice of a national party to choose a given type of politician helps to unravel the puzzle
of representation in this mutli-level institution and assess how the quality of democracy in
the EU varies across parties and member states.
The theoretical insight of this chapter rests on the assumption that different national
parties view the role of MEPs differently. Any casual observer of the EP knows that each
seat in the institution is not equal in the eyes of national parties and incentives to serve
in the EP vary widely. In 2009, salaries among MEPs were harmonized to about e92,000
annually, to be paid buy the EU instead of being determined and paid by member states
as in previous years. While this created equality among MEPs in absolute terms, it altered
the incentives across member states for individuals to serve in the EP. For example, Italian
MEPs, the highest paid before 2009, took a pay cut from nearly e143,000 per year while
the Bulgarians, previously paid around e10,000, experienced an enormous boost in salary
(Mocan and Altindag 2013). In addition to relative salaries, vast differences exist across
these states, parties, and individuals in the desirability of the post, the value of an EP seat
for one’s individual career, and a party’s broader political agenda. It was apparent while
interviewing current MEPs that differences exist across individuals regarding motivations for
seeking office, career goals within and beyond the EP, and personal views on representation.
In addition, the previous chapter showed there are differences across parties with respect to
the the role of the MEP in decision making structures within parties, the place of EP office
in the hierarchy of elected positions, and the processes of candidate selection.
For example, large differences exist with respect to individual motivations for running
for, and holding, office. Parties in the United Kingdom consider campaign experience to be
a very important identifier of a high quality candidate for national office. The EP election
is viewed as a way for ambitious politicians to campaign for and win an election before
being promoted or placed in competition for national office. Therefore, if one desires to
serve in Westminster, the EP is a suitable way to gain more political experience before
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running for national office.1 In contrast, many German MEPs think the idea of serving in
the Bundestag is uninteresting, and in some respects less important, than legislating at the
EP level. To them, the EP is thought to be far more powerful and exciting than legislating
at home and MEPs rarely return to national office.2 As Chapter 3 reported, differences
are also clear with respect to the treatment of incumbents. Some parties are organized to
create a large advantage for their current MEPs and others try to make their MEPs work for
reelection. This variation across individuals, parties, and member states creates the unique
opportunity to observe and analyze candidate selection and legislator choice in a diverse
multi-level system. In the legislature, there are many different types of legislators among its
members from many different national parties and national electoral systems, with variation
in the organization of their parties and their political experience. Below is a just a small
sample, taken from the seventh session (2009-2014), of the plethora of politician types you
can find in the legislature at any given time.3
• Luigi Ciriaco Da Mita is an Italian politician who made a career in national politics
before entering the EP. Joining the EP in 1988, he had a long tenure in the Italian
Chamber of Deputies, held several ministerial positions, and was once prime minister.
He is a lawyer by training and was elected with the Union of Christian and Christian
Democrats (UDC) in the 2009 election. He remained in the parliament until 2013. This
is an example of what I call a national politician turned MEP, having left national politics
to finish his career in the EP. His party, the UDC, placed third in the Italian national
election prior to 2009, so they were neither the ruling party nor the main opposition.4
They are also largely uninterested in European Affairs, having hardly mentioned Europe
in their party manifesto for the European elections. Given this lack of interest, it is
unsurprising that the party has no formal process of candidate selection for European
elections and the party leadership does not include an MEP.
• Pál Schmitt is a Hungarian politician who made a career as a diplomat and Olympic
1Interviews 6.5.2013, 6.7.2013, 6.18.2013, European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium
2Interviews 6.4.2013, 6.6.2013, 6.18.2013, 9.18.2013, European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium.
3For more information on the data sources for MEP information, please see Chapter 4, Section 4.4. For
the electoral data see section 4.3 of this chapter (4) and for party organization see Chapter 3, Section 3.5.
4The Italian general election closest to the 2009 European election took place in April of 2008.
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fencer before entering the EP. He had been the president of the World Olympian Associ-
ation and the Hungarian ambassador to Spain and Switzerland. He entered the EP with
Fidesz (Hungarian Civic Alliance) in 2004 and was re-elected in 2009, but left the par-
liament in 2010. Fidesz won the majority in the Hungarian national election and he left
to serve in the Hungarian National Assembly. He became the president of the assembly
and was elected as the fourth president of Hungary later that year. Mr. Schmitt is an
example of a European elite, serving as a diplomat before moving through the EP to enter
national politics. In 2009, his party was in opposition in Hungary and Schmitt was a well
known figure chosen to run for office. At the time of the European elections, Fidesz had
experienced a significant loss in the previous national election and had a constituency
with a higher than average interest in European elections. However this party did not
have formal procedures for the treatment of their MEPs until 2014.
• Martin Schulz is perhaps one of the best known figures of the EP, having served as its
president in the seventh and now eighth term (2014-2019). He is a German politician
and member of the SPD. Before becoming EP president, he served as the leader of the
socialist European party group, the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats
(previously the Party of European Socialists). Prior to his EP service, he held only
municipal and mayoral positions in the German government, but was an active member
of his party, holding a position in the federal executive. He has been an MEP since 1994
and held many leadership positions in the EP prior to his presidency. Mr. Schulz is an
example of a European Politician who has made a career in the institution. His party
was part of the ruling grand coalition and had a strong interest in European affairs in
2009. It also has a centralized process of candidate selection but no formal requirement
that MEPs participate in party leadership.
• Marek Henryk Migalski is a Polish politician entering the EP with no political experi-
ence and no national party leadership experience. Marek holds a PhD in Political Science
and worked as an academic before he was elected for the Polish Law and Justice Party
(PiS); however, he never became a formal member of the party even after he entered the
EP. He is a Newcomer to the political scene. While not a member of the PiS, this party
still chose him to run for the 2009 election. At this time, the party had just left national
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government after a 2007 election following the dissolution of the Sejm. They remained
in opposition through 2009, but had no strong preferences for European integration nor
a constituency that was particularly interested. Candidate selection is centralized in the
PiS and they do incorporate MEPs into their leadership.
All of these members of the seventh parliament have different experiences and likely
held different career goals at their time of entry. Table 8 summarizes the variation across
these examples. As the table shows, they are all from different countries and serve different
parties or themselves (as is the case of the non-partisan Migalski). Just as their experience
and career goals differ, so does the treatment of European elections within their parties
as the columns of Centralized Selection and Inclusive Leadership indicate. Some of the
parties were in opposition at the time of the 2009 elections, while others were in national
government. Some were relatively new parties and some were long established parties. All
of these characteristics contributed to the election of each individual and this chapter will
investigate the nature of that influence.
Table 8: Examples of Politicians in the European Parliament
MEP Party Country Type Centralized 
Selection 
Inclusive 
Leadership 
Luigi Circiaco Da Mita UDC Italy National Politician No Formal None 
Pál Schmitt Fidesz Hungary National Politician No Formal None 
Martin Schulz SPD Germany European Politician Yes None 
Marek Henryk Migalski PiS (non-member) Poland Newcomer Yes Yes 
 
4.1 POLITICAL AMBITION AND EUROPEAN LEGISLATORS
If the strategic goals of political parties structure politician behavior in elections, then the
strategic goals of individuals structure their own work in a legislature in reaction to party
behavior. Legislators wishing to remain within their institution behave in systematic ways
that are distinct from the behavior of those that wish to move to another institution. Politi-
cians with progressive ambition use each elected position as a way to move up to a more
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desirable office, while those with static ambition forge long careers in the same institution
(Schlesinger 1966; Palmer and Simon 2003). The EP is characterized as an institution that
houses both static and progressive kinds of legislators, those looking to return to national
office and using the EP as a “stepping stone," and those whose main interest lies in EU
politics (Daniel 2015, 6).5 Politicians both coming from and seeking to return to national
politics will behave differently in the EP than their Europe-inclined peers, especially with
respect to their relationship with their national party. Therefore parties must consider an
individual’s career ambitions when considering who will serve in the EP.
A substantial body of literature exists addressing the role of individual legislators’ per-
sonal ambition, and the relationship between experience and legislative activity (Daniel 2015,
2013; Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard 2009). This research suggests that individuals with
goals in European careers behave very differently from their nationally inclined colleagues
(Borchert 2011; Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard 2009). These authors argue that politi-
cians seeking national political careers will adhere to national party preferences and those
seeking careers in the EP will be much more integrated into the European party system.
Once in the EP, they argue that nationally ambitious politicians will seek to preserve the
sovereign powers of the member state and will be less supportive of integrative policy. In
contrast, those seeking careers in the EP will work with the EPGs to increase the power
of the Eurpoean institution in which they serve (Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard 2009).
These type of politicians have become more distinct over time, as the EPGs and the EP it-
self evolved and became more powerful (Kreppel 2001). When conflict arises between EPGs
and national delegations, European ambitious MEPs have incentives to cater more to their
EP colleagues than their national peers. These groups have a large amount of control over
leadership positions in the EP so any desire to grow your career in the Parliament must
be realized through these groups. In contrast, those wishing to return to national politics
are much more likely to side with their national peers to show that they are “good" party
politicians in hopes of ultimately gaining a more lucrative seat back home.
5Daniel (2015) also mentions the long held belief of EP scholars that the EP is a retirement home for
national politicians that spend the last few years of their careers in the EP before leaving politics all together.
Daniel (2015) and I both find this is no longer the case in the most recent sessions of the EP. However, even
if this were the case, I would consider these politicians to really have no career ambitions, having already
experienced their glory days in office.
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Political career goals are explicitly linked to party candidate selection because national
parties choose whom to place on the ballot. Individuals determine their behavior based on
their goals for their careers in the future. National parties determine the implications of
choosing certain candidates to seek and possibly gain office in the EP relative to their more
general party objectives. Candidate recruitment and nomination mechanisms are impor-
tant for the type of representative a party gets (Wessels 1997). Recruitment and selection
strategies determine how several thousand eligible citizens are narrowed to a pool of a few
select people that are able to run for elected office and represent the party (Mühlbock 2012;
Putnam 1976). In most western democracies, this recruitment process has produced a pro-
fessional core of politicians that make careers out of public office and tend to be highly
educated, male, and middle aged (Wessels 1997). These professional politicians are more
likely to maintain the structure of centralized party leadership and accountability to elites
over the pressures of interest or citizens groups (Gunther and Diamond 2003; Norris 1997a;
Ware 1979). If candidate selection and list placement is the privilege of elite leadership then
we are more likely to see candidates selected that represent the interests of the elite as the
result of a party’s electoral strategy. The stronger a MEPs ties are with their national party,
the more likely they will be loyal agents for the party when serving in an institution. There-
fore candidates with national government experience or previous national party leadership
will provide better representation of a party’s interest. If some parties value policy making
more than maximizing office, they will likely choose these “high" quality candidates that
are experienced in working at the European level; namely incumbents with several years of
experience. If they value office over policy, which is the case especially in situations where
the election is serving as a referendum on the national government, they may seek to put
candidates on the list that are the most recognizable even though they may be “low" quality
candidates with little experience working in Europe or little desire to forge a career there
(Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard 2009).
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4.2 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT CANDIDATE SELECTION
The interests of elites in parties contesting European elections are determined by their elec-
toral goals. These goals lead parties to make strategic choices for candidacy. Candidate
selection methods increase or decrease the likelihood their goals will be realized in their
choice for electoral candidates. Parties lie on the demand side of the principal-agent rela-
tionship where a legislator must supply certain behavior (Norris 1997b). Their preferences
over behavior are determined by the goals of national parties given the structure of the na-
tional electoral systems and the availability of office (Pemstein2015). Just like individuals,
national parties must determine the costs and benefits of choosing certain candidates to seek
and possibly gain office in the EP. Electoral goals determine how to manage these choices
and the types of candidates selected are the visible product of these considerations. Office
seeking parties will seek new politicians to both reward their loyalty to the party and to
fill seats in the EP. Vote seeking parties will maximize votes in the election. Policy seeking
parties will choose experienced, educated, “European" politicians to work for party goals in
the EP.
Office seeking parties view the European elections as a way to gain office when domestic
positions are harder for them to attain. Parties that have recently lost a national election can
also be office seeking since EP elections offer additional opportunities for placing members in
office (Pemstein, Meserve and Bernhard 2015). The Hungarian party Fidesz is an example
of an office seeking party. Having lost 2 straight national elections, Fidesz had been kept
out of government for seven years between 2002 and 2006. During much of this time, party
leader Pál Schmitt served in the European parliament. He was placed on the top of the
European ballot and elected to the EP in both 2004 and 2009. However, after a landslide
victory for Fidesz in the national elections of 2010, Pal left the EP to join the national
parliament, having served less than one year of his EP term for the seventh session and
became the Hungarian president upon election by the National Assembly. It appears his
service in the EP may have just been an opportunity to hold office until national conditions
improved for the party. Following from this example, when choosing candidates for the EP,
office seeking parties should favor national politicians to make up for fewer opportunities for
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office at home.
H1: Office seeking goals will increase the probability national politicians will serve in the
EP.
Parties that have too few offices to offer their loyal members can use European elections
as an additional opportunity to offer rewards to their members or as an opportunity to
provide campaign experience to newer party members that have not yet sought office. If EP
elections are rather low stakes, then placing a newcomer on the ballot can provide gains in
experience at a relatively low cost. For instance, parties struggling electorally may be more
likely to “clean house" and contest the elections with politicians that were not involved in
their previous defeat. Therefore I also hypothesize that office seeking parties will choose to
send national politicians that have recently lost office or new politicians to the EP.
H2: Office seeking will increase the probability new politicians will serve in the EP.
Vote seeking parties wish to nominate candidates that are well known and attractive in
order to draw voters to their lists and increase the amount of votes they receive in the election.
For example, in 2009, a Portuguese MEP was asked to run on a vote seeking party’s list for
three specific, vote-maximizing reasons.6 First, she was a woman and the party thought it
needed women on the list to win. Second, she was from a particular region in which this party
had failed to win in the last national election and needed representation in the EP election.
Third, she had worked closely with the party president and was said to have brought a certain
amount of prestige to the list.7 These vote maximizing strategies elevate the public face of
the party and the perception of public approval for parties in opposition and government
alike. The strategy works to attract votes to the opposition, either as genuine support for
the party or as protest votes against the current ruling coalition. Governing parties want to
attract votes to maintain the perception of having the public’s confidence. For vote seeking
parties, we would expect to see politicians on the EP candidate list that have recognizable
names or desirable attributes for the electorate. These are usually experienced, well known
6Discussion of how I empirically classify office seeking, vote seeking, policy seeking is forthcoming in
Section 4.3 of this chapter.
7Interview 9.25.2013, European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium.
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politicians and party members that have a long tenure in office and in the party at the
national or European level.
H3: Vote seeking will increase the probability experienced candidates (national politi-
cians, national party leaders, and incumbents) will serve in the EP.
Policy seeking parties want candidates that can work effectively in the EP if elected.
These parties seek out experienced candidates in European politics or diplomacy or candi-
dates with a specific type of expertise to push their interests in an increasingly technical
EP. One way parties promote policy goals is through reliance on EPGs. These parties have
likely had success in placing well experienced MEPs in the European parliament who know
how to work within the system and have already proven their ability deliver on party goals.
For example, the UK Liberal Democrats is a policy seeking party and has strong ties with
the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) in the EP. In the seventh term
of the EP, over half of the delegation members had served in the Parliament since 1999 or
earlier. A sixth term leader of the ALDE group in parliament went on to become the pres-
ident of the entire ALDE organization. When considering candidates for the EP election,
the party explicitly seeks members that have expertise in a specific policy area related to
Europe.8 As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Liberal Democrats use a pre-approval process
to screen candidates. This process for candidacy is tailored for European candidates and
consists of assessments in policy areas specific to Europe.9 All policy seeking parties desire
the same level of competence in European affairs in their MEPs and should seek out MEPs
with experience and knowledge at this level.
H4: Policy seeking will increase the probability previous EP party leaders and incumbents
will serve in the EP.
If we consider the electoral goals of a party to also be dictated, in part, by the structure of
opportunities in any given political system, systemic factors that vary by party and member
state also play a role in choosing representatives for the EP. Party age may affect how well a
party can identify its needs and strategize effectively. Older parties are more established in
8Interview 6.17.2013 European Parliament, Brussels Belgium.
9Information on this process is available in the form of an information packet available at
http://www.libdems.org.uk/become_a_candidate (accessed on April 30, 2015).
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their party systems and are likely better able to accurately predict their electoral outcomes.
They also have a larger supply of candidates and are thus able to manage the demands
of a multi-level system more easily. Therefore, I expect older parties to be more able to
accommodate their “quality" members at the national level and less likely to need to use
European elections as holding a ground between national elections.
Variation among member states in the structure of their legislative, governmental, and
party systems also produces variation in the structure of opportunities for parties at the
national and European level. Federal systems, like Germany, Austria, and Belgium already
participate in multi-level politics at the national level and should thus be better able to
manage the demands of filling European office more easily. Parties in federal states will have
politicians that move more freely between levels of government and are thus likely to work
in multiple positions before joining the EP. In contrast, states with bicameral legislatures
should have less need to put experienced politicians in the EP, as they have many more
opportunities for national office in their home state. Party system fractionalization also
limits the number of opportunities for any single party by increasing the competition for
seats among parties.
4.3 IDENTIFYING PARTY GOALS
In order to identify which parties can be categorized as having which type of electoral goals,
I compiled a data set of electoral goals with contextual country level and party system
characteristics by utilizing the European Election Studies contextual and manifesto data,
the European Elections Database, and the Eurobarometer survey (EES 2009a; Czesnik,
Kotnarowski and Markowski 2010; EuropeanComission 2009). I identify parties that hold
office seeking goals as those that have experienced a significant seat loss in the national
election directly preceding the European election of interest.10 For this study, this will be
10Change in seat share is for the lower house of a legislature. A list of institutions is available in Table 33
in Section B.1 in Appendix B. This table also includes a score for bicameralism that is used in the analysis of
chapters 3 and 5. This score is taken from the European Elections Contextual Data (Czesnik, Kotnarowski
and Markowski 2010), which takes the measure from the Comparative Political Dataset III, which uses the
bicameralism index provided by Lijphart (1999).
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the election in each member state immediately preceding the May 2009 European election
and a significant seat loss is defined as a ten percent loss of the total number of seats held
by a party in the previous session of the national legislature.11 For example, in the 2005
election for the Portuguese Assembly, the Social Democrats had the largest vote loss (28.6%)
and obtained only 75 seats in the assembly where it had previously held 105. Since this loss
is greater than 10%, the party is coded as having experienced a significant loss. Table 35 in
Appendix B displays the electoral data for parties and electoral coalitions included in this
chapter. The Portuguese Social Democrats represent that largest seat loss, while Lega Nord
of Italy had the highest national gains preceding the European election with an increase of
130.8% between their 2006 and 2008 elections. In 2006 the party won 26 seats, but won 60 in
2008. The average loss experienced by a party in the preceding national election was ∼ 16%
and the average gain was ∼ 44%. Overall, seventeen parties experienced a significant loss.
Figure 4: Empirical Indicators Electoral Goals
11The dates of the last national, parliamentary elections held before the 2009 European elections are listed
in Table 34 in Appendix B. The closest election was in Romania in November of 2008 and earliest election
was February of 2005 in Portugal.
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Table 9: Frequency of Empirical Indicators By Party
Empirical Indicator # of Parties Percent 
Significant Loss 17 37% 
No Representation 4 9% 
Majority Minority 14 30% 
Government 19 41% 
Strong Preferences 19 41% 
Salience of Euro Election 17 37% 
 
Coding for vote seeking parties is relatively straightforward. The contextual data of the
European Election Studies was used to determine which parties had ministers in the current
government at the time of the election, while the electoral data allows the identification of
the majority minority party.
Finally, in order to code policy seeking goals, the Eurobarometer of January and February
of 2009 was used to first gauge the salience of EP elections in each party’s electorate and
then manifesto data was used to gauge preferences for integration. The Eurobarometer study
surveyed citizens of each EU member state and, this particular version, asks questions specific
to the European Parliament elections of 2009. For the purpose of calculating salience, the
survey includes questions identifying both the party for with which the respondent identifies
and their level of interest in the election. The survey also asks which party respondents voted
for in the previous national election and asks how interested they are in the forthcoming
European election. For a party to be identified as having a constituency where European
elections are salient, the party needed to have a previous voting constituency that held an
interest in the top quartile of the data. In this particular case, the cutoff was around 61%.
Table 36 in Appendix B displays the constituent interest in European elections of each party.
The party with the highest interest among their supporters is the liberal-conservative party
of Romania, Partidul Democrat-Liberal. The party with the least amount of interest is the
right-wing, Partij voor de Vrijheid in the Netherlands.12 Based on the parties used in the
12GERB of Bulgaria is technically listed as having zero supporters interested in European Elections,
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analysis, the country with the most interested party supporters on average is Romania and
the lowest is Poland.
The party manifesto data from the European Election Study of 2009 was used to identify
parties that have strong European agendas, both positive and negative (EES 2009b). The
manifesto data offers a quantification of many different subjects addressed in the election
manifestos of national parties for the 2009 European election. It codes the number of times
parties mention European integration in their electoral programs, both positive and negative.
It also offers a summary measure of integration views where the sum of integration skeptic
views are subtracted from the sum of positive mentions of integration to produce a total score
of pro-anti views on a scale from -100 (skeptic) to 100 (supportive). In order to produce
an indicator of intense European views, a measure of absolute distance from the mean was
calculated.13 The highest quartile of this distribution was identified as parties that hold the
most intense views of European integration. The distribution of this distance ranges from
0.52 to 80.78 where the cut-off for the top quartile is 11.11, which includes 17 parties. The
integration score for each party and its absolute distance from the mean is listed in Table 37
in Appendix B. The parties with preferences closest to the mean are Il Popolo della Liberatá
and Christliche-Soziale Union of Germany (∼ 0.5) and the furthest from the mean is the
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) with (∼ 80.8). In terms of specific views on
integration, the country with the most positive parties, on average, is Romania and the least
positive is the United Kingdom (which is largely driven by UKIP). Of the two measures of
policy seeking, only six parties meet the criteria for both (ÖVP, CDA, PASOK, PD-L, PNL,
PSD-PC).14
The coding of these goals is meant to be simplistic in order to capture a very fundamental
level of differences across parties. Figure 5 identifies the distribution of goals across national
parties. In Appendix B, Table 38 identifies the country and party of each abbreviation used
in Figure 5. In this table, a single plus (“+") indicates the party is identified as having
however, this is due to the fact that the variable accounts for previous party voters that are interested in
European elections and because GERB is a new party, it has no previous supporters
13Absolute Distance = |PRO/ANTIScore− 3.865099|
14This measurement of policy seeking is meant to be strict and include only those parties whose views
and consituents are substantially different than most. In Appendix D, the identification of moderate policy
seeking parties in addition to strong policy seekers is reported along with the results of the main analysis of
the dissertation with this alternative measure.
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Figure 5: National Party Electoral Goals
one factor of these goals, additional plus signs indicates having additional factors. Eighteen
parties are office seeking (∼ 39%), thirty-two are vote seeking (∼ 70%), and twenty are
policy seeking (∼ 43%). The most common singular goal held by parties is vote seeking with
twelve parties (∼ 26%). There are three parties each (∼ 7%) holding only office seeking or
policy seeking goals.
Fourteen parties hold at least two concurrent goals (∼ 30%) and eight parties (∼ 17%)
hold all three goals simultaneously. Table 10 displays the number of parties in each goal
configuration. Another important feature of the data to note is that six parties (Die Linke,
FDP, IdV, UDC, S, SLD-UP) are coded as having none of the goals described above. For
an example of why this occurs, consider the SLD-UP in Poland. This party is the third
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Table 10: Frequency of Goal Types By Party
Goals  # of Parties Percent Cum. 
None 6 13% 13% 
Office 3 7% 20% 
Votes 12 26% 46% 
Policy 3 7% 52% 
Office and Policy 2 4% 57% 
Office and Votes 5 11% 67% 
Votes and Policy 7 15% 83% 
Office, Votes, and Policy 8 17% 100% 
Total 46 100%   
 
largest Polish opposition party and in June 2009 held neither the majority nor the largest
opposition status. It is a center-left party with middle of the road views on integration (6.7)
and about 40% of its supporters interested in the European Election. In the 2007 Polish
election, it had only a modest loss of seats in the Sejm (3.6%). Similarly, the German liberal
party FDP, has often been a junior coalition party in the federal government but it did not
serve in this role between 1998 and September 2009 when there was a grand coalition. It
also holds middle range views on integration (5.2), with a somewhat disinterested electorate
(38%), and had gained several seats in the 2005 election (∼ 30%).15 If we compare electoral
goals in Eastern and Western Europe, the first thing to note is the less prevalent policy goals
in Eastern Europe.16 Twenty-seven percent of parties in Eastern Europe are policy seeking,
while 50% of parties are in Western Europe. While parties are concentrated in vote seeking
in both regions with office seeking being the least common goal, no Eastern European parties
hold all three goals simultaneously.
15Given the electoral loss the FDP experienced in the September 2013 federal election and their failure to
pass the electoral threshold for representation, this party would certainly be an office seeking party in the
2014 European Election.
16Separate maps of the distributions of goals among Eastern and Western Europe are available in Appendix
B, Section B.1, Figures 17 and 16.
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4.4 WHO ARE THE MEPS?
In order to measure what types of politicians parties select for the EP, this study focuses on
MEPs who served in the seventh session. While these politicians are not proper candidates
anymore, they do represent a certain subset of candidates for the EP. These MEPs, in
the vast majority of cases, were selected by their parties to hold the top positions on the
candidate lists in the 2009 European elections. About 28% of these MEPs held the first
position on their party lists, another 17% held the second position and another 10% held the
third position. This means 55% of all MEPs serving in the seventh Parliament were listed
in one of the top three spots of their party’s list. Furthermore, a full 87% were placed in a
top ten position. So while the sample here is not of the whole population of candidates, or
all parties contesting the European election, it is a sample of those top candidates, or the
very best example of a party’s most preferred choice for the election.
The diversity of backgrounds and experience for MEPs is measured in terms of past
national political service, past EP service, service to national party leadership, and European
party group leadership. This information for each MEP in the seventh session of Parliament
(2009-2014) was taken from MEP curriculum vitae that are made publicly available on the
EP website and is supplemented by the personal websites of MEPs when necessary along
with a MEP’s history of EP parliamentary service. Education is also included in the data
by simply coding the highest level of education obtained by the MEP and any specialized
professional degree the MEP may have (law or MD). Past political service is coded on various
levels, providing a unique data set that separates MEPs from one another on the basis of
having served at the regional level (federal or regional state parliaments) or in national
parliaments, cabinet positions, or prime minster positions. This allows the data to account
for MEPs that have held multiple positions within their member state and indicates the level
of government for which they have served. Party leadership indicates whether an MEP has
ever served in the national leadership (executive) of their party or in a regional leadership
executive position. EP leadership experience refers to MEPs that have ever held a leadership
position within the European party group.
The data show a large amount of variation in the past experience and service of MEPs,
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Table 11: Frequency of Politician Types
  Experience Type # of MEPs % of Total MEPs 
(1) Regional and National Gov Exp 239 43.40% 
(2) National Party Leadership Experience 209 38.90% 
(3) EP Incumbent 287 52.10% 
(4) EPG Leadership Experience  165 30.10% 
(5) No Gov Exp 157 28.50% 
(6) No Party Exp 188 34.90% 
(7) New 163 31.90% 
 
suggesting that types of politicians chosen by parties at the national level is nonstandard and
likely subject to strategic considerations or considerations of party resources and investments.
Only about 50% of MEPs were incumbents in 2009, suggesting that turnover remains high
in the EP. In terms of past national political experience, just over 40%, have held regional or
national legislative positions. Party service is unevenly distributed among parties with only
about 38% of MEPs having served in leadership positions, either presently or in the past.
Variation also exists across countries and across parties with some parties having no MEPs
that have previously held leadership positions within the party and some parties that only
have current or past party leaders. European party group service is the least common type
of positions for MEPs to hold with only about 30% having participated in the management
of the party group. Table 11 presents the breakdown of experience, which is subsequently
used as the seven dependent variables for the analysis, with the addition of politicians that
have neither government nor party experience or are completely new to politics. Table 12
shows the distribution of MEPs across party types with respect to electoral goals.
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Table 12: Frequency of MEPs by Party Types
Goal Type Frequency Percent Cum. 
None 43 8.14% 8.14% 
Office 23 4.36% 12.50% 
Office and Policy 18 3.41% 15.91% 
Office and Vote 84 15.91% 31.82% 
Office, Vote, and Policy 61 11.55% 43.37% 
Policy 33 6.25% 49.62% 
Vote 181 34.28% 83.90% 
Vote and Policy 85 16.10% 100.00% 
 
4.5 TESTING GOALS AS PREDICTORS OF CANDIDATE SELECTION
In order to test the hypotheses about the relationship between party goals and the choice
of politician type, a series of maximum likelihood estimation models will again be used for
analysis. The relationship between office seeking, vote seeking, and policy seeking goals
and the likelihood each type of politician serves in the EP is modeled in a series of logistic
regressions.17 I estimate the models using robust standard errors clustered on countries but
also include several party and country level variables to control for variation across member
states and parties with respect to institutional and party system factors. The results of the
first set of models, testing the relationship between party goals and the choice of experienced
politicians, are presented in Table 13. The results in Table 13 report the marginal effects of
each type of electoral goal on the likelihood that a member of the EP will be one of 4 types.
Either they will have held past regional or national government positions (1), or national
party leadership positions (2), are incumbents (3), or have past EPG leadership experience
17With the exception of the “new" type who has no experience at all, the categories are not mutually
exclusive and therefore an observation of a MEP may appear in more than one model. Accordingly, I chose
to keep seven different models instead of developing a rank or multinomial category to identify politician
types. While collapsing these categories into a more manageable index would make for a more concise
analysis, the different politician types are not independent of one other, thus making any type of ordered or
multinomial index statistically untenable.
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(4). In addition to these models, Table 14 reports marginal effects of the independent
variables on the likelihood of inexperienced politician types serving in the EP. These are
those MEPS with no government experience (5), no party experience (6), or neither party
nor government experience (complete newcomers) (7).18 Overall, the results of the models
provide evidence that electoral goals are in fact significant predictors of politician type.
4.5.1 The Effects of Office Seeking Goals
These models suggest that parties with office seeking goals are more likely to place inexpe-
rienced MEPs in office over their nationally experienced peers. The results of the analysis
show that office seeking parties, whether office seeking is a pure goal or combined with policy
seeking, increases the likelihood that new politicians, those without government experience,
and party members with no leadership experience will serve in the EP. These results support
H2, which hypothesized that electoral defeat at the national level may induce parties to
“clean house" before European elections and seek new politicians for office. The strongest,
positive effect of pure office seeking is on the probability of politicians with no prior national
government experience serving in the EP (7). Inexperienced MEPs are 27% more likely to
serve office seeking parties than non-office seeking parties. Similarly, MEPs with no party
leadership experience are about 25% more likely and MEPs with neither government nor
party experience are 15% more likely to serve these parties than non-office seeking parties.
Figure 6 shows the change in probability for both inexperienced and experienced politician
types, comparing office and non-office seeking parties.
Given that office seeking electoral goals are positively and significantly related to the
presence of inexperienced politicians in the EP, it is unsurprising that this relationship is
significant but negatively related to the presence of experienced politicians. In fact, pure
office seeking goals reduce the probability of national politicians serving in the EP by nearly
44% versus non-office seeking goals. In addition, office seeking goals are not a significant
predictor of incumbents, therefore I cannot make any conclusions about the relationship of
this goal to the re-selection of an incumbent. The effect of office seeking goals also remains
18Note that for some politician types, incumbency is omitted as a control variable given there are no
observations of incumbents in these categories (no government experience, incumbents, and new politicians).
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Table 13: Party Goals and Experienced Politician Types
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Regional and 
National Gov 
Experience 
National Party  
Leadership 
Experience 
Incumbent EPG 
Leadership 
Experience 
     
Office -0.315*** -0.324*** 0.056 -0.142*** 
 (0.046) (0.048) (0.071) (0.051) 
Office and Vote -0.043 -0.201*** 0.210*** -0.107 
 (0.082) (0.046) (0.061) (0.083) 
Office and Policy -0.352*** 0.003 0.037 -0.227*** 
 (0.079) (0.113) (0.087) (0.036) 
Office, Vote, and Policy -0.067 -0.105 0.089 -0.056 
 (0.105) (0.097) (0.074) (0.083) 
Vote 0.095* -0.146 0.182*** -0.072 
 (0.055) (0.125) (0.065) (0.095) 
Vote and Policy -0.002 -0.206** 0.151*** -0.188** 
 (0.064) (0.093) (0.044) (0.092) 
Policy -0.092 -0.084 0.175** -0.150** 
 (0.073) (0.152) (0.086) (0.059) 
Party Age -0.002** -0.001 0.001* -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Time since last election -0.007** -0.003 0.002 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Bicameral -0.092 0.010 -0.005 -0.028 
 (0.102) (0.110) (0.067) (0.083) 
Federalism 0.040 -0.137 0.052 0.314*** 
 (0.086) (0.117) (0.055) (0.081) 
Effective Number of Parties -0.040 0.023 0.008 0.015 
 (0.028) (0.039) (0.018) (0.025) 
Eurozone 0.019 0.065 -0.097 -0.071 
 (0.065) (0.071) (0.062) (0.046) 
Advanced Education 0.026 0.005 0.033 -0.030 
 (0.058) (0.035) (0.056) (0.025) 
Age 0.013*** 0.000 0.016*** 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Incumbent 0.013 0.141***  0.287*** 
 (0.038) (0.048)  (0.047) 
     
Observations 514 514 514 514 
Pseudo R-sqaure 0.129 0.0641 0.100 0.162 
Wald chi2(12) 4515 416.6 1652 3982 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std. Err adjusted for 18 clusters 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 14: Party Goals and Inexperienced Politician Types
 (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES No Gov 
Experience 
No Party 
Experience 
New 
    
Office 0.258*** 0.256*** 0.195*** 
 (0.073) (0.084) (0.066) 
Office and Vote -0.059 0.172 0.083 
 (0.061) (0.111) (0.076) 
Office and Policy 0.287** 0.251*** 0.409*** 
 (0.135) (0.091) (0.111) 
Office, Vote, and Policy 0.031 0.080 0.113 
 (0.096) (0.116) (0.075) 
Vote -0.092* 0.061 0.027 
 (0.048) (0.095) (0.062) 
Vote and Policy -0.029 0.205* 0.070 
 (0.050) (0.115) (0.068) 
Policy 0.004 0.228*** 0.083 
 (0.082) (0.075) (0.105) 
Party Age 0.000 0.002** 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Time since last election -0.001 0.004 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Bicameral 0.011 0.073 -0.009 
 (0.067) (0.082) (0.053) 
Federalism 0.005 -0.195*** -0.043 
 (0.039) (0.072) (0.037) 
Effective Number of Parties 0.020* -0.034 0.000 
 (0.012) (0.037) (0.021) 
Eurozone 0.058 -0.035 0.048* 
 (0.039) (0.053) (0.028) 
Advanced Education -0.029 -0.018 -0.021 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.032) 
Age -0.015*** -0.002 -0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Incumbent  -0.182***  
  (0.040)  
    
Observations 514 514 514 
Pseudo R-sqaure 0.136 0.0878 0.0708 
Wald chi2(12) 413.5 1052 1439 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std. Err adjusted for 18 clusters 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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robust with the addition of policy seeking goals to this electoral strategy (office and policy),
providing further evidence in support of H2.19 However, because these models show us
that the presence of national government and party experienced politicians are unlikely,
I do not find evidence to support H1, which hypothesized that office seeking parties will
use European elections to compensate national politicians that have recently lost office.
Instead, it appears parties experiencing electoral difficulties at the national level choose to
use European elections to incorporate new and inexperienced politicians into the ranks of
their elected officials.
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Figure 6: Predicted Probability of Politician Type in Office Seeking Parties
19Figures 18 and 19 in Appendix B, Section B.2 display the predicted probabilities for variables representing
goal combinations.
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4.5.2 The Effects of Vote Seeking Goals
The results of the analysis also show that vote seeking electoral goals have a significant, but
opposite, effect of office seeking on politician type. H3 hypothesized vote seeking parties
will be more likely to place experienced politicians in the EP, both those experienced at the
national and European level. The results of the analysis provide support for this hypoth-
esis. Vote seeking electoral goals are significantly and positively related to the presence of
national politicians and incumbents in the EP. While vote seeking is a positive predictor of
both nationally experienced politicians and incumbents, the substantive effect is larger with
incumbents. Incumbents are 18.5% more likely to serve in the EP in vote seeking parties
than non-vote seeking parties and national politicians 9.6% more likely. In contrast, new
politicians are 9.2% less likely to serve vote seeking parties than non-vote seeking parties.
The predicted probabilities of the significant vote seeking relationships are reported in Figure
7. These results are consistent with the estimates of vote and policy seeking goals, where
incumbents are again 15.4% more likely to serve these parties than non-vote and policy seek-
ing parties. This hypothesis also predicted that national party leaders were likely to serve
vote seeking parties in the EP but I do not find evidence for this relationship. Overall, the
models show that MEPs with national party leadership experience are unlikely, regardless
of the electoral strategy of parties.
4.5.3 The Effects of Policy Seeking Goals
Finally, the results provide evidence that policy seeking parties are more likely than non-
policy seekers to choose politicians with European experience for EP office. The relationship
between policy seeking and the presence of incumbents is positive and significant. As Figure
8 reports, the predicted probability of incumbents serving in the EP increases by 18.4%
with the presence of purely policy seeking goals. In addition, policy seekers are less likely
to send experienced party members to the EP, perhaps suggesting that their EP cohort of
politicians is entirely separate from their national politicians. Perhaps European careers
are on a separate path in the party than that of national careers. These results provide
evidence, in part, to support H4, which hypothesized policy seeking parties are more likely
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Figure 7: Predicted Probability of Type in Vote Seeking Parties
to send incumbents and European party leaders to the EP. While the results with respect
to incumbents are as expected, the relationship between EP party experience is significant,
but negative. This is a curious result that remains to be explored in future research.
In sum, the results provide evidence that electoral goals are a determinant of politician
type, supporting hypotheses about the effects of electoral expectations and experience on
candidate selection. The results of the empirical analysis show that office seeking is the
most powerful predictor of politician type, predicting that national parties will select new
politicians after suffering a national electoral loss. These parties will rarely choose national
politicians, favoring a new class of politicians instead. Vote seeking is the second, strongest
predictor of type. The results show that vote seeking parties favor incumbents and national
politicians over those that are inexperienced. Finally, policy seeking goals are the weakest
in these models. This is likely partly due to the difficulty measuring policy seeking given
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Figure 8: Predicted Probability of Type in Policy Seeking Parties
the limitations of the data. Policy seeking positively predicts only the choice for incumbents
and non-national party leaders. One final result to note is that holding all electoral goals
simultaneously (office, vote, and policy seeking) is not a significant predictor of any politician
type. I would expect this since it is unclear what kind of politicians these parties would seek
to place in the EP when they hold all goals.
4.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The role of EP office has often been conceptualized as possessing two different functions.
On one hand, exemplified by the electoral experience of MEPs in the UK discussed in the
introduction, the EP can be a breeding ground for national politicians, or a “primary school
of politics." It is a place for newcomers to get their feet wet, prove they can win elections,
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and/or prove they can sustain office. On the other hand, it has also been characterized as
a retirement home for aging politicians that parties no longer want to hold domestic office
positions, but are unwilling to remove from politics all together. The research reported here
shows that this second idea, that of the EP as a retirement home, is no longer an accurate
description of the EP. It is much more likely that the EP is either a training ground for new
or young politicians or an institution with its own class of politicians. Parties may use the
office as a reward to their newest, most loyal, and most active young members or they may
have an entirely separate faction of party politicians dedicated to EP service. Especially
after examining the policy seeking results of the models, the results of the electoral goals
might represent growing tendencies to separate European from national politics within a
party’s electoral strategy.
Ultimately, this research contributes to the growing literature on the EP and the role of
national parties in the politics of this increasingly important institution. The results support
existing research claiming that European elections are second order national elections, where
parties and voters use national issues to decide the election (Reif and Schmitt 1980). How-
ever, I show that parties are acting strategically given their second order electoral goals while
simultaneously using them as opportunities to train new politicians. Which strategy per-
vades is dependent on the national electoral experience of each individual party. I also show
that the effect of second order elections on the composition of the EP is conditional. Some
parties opt to use the election purely for political gains in the national arena–office seeking
and vote seeking–while others are seeking to strategically place well qualified politicians in
office–policy seeking.
The analysis of this chapter highlights the conditions under which national parties will
select different types of candidates and concludes that newcomers are far more likely to be
chosen over experienced members of parties under a variety of conditions. This may be the
result of the growing tendencies for the EP to be a learning ground for national politics or a
separate political arena all together, with little switching between political levels. National
politicians are likely to join the EP only when parties are seeking to maximize their votes
in European elections. These are well known politicians with years of experience that are
likely to attract votes to their party’s list. The results also report that policy goals are
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weak predictors of candidate type. This suggests that preferences over European integration
and/or the salience of European elections within a party’s membership do not play a strong
role in developing the electoral strategy of a party for European elections. Since office seeking
and vote seeking goals are the result of purely national electoral experiences and motivations,
these findings support the persistence of second order elections when Europe’s parliament is
being elected. The implications of this are sure to be the subject of further study. If parties
are choosing to nominate and subsequently provide different types of politicians to the EP,
there is sure to be interesting variation in MEP behavior with respect to their member
states’, parties’, and constituents’ interests.
The results of this chapter have many implications for representation in the EP. This
analysis shows that the type of politician a party chooses to send the to the EP is usually
a direct result of national electoral politics and not strong policy concerns. This extends
the effect of the second order nature of European elections beyond just accountability and
legitimacy. Parties will choose their politicians for the EP to make strategic gains at the
national level, instead of considering the best way to represent any relevant policy interest
they may have. An institution composed of partly inexperienced legislators, nationally ambi-
tious legislators, and those seeking to hold European careers will naturally be unbalanced in
the quality of representation each individual constituency receives. In order to understand
this relationship more thoroughly, the next chapter will examine how the combination of
ambition and party organization influence legislative behavior directly.
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5.0 ELECTORAL GOALS, ORGANIZATION, AND LEGISLATIVE
BEHAVIOR
This final empirical chapter of the dissertation builds on the analysis of the previous two,
combining the data on party organization, electoral goals, and politician type to examine
how party and individual attributes work together to influence legislative outcomes. The
analysis investigates national party-MEP congruence, defined as the compatibility of MEP
voting behavior with their party’s ideological preferences, to determine under what condi-
tions parties encourage or discourage their most preferred actions. I examine the effects of
party centralization because parties are constrained in reaching their goals by three major
attributes of party organization: the centralization of decision making, the quality of re-
cruitment structures, and personnel accountability (Norris 1997a; Tavits 2013). As such, a
theory on party control and the relationship between national parties and MEPs requires
analysis of the centralization of candidate selection and supervision. All of these processes
play a role in determining the loyalty of a representative to their national party and the level
of policy congruence between domestic political parties and European legislative outcomes.
I argue that centralized parties with nationally ambitious MEPs and office or vote seeking
goals are more likely to experience compatible behavior from their MEPs. The careers of
these MEPs are not only controlled by the centralization of the party, these MEPs also often
wish to return to national politics and will cater to the national party in order to do so.
In addition to simultaneously testing all the theoretical components of the dissertation,
the analysis makes both a methodological and a substantive contribution to the EP liter-
ature on party politics. First, I introduce a new way of examining cohesion by comparing
the legislative activity of MEPs to their national parties’ policy preferences using a party
measure that is exogenous to the EP. I also examine behavior across both consequential and
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inconsequential legislation and across economic policy, foreign policy, and employment pol-
icy which allows for an in depth assessment of the impact of parties and individuals across
many different types of EP legislation. Second, I introduce the role of party organization for
cohesion in a novel way using the unique data I have collected on the treatment of MEPs
within their national parties. I find the level of congruence parties experience varies across
legislative procedures, policy areas, and parties and incumbent MEPs that are centrally se-
lected enjoy the highest level of congruence on consequential legislation and policy areas
where the EP has substantial power.
5.1 PARTY COHESION IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
Legislative politics and party cohesion within the EP are well studied but scholars disagree on
the relative strength of national parties in encouraging unity and enforcing discipline. There
is also substantial disagreement on the role of EPGs versus national parties in influencing
legislator behavior. For instance, Hix, Noury and Roland (2005) conclude that cohesion
between the party groups and their members increases with the size of EPGs, evolution
in the power of the parliament over time, and the presence of MEPs serving in governing,
national parties. This leads the authors to conclude that when faced with a choice between
two principals, the MEP is more likely side with the national party (Hix, Noury and Roland
2005). In a related study, Coman (2009) find that national parties only appear stronger
in Western Europe and Central and Eastern European MEPs are more likely to favor their
EPG. He argues that variation in the type of national party can account for much of the
variation in defect rates among MEPs. He identifies variation across party type through
differences in party and country specific variables that can be theoretically linked to party
control (e.g. ideological clarity of the party platform, the size of the national party, and
whether or not the party is in government). In addition to testing different party factors,
Coman also argues that one must test only those situations where conflict is present between
EPGs and national parties when voting in order to isolate the competition between these
groups (Coman 2009). In order to isolate the causal mechanisms that provide either the
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party group or the national party with more control over MEPs, Coman (2009) constructs
a model that tests the effect of several different variables on voting behavior using only
contested parliamentary votes where the EPG and the national party competed for MEP
loyalty.
In both of these studies, the preferences (Hix et al.) and the average behavior (Coman)
of both the EPGs and the national parties are taken from the roll call votes that are also
used in calculating cohesion or defection. While this data is useful in establishing patterns of
behavior across groups and individuals, it doesn’t tell us how cohesive the behavior of the na-
tional groups is to their national party at large. In most studies of EP legislative behavior or
cohesion, the dependent variables measure only when and how often an individual votes with
the majority of the members of his/her national party and/or EPG. They do not measure
whether individuals are voting the way they would be predicted to vote based on exogenous,
national preferences, nor do they take into account different legislative procedures or policy
areas. By assuming legislative behavior remains constant across legislative procedures and
policy areas in their analysis, these studies miss important variation. Because the EP has
varying levels of competence across policy areas, it cannot be expected that the value of each
piece of legislation remains constant.1 Parties value consequential legislation on policy areas
that are beyond the control of national governments over inconsequential resolutions in an
area where the EU has no power (foreign policy, for example).
Examining legislative behavior in a more nuanced way within the EP is important for
several reasons. Recall the example in the introduction of the dissertation of the UK Labour
Party and the working time directive. This vote was of particular importance to both the
Labour Party and its MEPs because it was a legislative vote on an amendment in a directive.
This means the result of such a vote, if the directive passes, is binding for member states.
Not all of the votes in the EP carry this kind of power. Many of the votes are non-legislative,
meaning they do not produce or amend binding legislation. This has obvious implications for
legislative behavior because the consequences of votes across legislative and non-legislative
procedures are not equal (Carruba et al. 2006; Lauderdale 2010). EPGs and national parties
1In EU vernacular, competence references the right to make policy in a given area, not the actual ability
to do so.
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should care more about consequential legislative votes and put more pressure on MEPs to
behave appropriately. Because of the increased pressure on MEPs in legislative votes, dele-
gations should be more cohesive than when they vote on inconsequential legislative. MEPs
can vote their true, non-party or EPG influenced preferences on inconsequential legislation
because the votes really have no weight. The data presented in this chapter shows that
this distinction between procedures is incredibly important. In fact, the average variance
of MEP ideal points within national party delegations in the EP when voting on legislative
acts is 34% greater than when voting on non-legislative acts. On legislative votes, MEPs are
subject to the many influences they must deal with at the EP: their national parties, their
EPGs, their constituencies, committees, etc. On non-legislative votes, they are more free
to vote as they would like. Hence party delegations are more cohesive when they need not
negotiate with competing influences.
In addition to looking across policy areas, it is also useful to look outside of the EP
for comparison with national parties. Continuing with the example of the working time
directive vote, 12 members of the Labour party voted in favor of the amendment while 5
voted against. Most studies of cohesion simply measure the percentage of MEPs voting
together and consider those outside of the majority to be rebels. Using this type of measure
for cohesion, it appears that 5 members are rebelling from the party delegation in this vote.
However, given we know the position of the national Labour Party and its leader, it is
actually the majority of the party that is rebelling against their national peers. Hence, there
is a great deal to learn by comparing individuals and national delegations to their national
parties outside of the EP.
5.2 PARTY CENTRALIZATION AND PARTY INFLUENCE
The level of centralization in parties is an important factor in determining the amount of
control party leaders have over their members. Centralization works to reduce both ex
ante uncertainty and increase ex-post control over agent behavior. Like all principal-agent
relationships, parties want to place faithful agents in office. Centralization also increases the
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certainty parties have that they are choosing a desirable agent. It reduces ex ante uncertainty
through controlling the choice of agent and it can increase ex post control through the threat
of removal and/or supervision. For example, Chapter 2 offered poignant examples of powerful
Croatian party leaders. These leaders run highly centralized parties and they make nearly
all important decisions. In the European elections of both 2013 and 2014, they were able
to exert a large amount of control over the selection of candidates, exercising both ex-ante
and ex-post control techniques. For instance, the leader of Croatia’s SDP was able to use
the EP candidate list as a way to remove an observer, Antčević Marinović, that had been
scrutinized in the media.The leader of the HDZ similarly removed another observer because
this particular politician had been an avid supporter of the past party president, Jadranka
Kosor.2 Just before the election the leader, Karmomarko, and his presidency (the executive
of the party) expelled Kosor from the party. (Vecernji.hr 2013a). Several reasons were cited
for such action, among those given by Karomarko was that it was a “time for new people"
in the party (Vecernji.hr 2013b).3 The centralization of selection allowed the leaders to
both reprimand a “disloyal" member (ex post) and also ensure that this type of agent could
be replaced by a more desirable, loyal agent (providing better representation ex ante) for
the next term. The following sections will summarize the relationships between cohesion,
candidate selection, supervision, and individual political ambition while also providing the
hypotheses of the chapter.
5.2.1 Centralized and Selection
Candidate recruitment and nomination mechanisms are important for both the type of rep-
resentative a party gets and their performance in elected office (Wessels 1997; Siavelis and
Morgenstern 2012). Chapter 3 concluded the type of candidate a party chooses to recruit is
based on its electoral goals for European elections. A party’s ability to choose the right type
is conditioned by the level of centralization in the selection procedure. If candidate selection
and list placement are the privilege of elite leadership, a party’s leadership is better able to
control the type of candidate they choose. The clearer the goals of the party, the clearer the
2Interview 4.14.2013, Zagreb, Croatia.
3Quotation is a translated by the author, the original text in Croatian is “Vrijeme je za nove Ljude."
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strategy for whom to choose, and a more centralized selection process means the party has
a greater chance of securing that particular type of candidate. All else equal, centralized
parties are better able to select the “right" type of candidate. Centralized parties select
politicians that match the type of politicians elites want to serve. Not only does this match
make for better agents, centralization also allows the selected, and then elected, politician
to realize how powerful their leadership is in managing their career. The national party is
a very strong principal when centralized candidate selection is used (Hix 2004). Central-
ization of selection also allows them to easily remove politicians that have not served them
adequately. Thus politicians from parties with centralized selection are more accountable
to the leadership and must provide more congruent behavior. In contrast, when candidate
selection is left to mass membership, politicians are more personalistic, appealing to a much
broader base of constituents or special interests than simply the party elite (Ware 1979).
These candidates know the power to maintain their office lies in a larger selecorate and will
cater to these interests instead of the party leadership. Therefore, the multi-stage process
that determines policy congruence begins with the selection choice parties make over all
possible candidates for EP office. Thus the first hypothesis is as follows:
H1: MEPs in parties with centralized candidate selection methods are more congruent
with their national parties than those in decentralized parties.
5.2.2 Centralization and Supervision
In addition to candidate selection, another practice that varies widely across national parties
is how they incorporate EP politicians into their leadership structure and how communica-
tion with Brussels occurs. Just as centralization determines the power of selection procedures
in parties, it also encourages specific behaviors in leadership-politician (principal-agent) com-
munication and exchange of information. A party’s choice over the composition of executive
leadership determines whether MEPs are part of the centralized leadership of the party. This
structure, together with candidate selection mechanisms, is likely to determine whether the
legislator acts as a delegate or a trustee. MEPs that act as trustees are likely to behave in
the way they see fit based on their own personal beliefs, expert judgment or knowledge, or
the requirements of the institutional decision making process. MEPs that act as delegates
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are more likely to be loyal members of the party and act in a way they feel the party would
find most acceptable (Fox and Shotts 2009). Trustees are expected to work independently
in the EP, while delegates will stay close to the party.
The success of the MEP-party relationship relies on the intersection of individual and
party goals within a framework of oversight. Because many factors influence the decision
making of the EP, MEPs acting as delegates are likely to have a harder time pursuing
personal goals or cooperating with their colleagues because they are more constrained by
the party. They are likely to be informed by the party before making decisions and acting
in way they feel will serve the party best. In contrast, trustee-style MEPs will likely be
more successful in the EP because they are able to work freely and make their own decisions
over policy outcomes. This EP level success may sometimes come at the expense of greater
congruence with national party preferences. MEPs that can work freely are better able to
manage the complexity and specialization of legislating in the EP where the party is simply
not as knowledgeable. Therefore they will have a greater opportunity to shape their own
agenda and that of the parties. These two types of information exchanges are depicted in
Figure 9.
 
 
 (a) Scenario A: Delegates
 
 
 
(b) Scenario B: Trustees
Figure 9: Information Flows in MEP-Party Relationships
The inclusion of MEPs in their party’s executive authority may also increase the exchange
of information between the EP delegation and the party leaders. MEPs often told me that
the main reason for tension with their national party was a lack of communication and/or
information sharing. Communication standards are vastly different across national parties
serving in the EP. Some MEPs, and/or their assistants, disclosed that they rarely speak to
their counterparts in their home country but others communicate almost daily. Usually this
lack of communication was due to a lack of interest on behalf of their party leaders for their
work in the EP. However, sometimes this also stemmed from a lack of understanding of the
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complicated nature of EP legislation. MEPs often commented on the technical aspect of EP
legislation and the difficulty this creates for an outsider to understand. One MEP shared
a pattern of communication breakdown between his party and himself. He said he often
experienced a total lack of awareness or interest when trying to communicate with his party
during important policy debates. He often tried to consult national leaders over important
policy matters but rarely had luck engaging them, only to have to later bear his party’s
lament after unfavorable legislation was concluded and no longer an issue for the EP.4
Being left out of regular communication with the national party appears to inhibit both
the sharing of policy preferences from the leadership to the MEP and the sharing of in-
formation from the Parliament back to the party. If an MEP is included in the executive
structure of the party, not only will he or she have greater access to information on the
policy preferences of his or her party, but the MEP will also be able to share information
about their work and the current agenda of the parliament more easily. Having an executive
structure that requires regular communication between MEPs and their party leaders helps
to eliminate information asymmetries that can often increase agency losses between parties
and their politicians. Hence I hypothesize inclusive in the central leadership is more likely
to result in scenario A, where MEPs act as delegates for the party and the direct effect on
ideological congruence is positive:
H2: MEPs incorporated into party executive structures are more congruent with their
national parties.
Parties goals will also affect the way in which communication works between MEPs and
their parties. One of the determinants Coman (2009) concludes affected the influence of
national parties on their MEPs was ideological coherence. Coman argues that the clearer
the position of a party on any given policy area, the easier it is for a MEP to determine
what position he or she should also take. This can be extended to party goals. The clearer
the goals of the party, the easier it is for a MEP to determine what the party wants. Policy
seeking parties want to influence policy and are more likely to make their preferences known
to their MEPs, who are then able to act more in congruence with the party. In contrast,
office and vote seeking parties will experience less congruence with their MEPs because
4Interview(3) 6.18.2013, European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium.
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they simply do not care about legislating and do not have clear preferences. Therefore, the
hypotheses about electoral goals and congruence are as follows:
H3: MEPs in policy seeking parties are more congruent with their national parties than
those in office or vote seeking parties.
5.2.3 Individual Ambition and Experience
One final consideration in determining how politicians will behave is the personal goals of the
MEP. In addition to the centralization of selection, parties must also be able to recruit the
candidate types they want to serve. Parties first decide what type of candidates to choose
from possible alternatives, but chosen politicians must also be interested in competing or be
persuaded to compete for office. The motivations of an individual play an important role in
the way an individual will behave if elected. This intersection of party goals and individual
ambitions means that many scenarios for candidacy can exist. Chapter 3 concluded that
office seeking parties are most likely to nominate inexperienced politicians. Parties with
relatively stronger policy seeking preferences will prefer those that have experience working
at the European level.
Political ambition in the EP is an ever growing area of study in EU politics and research
on the topic tells us that individuals with goals focused on European careers behave very
differently from their nationally inclined colleagues (Borchert 2011; Meserve, Pemstein and
Bernhard 2009; Pemstein, Meserve and Bernhard 2015). Existing literature often distin-
guishes between these two types of candidates as low and high quality, which is meant to
imply that candidates with experience and ambition in Europe (often incumbents) will make
better MEPs (high quality) than those that are more interested in the national arena or are
relatively inexperienced in European politics (low quality) (Pemstein, Meserve and Bernhard
2015). National politicians adhere to their national party preferences but EP careerists are
more integrated into the EP party system (Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard 2009). Nation-
ally ambitious politicians are more likely to be delegates and exhibit high levels of congruence
since they need to protect and prolong their careers with their national parties. EP careerists
are more likely to behave like trustees and produce lower levels of congruence because they
are less dependent on their national party for career advancement. Experience can be used
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as a proxy for ambition since a measure of experience contains information regarding past
political career choices. A hypotheses regarding the relationship between experience and
congruence are below.
H4: MEPS that with national political experience are more congruent with their national
parties than those without national experience.
5.3 MEASURING INDIVIDUAL AND PARTY PREFERENCES
A large sample of MEPs and parties is used to empirically test the implications of internal
party controls dictated through formal party rules, external controls dictated by member
state electoral and institutional characteristics, and individual experience attributes. Con-
tributing to the understanding of multi-level European politics by focusing on the domestic
party-EP link specifically, the analysis directly compares individual behavior to the expected
behavior given national party preferences.
5.3.1 Party Positions
The first step in empirically analyzing the relationship between the MEPs and their national
parties is determining how best to measure ideological preferences for both the national
parties and MEPs. There are several large data sets available that contain various measures
of ideological positions on several different issues that can be used to construct exogenous
and aggregate measures of national party preferences.5 I use the Comparative Manifestos
Project study from the 2009 European Elections to measure party preferences in the areas
of economic policy, employment policy, and foreign policy along with an aggregate measure
of left-right placement (EES 2009b). The creators of the manifesto project have categorized
manifesto text into many different areas on the levels of local, regional, national, and global
5This data includes the expert data of the Chapel Hill Surveys that provide party positions for European
integration and the Comparative Manifestos Project which provides data on a range of issues (Budge et al.
2001; Hooghe et al. 2008; EES 2009b; Hooghe et al. 2010; Volkens et al. 2011). These data sets allow for
positions on issues in national and European elections to be coded on an ideological scale in order to estimate
preference ideal points for national parties across Europe. The manifesto data contains a series of positions
on individual issues that are both domestic and European.
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and have also indicated whether the particular coded statements are representative of leftist
views or rightist views, allowing the placement of parties from left to right in each policy
area.6
5.3.2 Individual Political Positions
To measure individual behavior in the EP I use legislative voting records. This data has been
collected and made available through the Votewatch Europe project and the work of Hix et
al. (2007, 2009). I use the raw roll call data from the start of the seventh term (2009) through
March 2013 to estimate individual ideal points. I first separated the data into specific policy
areas corresponding to EP committees, as well as two data sets: one that incorporates only
legislative acts and one incorporating only non-legislative acts.7 When using EP roll call
votes in the analysis, it is important to recall that not all votes in the EP are equal in terms
of procedural importance. One of the largest criticisms that can be levied at the use of
roll call votes in their entirety in the EP is that many of these votes have no real bearing
on legislative outcomes. As the introduction stated, many votes are on strictly procedural
or non-legislative reports and resolutions and are far less important than co-decision votes,
which carry greater legislative weight. Therefore, the use of the complete universe of roll
call votes in determining the ideal points of MEPs can lead to false identification of party
relationships (Carruba et al. 2006). In less consequential votes, MEPs are expected to vote
absent any conflicting demands from their national parties, their peers, or EPGs.
In order to illustrate this difference in behavior across both procedures and policy areas,
Figure 10 displays the density of ideal points for legislative and non-legislative votes in a
single national party in the EP. This figure visually displays the densities of the same set of
legislators in the Platforma Obywatelska, a Polish Christian democrat/liberal conservative
party. In the figure, the dash line displays the density of individual positions of the Polish
MEPs given their voting behavior on legislative votes while the solid line marks the same
6For further information on the coding of this variable, please see Appendix C, Section C.1.2.
7The use of roll call votes for the measurement of ideological positions is not unproblematic (Carruba,
Gabel and Hug 2008); therefore this analysis used data from the most recent EP session where roll call
voting is now the standard procedure in order to mitigate any possible selection effects of the roll call data.
I would like to thank Simon Hix for his generosity with this data as it is not yet published publicly.
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measure for non-legislative votes. The y-axis represents the number of places at any given
ideal point, the actual ideal points are then shown in the the x-axis. This figure shows that
not only are the point estimates for these legislators different across voting procedures, but
they are also much more cohesive in non-legislative voting. The density of the legislative
ideal points is rather flat, suggesting each individual legislators has an unique ideal point for
legislative voting. The strong peak near 25 for non-legislative votes suggests that members
of the party vote similarly and thus share ideal points clustered around -0.7 to -0.5.
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Figure 10: Individual Ideal Points for Legislative and Non-Legislative Votes: Polish Christian
Democrats/Liberal Conservatives(Platforma Obywatelska)
In addition to these procedural differences, it is also prudent to examine ideal points
across committees or policy areas because the EP does not have equal amounts of power
across policy areas. While capturing legislative ideal points on a left-right dimension (first
dimension) will encapsulate many of the ideological splits among MEPs and national parties,
it is also necessary to think of issues that arise in the EP that split legislators along a pro-
vs. anti-integration dimension (second dimension) (Hooghe and Marks 2002; Marks and
Steenbergen 2002). This allow us to identify policy areas where the greater debates take
place over who has the right to legislative and when is the EP the appropriate institution
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to do regulate policy. Politicians themselves are likely to behave differently across policy
areas given their career goals. As stated above, nationally ambitious MEPs will likely be less
open to more integrative policy because they will value sovereignty more relative to their
Europhile peers. By dividing the ideal points into three different policy categories, I am able
to test if there is more or less congruence across first and second dimension issues.
For example, foreign policy is still a largely national area of policy that fall on the first
dimension. The EP has relatively little power and only 9% of the foreign policy legislation
used in ideal point construction was on legislative acts. In contrast, employment and social
policy generally tends to relate to issues of the single market and the free movement of people.
As the debate over the working time directive illustrated in the beginning of the dissertation,
some of the debates over employment policy take place on the first dimension (left vs. right,
more vs. less regulation), but a great deal also encompass debates over competence, or which
level of government is most appropriate to regulate in this area (second dimension). Of all
the legislation coming from the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, only 28%
of it was legislative acts. In the third area of policy examined in the analysis, Economic
and Monetary Policy, 66% of the votes taken were on legislative acts, making it the most
consequential areas of policy in the analysis.8 Given these differences, I expect votes across
policy areas to provide different levels of congruence conditional on how active (or inactive)
the parties are in a given area.9
Figure 11 displays three density curves for the same Polish party for ideal points across
the three policy areas. These curves shows that there is more dispersion for economic and
monetary policy (solid line). Employment policy (dash line) follows a similar distribution
and both of these policy areas resemble the legislative ideal points more closely than they
do the non-legislative ideal points. This suggests significant variance among MEPs in their
voting in these areas, even though there is some cluster in foreign policy votes (short dash
8The percentages reported here are taken from only those votes used in the analysis (July 2009-March
2013) and not all of the votes in the seventh session.
9Another problem that can arise in using roll call votes is the selection effects the agenda may have on the
determination of individual legislator positions. Ideal point construction in item response models produces
point estimates that are derived only from the available votes so if agendas vary over sessions of the EP,
comparing the ideal points across legislators and across time is difficult. This is less of a problem in this
study since the relative distance from party to individual is the subject of concern and I am not trying to
compare MEPs over time (Carruba et al. 2006; Høyland 2010).
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Figure 11: Individual Ideal Points for Policy Area Votes: Polish Christian Democrats-Liberal
Conservatives (Platforma Obywatelska)
line) around -1. The differences across policy areas is further supported given correlations
among them reported in Table 15. The ideal points presented in the figure above along with
the remaining members of the EP were constructed using item response models through the
IDEAL process in R (Clinton, Jackman and Rivers 2004).10
10Ideal points can also be constructed through the use of the NOMINATE procedure, which also provides
unique ideological identifiers for each MEP (Hix, Noury and Roland 2007; Poole and Rosenthal 2007).
However, due to the small number of roll call votes for certain policy areas and the unusual amount of
absenteeism in the voting records, the IDEAL process provides an estimator that allows us to assess the
certainty of the estimates in a way that the NOMINATE scores do not. For more detailed discussion see
Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004) and Lauderdale (2010). For more information on this process, see
Appendix C, Section C.1.1.
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Table 15: Ideal Points Correlations Among Policy Areas
  Economic Employment Foreign 
Economic 1 0.7123 0.8637 
Employment 0.7123 1 0.7734 
Foreign 0.8637 0.7734 1 
 
5.4 COMPARING PARTIES AND THEIR INDIVIDUALS: THE
EMPRICAL CHALLENGE
The majority of prior work on national party unity and power in the EP has used vote
data entirely endogenous to the EP; measuring unity, coherence, or strength among MEPs
of national party delegations only (Hix, Noury and Roland 2007; Coman 2009; Mühlbock
2012). I seek to extend our understanding of the relationship between national parties
and their MEPs by measuring extra-parliamentary unity between these legislators and their
parties. Preferences within the party must be linked to behavior within the parliament using
an exogenous (of the EP) measure of party preference. This task is difficult given that there
are no straightforward ways to bridge party preferences with individuals in the EP. While
most of the party data described above offers ideal points for parties on a left/right scale,
these exogenous measures of position are not immediately comparable with ideal points
constructed from individual records. The individual points calculated using roll call data are
merely a representation of relative left-right rank among the members of the legislature for
the particular set of votes, therefore we cannot draw any conclusions about the substantive
nature of this left-right placement or assume it shares a common ideological space with
any of the manifesto data. However, it is possible to measure the relationship between the
two scales using a few simple assumptions and conceptualizing congruence as a measure
of relative distance between where the party preference predicts an ideal point and where
the ideal point is observed in the data. The first assumption I make about the relationship
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between parties and their legislators in order to calculate party predictions is that it is linear:
MEP Ideal Point Estimate (Y ) = α + β Party Preference(x) + ε (5.1)
Given the linearity assumption, the position x of any given party (from the manifesto data)
predicts the individual’s point estimate Y given a starting intercept (α), a slope β, and
random error ε. The actual measure of congruence used in the analysis is each MEP’s
residual error from the equation above. The regression equation above estimates values for
α and β which are used to predict a MEP ideal point given their party’s preference (x).
The farther the distance of the observed MEP ideal point from this predicted value, the less
congruent the MEP. Therefore the main dependent variable of the analysis is constructed as
follows:
Inverse Preference Congruence = |Yˆi − Yi| (5.2)
where Yˆi − Yi is predicted by equation 5.1
Because I am interested in the relative size of this distance, and whether or not it increases or
decreases with changes in the predictor variables, I take the absolute value. This results in a
dependent variable that measures inverse congruence. As this dependent variables increases,
observed MEP ideal points move further away from the predicted ideal points and congruence
decreases. As the measure decreases, observed MEP ideal points are closer to the predicted
points and congruence increases. Therefore a negative and significant relationship between a
predictor variable and the dependent variable represents a positive effect on congruence. In
sum, I use linear regression to test the chapter’s hypotheses where the dependent variable is
inverse policy congruence measured as the absolute value of the residual error between each
individuals’ ideal point and that which their party’s preferences would predict in equation
5.1.
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5.4.1 MEP-Party Congruence: An Empirical Example
In order to illustrate the construction of the dependent variable, I return to the Polish
example described above. Figure 12 graphically depicts both the observed and the predicted
ideal points for this party’s MEPs. In this figure, the curves are the density estimates of
the observed ideal points for each individual for legislative votes (dash) and non-legislative
votes (solid) in Figure 12a; and economic votes (solid), employment votes (short dash), and
foreign affairs votes (dash) in Figure 12b. The dotted vertical lines mark the predicted ideal
points for each legislator give the party’s preferences and Equation 5.1. Of course the data
from the party will predict all the MEPs at the same position (the vertical dashed lines)
because it predicts the same ideal point for all of its legislators. If there was perfect unity
and congruence, we would observe each MEP at this point.
Figure 13 presents an example of a single, specific legislator, MEP A, and the calculation
of his/her congruence in legislative acts. Suppose this MEP has an observed ideal point of
-1.68 when voting on legislative acts, represented by the dot marked MEP A in the figure.
The party manifesto data gives Platforma Obywatelska a value of 0.099 on the left/right
scale. When the initial regression equation (5.1) was estimated, it provided a value for α of
-0.255, a value for β of -0.030 and a value for ε of -0.019. Given the party preference value of
0.099, Equation 5.1 yields a prediction of Yˆ = (-0.255) + (-0.30*0.099) + (-0.019) = -0.277,
which is represented by the vertical line in the figure. Thus, the dependent variable is the
absolute value of the distance between these two points:
Inverse Preference Congruence = |Yˆi − Yi| = | − 0.277− (−1.68)| = 1.403 (5.3)
Together, these three figures show that the error present when individuals are voting on
non-binding legislation (non-legislative) is less than for binding legislation (legislative) when
both are predicted using the left-right position of the party (12a). These figures also show
that both the dispersion of ideal points and the measure of congruence is greater in votes for
foreign policy than on votes for economic or employment policy (12b). This suggests that
this Polish party experiences more difficulty in maintaining both delegation unity (shown by
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Figure 12: Congruence: Polish Christian Democrats-Liberal Conservatives(Platforma Oby-
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Figure 13: Example of MEP Inverse Congruence
the individual ideal points) and congruence (shown by the distance from the vertical line)
in foreign policy than in the other policy areas. The Polish example was chosen to display
the measurement of the dependent variable in a mid-sized party. While there appears to be
much variation in legislative ideal points and across policy areas, non-legislative ideal points
appear quite uniform. While the variance in non-legislative votes is small in this particular
example, the variance across parties is quite large. The summary statistics for all dependent
variables are listed in Table 16. For a complete list of the mean inverse congruence of each
party across both legislative acts and all three policy areas, see Appendix C, Section C.2.
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Table 16: Summary of Dependent Variables
 
 
Mean Variance Min Max 
 
Legislative Acts 0.841 0.254 0.116 2.387 
 
Non Legislative Acts 0.681 0.353 0.024 3.097 
 
Economic Policy 0.888 0.128 0.465 1.824 
 
Foreign Policy 0.774 0.212 0.057 1.960 
 
Employment Policy  0.780 0.302 0.034 2.021 
 
5.5 PARTY, MEMBER STATE, AND INDIVIDUAL INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES
The data for party, member state, and individual level characteristics utilized in this chapter
have been described at length in previous chapters. The main independent variables mea-
suring party organization as selection and leadership structure are the subject of Chapter 3.
All of the additional party and member state level variables are also described in Chapter
3, with the exception of the variable Open Electoral List. I use this variable to denote those
countries that have preferential voting in European Elections. Finally, I use the measures
for national politicians, incumbents, and new politicians that are described in Chapter 4 for
individual experience, but have modified them to be mutually exclusive indicators. National
Experience Only is an indicator for those that have served only in national government be-
fore entering the EP. European Experience Only is an indicator for those that have served
only in the EP previously and No Experience is an indicator for those that have held no
previous government or party positions, at the national or EP level, before entering the EP.
The omitted category in this case are those politicians that have held multiple positions on
multiple levels. I also add a measure of party switching in order to account for those MEPs
that switched their national party affiliation in the seventh session as a control variable, al-
though this was rare. The remaining control variables account for variation across national
institutions and member state experience with the EU. As Hix (2004) found, features of the
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electoral systems, combined with selection mechanisms, are also important predictors of a
party’s ability to exercise control over their members. Proportional representation systems
with closed lists have the most powerful parties in terms of discipline. Similarly, Hix (2004)
also theorizes that unitary states will have more cohesive parties than federal states. There-
fore these are also included as control variables in the model. All of the predictor variables
are listed in Table 17.
Table 17: Predictor Variables
Main Predictor Variables Control Variables 
Centralized Candidate Selection Open Electoral Lists 
Inclusive Leadership Federalism 
Office Seeking Goals Bicameral Legislature 
Vote Seeking Goals Eurozone Membership 
Policy Seeking Goals Membership in EU in Years 
National Experience Only Age of MEP 
European Experience Only Party Switcher 
No Experience   
 
5.6 EMPIRICALLY MODELING CONGRUENCE AND ORGANIZATION
The analysis models five linear regression equations for congruence, one for legislative votes
(1), non-legislative votes (2), economic and monetary policy (3), employment and social
policy (4), and foreign policy (5), all where the dependent variable is inverse congruence.11
Table 19 reports the results for legislative versus non-legislative congruence while Table 20
reports the inverse congruence equations across policy areas. All of these models also include
11Given that no information with respect to the treatment of MEPs can be gained from statutes that make
no mention of MEPs, in this analysis I have included only MEPs from parties that make explicit mention
of this treatment. Therefore the analysis includes 362 MEPs. In order to test if addressing/not addressing
MEPs could influence the behavior of MEPs, I have also constructed five Heckman selection models (Heckman
1976) which test for the independence of the congruence models from the choice to include or exclude MEPs
in party statues. The results for those models and their analysis are available in Appendix C, Section C.4,
Tables 46 and support the analysis presented here.
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an interaction variable for the presence of both centralization tactics, centralized selection
and inclusive leadership, in order to asses the effect of simultaneous use of both strategies.
Overall the results reported in Table 19 show that party organization and the electoral
goals of parties are significant predictors of congruence, but past experience has only limited
effects. These results of the models provide evidence in support of the hypotheses, which
are summarized in Table 18, with the exception of individual political ambition. I find
little evidence in support of a relationship between individual MEP political experience and
congruence. Table 20 suggest that the effect of organization extends only to foreign policy
(4) but the effects of electoral goals are robust across specifications.12 The variation in the
results across equations suggests that the analysis of ideal points at the aggregate level (i.e.
the full universe of roll call data for any given session) may overlook interesting variation.
In these models, we can see that many of the covariates do not have equal effects across
the different models. Breaking the roll call data into the three policy areas in addition
to the different procedural votes allows us to reach conclusions that may be obscured by
the aggregate measures. The following sections summarize the results across the models in
detail.
Table 18: Congruence and Party and Individual Characteristics
  
Independent Variable Hypothesis Hypothesized Effect on Inverse Congruence 
Centralized Selection H1 - 
Inclusive Leadership H2 -  
Policy Seeking H3 - 
National Political Ambition H4 - 
 
5.6.1 The Effects of Centralized Selection on Congruence
The results of the model in Table 19 suggest that the effects of party centralization, while
significant, differ across procedures in EP legislation. By including the interactive term, I
am able to determine the effect of centralized selection on MEPs in parties that use this
12In these models, the omitted category for electoral goals is that of no goals, which includes 37 MEPs,
about 10% of the sample.
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method of selection versus those that do not, both when inclusive leadership is present or
when it is absent. In Legislative Acts (1), the unique coefficient of Centralized Candidate
Selection reports that centralized selection is both significant and negatively related to inverse
congruence, thereby increasing the level of congruence between MEPs and their parties. In
fact, the use of centralized selection increases congruence in legislative acts by about 6%,
providing evidence in support of H1. When combined with inclusive leadership, the effect
becomes even stronger, providing for a 21.8% increase in congruence, further supporting H1
for legislative acts. This suggest that parties which choose to exercise centralized control
over both candidate selection and supervision have the most congruent MEPs. However,
centralized selection has the opposite effect in non-legislative votes when used on its own.
In this case, centralized selection increases congruence (decreases inverse congruence) only
when used simultaneously with inclusive leadership. If a party uses both of these centralizing
tactics, the marginal effect is equal to -0.285, or about a 9.3% increase in congruence.
Table 20 reports the results of the models for the three policy areas and these results
complement the findings described above. In Foreign Policy (4), centralized selection behaves
much like it does in the model for Non-legislative acts. This is unsurprising given that
many of the votes used to determine the ideal points for foreign policy were non-legislative
resolutions. The EU has very little supranational power in this area. Centralized selection
again only has a positive effect on congruence when combined with inclusive leadership,
increasing congruence by about 3.2%. These results remain similar in employment policy;
however the effect is weaker, decreasing congruence by a nominal 1% when present by itself.
When parties centralized selection and include MEPs in their leadership, the effect is much
stronger, increasing congruence by almost 18%. These results provide more evidence in
support of H1, which stated that centralized selection should increase MEP congruence.
The only policy area where this does not hold is economic policy (3), where there is no
significant effect.
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Table 19: Congruence and Party Organization in Legislative and Non-Legislative Acts
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Legislative 
Acts 
Non-Legislative 
Acts 
   
Centralized Candidate Selection -0.137* 0.480*** 
 (0.073) (0.103) 
Inclusive Leadership 0.389*** 0.285** 
 (0.137) (0.110) 
Centralized Candidate Selection*Inclusive Leadership -0.358** -0.765*** 
 (0.164) (0.154) 
Office Seeking Goals 0.440*** 0.430*** 
 (0.072) (0.0911) 
Vote Seeking Goals 0.035 -0.198*** 
 (0.053) (0.0527) 
Policy Seeking Goals -0.209*** -0.0317 
 (0.045) (0.0617) 
National Experience Only 0.071 0.0333 
 (0.062) (0.0757) 
European Experience Only -0.060 0.152** 
 (0.058) (0.0652) 
No Experience 0.058 0.217** 
 (0.069) (0.102) 
Open Electoral Lists 0.224*** 0.139** 
 (0.060) (0.0661) 
Federalism -0.341*** -0.559*** 
 (0.116) (0.0961) 
Bicameral Legislature 0.150** 0.571*** 
 (0.069) (0.111) 
Eurozone Membership -0.017 0.279*** 
 (0.095) (0.105) 
Membership in EU in Years 0.002 -0.00152 
 (0.003) (0.00262) 
Age of MEP 0.002 -0.00422* 
 (0.002) (0.00251) 
Party Switcher 0.016 -0.113 
 (0.119) (0.127) 
Constant 0.349* 0.0466 
 (0.177) (0.179) 
   
Observations 362 362 
R-squared 0.270 0.402 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 20: Congruence and Party Organization Across Policy Areas
 (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Economic 
Policy 
Foreign 
Policy 
Employment 
Policy 
    
Centralized Candidate Selection 0.088 0.622*** -0.190* 
 (0.057) (0.079) (0.100) 
Inclusive Leadership 0.113 0.610*** 0.512*** 
 (0.115) (0.128) (0.100) 
Centralized Candidate*Inclusive Leadership 0.015 -0.684*** -0.150 
 (0.134) (0.150) (0.101) 
Office Seeking Goals 0.118* 0.269*** 0.685*** 
 (0.060) (0.075) (0.067) 
Vote Seeking Goals 0.152*** 0.070 -0.312*** 
 (0.040) (0.056) (0.044) 
Policy Seeking Goals -0.219*** -0.155*** -0.110* 
 (0.044) (0.049) (0.056) 
National Experience Only 0.084* -0.001 0.027 
 (0.049) (0.072) (0.070) 
European Experience Only 0.044 -0.012 -0.006 
 (0.054) (0.072) (0.054) 
No Experience 0.075 0.157* -0.004 
 (0.055) (0.082) (0.068) 
Open Electoral Lists 0.112* 0.374*** 0.216*** 
 (0.063) (0.068) (0.072) 
Federalism 0.122 0.005 -0.154** 
 (0.100) (0.105) (0.076) 
Bicameral Legislature 0.070 -0.154 0.161 
 (0.062) (0.101) (0.108) 
Eurozone Membership -0.325*** -0.484*** -0.143* 
 (0.081) (0.099) (0.081) 
Membership in EU in Years 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.005* 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age of MEP 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Party Switcher -0.123 -0.348** 0.055 
 (0.117) (0.142) (0.145) 
Constant 0.357** 0.023 0.325 
 (0.144) (0.205) (0.215) 
    
Observations 362 360 361 
R-squared 0.232 0.207 0.508 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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5.6.2 The Effects of Inclusive Leadership on Congruence
The relationship between inclusive leadership and congruence reported in Tables 19 and 20
suggest that including MEPs in party leadership is a powerful tool for influencing legisla-
tor behavior only when used as a compliment to centralized selection. In both the models
for legislative and non-legislative acts, the unique effect of inclusive leadership is positive,
decreasing congruence by 17.1% and 9.3% respectively. These effects are also robust across
most policy areas, increasing inverse congruence by 32.1% in foreign policy and 23.6% in
employment policy. Similar to the results described above, the effect is not significant in
economic policy. These results do not provide support for H2, which hypothesized that the
inclusion of MEPs in party leadership should increase MEP congruence. However, if the
effects of inclusive leadership are examined in parties that also exercise centralized selection,
the effect does have the hypothesized effect in non-legislative acts and foreign policy, in-
creasing congruence by 9.3% and 4% respectively. This suggests that the impact of inclusive
behavior is again conditional on both the selection method used by parties and the type of
legislative activity in which the MEP is participating.
5.6.3 The Effects of Electoral Goals on Congruence
Not only are electoral goals significant predictors of the type of politicians a national party
will choose to send to the EP, as shown in Chapter 4, they are also strong predictors of MEP
behavior. The results reported in Tables 19 and 20 show that policy seeking significantly
reduces inverse congruence, providing evidence that MEPs from policy seeking parties tend
to be more congruent than those that are not. When voting on legislative acts (1), MEPs
from policy seeking parties are 9.2% more congruent than MEPs from parties without policy
seeking goals. The relationship between policy seeking and inverse congruence is also negative
in economic policy, foreign policy, and employment policy, decreasing this measure by 16.1%,
8.1%, and 5% respectively. In contrast, MEPs from office seeking parties are about 19.3% less
congruent when voting on legislative acts, 14% less congruent when voting on non-legislative
acts, and 8.7%, 14.1%, 31.6% less congruent across the three policy areas respectively. These
results provide evidence in support of H3, which hypothesized that MEPs from policy seeking
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parties are more congruent than their non-policy seeking peers. The effect of vote seeking
remains ambiguous, appearing significant in some models, but with inconsistent effects.
Taken together, these results suggest that electoral goals are important determinants of
legislator behavior. In supporting the theoretical hypothesis on goals of the this chapter
(H3), it appears the only MEPs who deliver on actual congruent policy are those in policy
seeking parties.13
5.6.4 Individuals and Congruence
One disappointing result of the analysis is the lack of evidence in support of H4, which
hypothesized that nationally ambitious politicians should be more congruent with their na-
tional parties than their European-ambitious peers because they seek to please their national
parties to return to the national arena. The results of the analysis show that this national
ambition, measured by proxy through national experience has no effect on congruence. Na-
tional experience is only significantly related to inverse congruence in economic policy (at
90%). The indicator for European experience is significant and positively related to non-
legislative voting and foreign policy and inexperience is significant and positively related to
foreign policy only. Given that these effects are only significant in a small number of cases,
there is not much of evidence to support H4. Ambition may have no effect on behavior,
as shown in the models, or it also could be that these measures are simply poor proxies
for ambition. Perhaps we are unable to predict what a politician desires for their future
career given their past experience. In order to incorporate alternative measures of individual
characteristics, I also included age as a possible determinant of behavior. Following Meserve,
Pemstein and Bernhard (2009); Pemstein, Meserve and Bernhard (2015) who use age as a
proxy for ambition, the variable was also included here but does not perform any better,
suggesting that better proxies of ambition are necessary in future work.
13The effects of electoral goals are also analyzed in models using mutually exclusive indicators of each
goal combination. These results are reported in Tables 47 and 48 in Appendix C, Section C.5. The results
provide further evidence in support of the analysis presented here.
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5.6.5 National Institutional Effects
In order to continue examining, and control for, the effects of national institutional and
electoral conditions on party and legislator behavior across member states, I have included
several institution variables that are worth noting. Several of these variables provide evidence
that institutional structures influence behavior by influencing levels of congruence across
individuals. First, the indicator for open list electoral systems performs as we would expect.
It is positively and significantly related to inverse congruence. MEPs elected in open list
systems are less congruent than their closed list peers across the models. Similarly, those in
states with bicameral legislatures are less congruent, although only in the aggregate measure
of legislative and non-legislative acts. Finally, it is also worth noting that these models for
legislative and non-legislative acts also provide evidence that MEPs in federal states are more
congruent than their unitary peers, as shown by the negative and significant relationship
with inverse congruence. In sum, national institutional structures are important for the
MEP party relationship, supporting a theme that has been present throughout the analysis
in this dissertation.
5.7 ALTERNATIVE TESTS AND EXTENSIONS
One of the contributions this dissertation seeks to make to the EP literature is extending our
analysis of MEPs and their behavior to include analysis of the relationship between a MEP
and his or her national party outside of the national, EP delegation. To date, most studies of
legislative behavior in the EP (For example Hix, Noury and Roland (2007); Coman (2009);
Mühlbock (2012)) have looked at cohesion among a national delegation in the EP or between
a national delegation in the EP and the Council of Ministers. The analysis of congruence
in this chapter used an innovative measure of the MEP-party relationship to determine how
closely MEPs deliver on their national party’s wishes at large, not just among themselves.
However, in addition to the analysis of congruence, I also conducted two additional empirical
tests of the effects of organization and electoral goals. First, I use analysis of divergence from
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the national delegation in order to test if organization and electoral goals can create more
unified groups within the EP. Not only does this serve as an alternative test of the theory,
it can also serve as a direct complement to the existing literature. Second, I also extend
the analysis to a more explicit measure of legislative output. Using data on the legislative
activity of each MEP, I test how organization and electoral goals influence specific choices
over the activities of each MEP.
5.7.1 Alternative Test: Within Group Divergence
In order to implement the alternative test, I construct a measure of group divergence to test
the effect of organization and electoral goals in an alternative scenario. I measure the absolute
value of each MEP’s distance from their party mean across the subsets of ideal points I have
constructed. The closer each MEP is to the mean, the "better," or less divergent, the MEP
is within his or her delegation. This alternative is given by:
Divergence = |Party Mean− Individual Ideal Point| (5.4)
Using divergence as the dependent variable, I estimate another series of linear regression
models replicating the analysis above to examine the chapter’s hypotheses in a new context.
If organization and electoral goals affect behavior, I expect these relationship to hold when
measuring divergence within delegations as well. These results are reported in Table 21 for
legislative and non-legislative acts. This table suggest that electoral goals and organization
are again significant predictors of behavior, but the effects denote slightly different dynamics.
Complementing the results of the analysis of congruence, the effect of inclusive leadership,
is significant and positively related to the distance of an MEP from the party delegation
mean. Parties that include MEPs in their leadership have more divergent MEPs. These
MEPs are roughly 6.4% further away from the mean than those in other parteis. For non-
legislative ideal points, the effect of organization is again significant and positive only for
MEPs in parties with inclusive leadership. In these two models, vote seeking goals are
also significant predictors across legislative procedures but office and policy seeking are only
significant in non-legislative votes. While the significance and direction are as hypothesized
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(i.e policy seeking decreases divergence from the group mean and office seeking increases it),
the substantive effects are quite small, 2% and 4% respectively.
Table 22 reports the results for models of the three policy areas. In these model the
effects described above carry through, inclusive leadership is again a significant and positive
predictor of individual divergence from the group. Including MEPs in the leadership increases
divergence by 10.6%, 14%, and 19.7% in economic policy, foreign policy, and employment
policy. The effects of electoral goals are also significant and mimic the results found in the
congruence analysis, albeit with the addition of significant vote seeking goals. In this case
the hypothesis that policy seeking leads to increased congruence is supported if we consider
divergence from the group to be an alternative measure. Policy seeking decreases the distance
from the mean by about 5% in foreign policy and 4.2% in employment policy, the two policy
areas where this effect is significant. Overall, party organization and electoral goals again
have significant effects on individual MEP behavior under a variety of conditions.
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Table 21: Individual Divergence from Group Across Legislative Procedures
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Legislative 
Acts 
Non Legislative 
Acts 
   
Centralized Candidate Selection 0.013 -0.056 
 (0.032) (0.037) 
Inclusive Leadership 0.109*** -0.055* 
 (0.040) (0.028) 
Centralized Candidate Selection*Inclusive Leadership -0.031 -0.004 
 (0.043) (0.039) 
Office Seeking Goals 0.037 0.051** 
 (0.026) (0.025) 
Vote Seeking Goals 0.094*** -0.041*** 
 (0.019) (0.013) 
Policy Seeking Goals -0.004 -0.033** 
 (0.029) (0.017) 
National Experience Only 0.039 0.033 
 (0.036) (0.023) 
European Experience Only -0.003 0.015 
 (0.028) (0.019) 
No Experience -0.006 0.075** 
 (0.022) (0.030) 
Open Electoral Lists 0.070** -0.006 
 (0.029) (0.021) 
Federalism -0.003 -0.068*** 
 (0.028) (0.024) 
Bicameral Legislature -0.136*** 0.020 
 (0.045) (0.035) 
Eurozone Membership -0.022 0.107*** 
 (0.028) (0.029) 
Membership in EU in Years 0.004*** -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Age of MEP 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Party Switcher -0.016 -0.036 
 (0.047) (0.045) 
Constant -0.109 0.122** 
 (0.074) (0.056) 
   
Observations 367 367 
R-squared 0.164 0.215 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 22: Individual Divergence from Group Across Policy Areas
 (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Economic 
policy 
Foreign 
Policy 
Employment 
Policy 
    
Centralized Candidate Selection 0.056 0.041 -0.049 
 (0.038) (0.032) (0.037) 
Inclusive Leadership 0.149*** 0.271*** 0.336*** 
 (0.043) (0.051) (0.052) 
Centralized Candidate Selection*Inclusive Leadership -0.002 -0.075 -0.147*** 
 (0.046) (0.050) (0.051) 
Office Seeking Goals 0.072** 0.109*** 0.192*** 
 (0.028) (0.033) (0.035) 
Vote Seeking Goals 0.070*** 0.144*** 0.070*** 
 (0.019) (0.025) (0.026) 
Policy Seeking Goals -0.008 -0.085*** -0.083*** 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.025) 
National Experience Only 0.014 -0.027 0.035 
 (0.035) (0.042) (0.033) 
European Experience Only 0.013 -0.070** -0.051 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.033) 
No Experience 0.007 0.000 -0.013 
 (0.034) (0.036) (0.040) 
Open Electoral Lists 0.148*** 0.167*** 0.210*** 
 (0.037) (0.044) (0.038) 
Federalism -0.035 0.010 -0.107*** 
 (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) 
Bicameral Legislature -0.089* -0.197*** -0.172*** 
 (0.052) (0.060) (0.040) 
Eurozone Membership 0.013 -0.051 0.116*** 
 (0.042) (0.039) (0.032) 
Membership in EU in Years 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age of MEP 0.002 0.001 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Party Switcher -0.090 -0.123 -0.005 
 (0.058) (0.087) (0.072) 
Constant -0.287*** -0.200** -0.339*** 
 (0.070) (0.097) (0.093) 
    
Observations 367 365 366 
R-squared 0.189 0.273 0.350 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
139
5.7.2 Extension: Legislative Effort
To test the impact of organization even further, I also model the effect of organization
and electoral goals on individual legislative activity. A natural extension of the theory
presented here is to extend the hypotheses to a measure of legislative effort and test whether
party organization and party goals influence the amount of, and type of, work a legislator
performs in the EP. Representation through voting is just one way that a legislator can impact
policy. Legislators can also actively shape policy through committee work, the drafting of
legislation, and shaping debate, etc. In the EP there are many channels to influence policy
through parliamentary activities. Testing influence on policy is a difficult task but I extend
the analysis here to test a simple model of effort and how party organization and goals
may encourage or discourage MEPs to work more or less visibly. Visible demonstrations of
opinions and work are also informational signals to parties and peers, so I construct models
that test the effect of organization and goals across the total effort observed for a legislator.
This effort is defined as the number of activities recorded in the log of parliamentary activities
for each individual MEP. This includes each individuals’ record of public speeches in plenary,
participation on the proposal of motions for resolutions, submission of written declarations,
and parliamentary questions.14
The results of the models, estimated using a Poisson maximum likelihood regression,
are reported in Table 23.15 These models are consistent with the results of the congruence
analysis and show that candidate selection methods have a positive impact on the number of
activities a MEP chooses to participate in, but that the composition of party leadership does
not. While the table reports the marginal effects, the expected count of total activities is
presented in Figure 14. This figure shows that an MEP in a party with centralized selection
will complete roughly 107 more activities than their non-centrally selected peers.16 The
14While work within committees as a rapportuer is argued to be some of the most influential work in the
EP (Ringe 2010), I opted not to include these activities due to the selection process for these roles. Because
rapporteurs are assigned strategically through the EPGs, the likelihood that each individual would have this
opportunity is not equal (Daniel 2013).
15The distribution of the data (count) does not allow for simple linear regression, therefore a Poisson
distribution is assumed, a maximum likelihood model estimated, and marginal effects are reported. The
model is run on the sample of 367 legislators whose parties include mention of the EP elections and data on
parliamentary activity was available.
16This interpretation is for those parties with central selection only (i.e. Centralized Selec-
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Table 23: Poisson Model with Marginal Effects for Legislative Effort and Party Organization
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Total Effort† Speeches Motions for 
Resolutions 
Written 
Declarations 
Parliamentary 
Questions 
      
Centralized Selection 122.010* 40.393 27.487** -0.274 59.802** 
 (71.703) (41.456) (11.167) (0.473) (23.872) 
Inclusive Leadership 81.932 13.265 8.279 0.009 73.319** 
 (101.017) (62.508) (11.401) (0.398) (34.537) 
Centralized Selection*Inclusive Leadership -85.340 -0.399 -11.445 0.773 -96.442** 
 (127.813) (81.106) (12.597) (0.665) (42.316) 
Office Seeking 90.622** 96.306*** 1.852 -0.326 -3.544 
 (42.616) (29.714) (6.881) (0.215) (14.235) 
Vote Seeking 76.966** 59.797*** -4.799 -0.394** 22.427** 
 (32.190) (21.401) (4.984) (0.169) (10.226) 
Policy Seeking 52.196* 25.227 3.965 0.019 11.220 
 (31.451) (21.220) (5.754) (0.188) (11.107) 
National Experience Only -45.869 -34.548 -15.107*** 0.032 3.882 
 (41.516) (22.417) (5.575) (0.319) (17.599) 
European Experience Only -34.832 -28.079 2.595 -0.140 -10.832 
 (34.576) (22.062) (7.901) (0.244) (11.181) 
No Experience -16.156 -7.903 -9.526 -0.322 -0.277 
 (37.831) (23.455) (6.381) (0.224) (15.881) 
Open Electoral Lists 51.516 -4.398 14.566* -0.346 52.957** 
 (59.136) (34.838) (8.606) (0.455) (23.452) 
Federalism -141.323** -74.086** 6.068 -0.685** -64.409*** 
 (56.948) (33.454) (9.512) (0.346) (18.171) 
Bicameral Legislature -393.971*** -272.542*** 22.532*** 0.382 -96.904* 
 (124.963) (83.436) (4.471) (0.395) (51.400) 
European Membership -77.880 -45.609 -22.461 0.672 -12.649 
 (113.354) (66.641) (14.184) (0.553) (39.276) 
Membership in Years 3.143 0.756 0.427 -0.006 1.675* 
 (2.709) (1.536) (0.286) (0.014) (0.984) 
Party Switcher 125.871 77.397 -6.350 0.200 51.407 
 (91.190) (63.450) (8.726) (0.372) (36.217) 
Age -6.075*** -3.220*** -0.340 -0.041** -1.890*** 
 (1.297) (0.745) (0.226) (0.021) (0.526) 
      
Observations 367 367 367 367 367 
Wald chi2 131.7 186.8 29.55 22.12 114.4 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.0205 0.139 0.000 
† Total effort does not include the writing of reports or opinions since these are strategically assigned and each MEP does not have an equal 
opportunity to partake in this type of work 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
effect of electoral goals is also shown in this model. Those in office and vote seeking parties
participate in more total activities than policy seekers or those with no goals. As models 1
and 2 show, the majority of these activities are in the form of speeches, which are the most
visible activity in which MEPs can participate. Figure 15 also shows that MEPs from office
seeking parties are predicted to perform about 67 more activities than those from non office
tion*Inclusion=0).
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seeking parties. MEPs from vote seeking parties are predicted to perform about 41 more
activities than those in non-vote seeking parties. Overall, it is clear that party organization
and electoral goals impact the legislative activities of their members.
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5.8 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The results presented in this chapter illustrate an important relationship between party
organization, party electoral goals, and MEP behavior. These results provide evidence for
hypotheses H1 and H2, which predicted centralization will increase congruence in selection
and supervision respectively. However, supervision appears to be powerful only when utilized
simultaneously with centralized selection. The results also support H3, which predicted that
policy seeking will increase congruence among MEPs and their parties. Unfortunately, the
results provide little support forH4, which hypothesized that nationally ambitious politicians
will exhibit less congruent behavior than those that are new or experienced in Europe.
The conclusions of this chapter make two main contributions to the current literature
on party politics in the EP. First, the results across the two legislative procedures and
three policy areas, in both the calculation of the individual ideal points and the models of
congruence, support the authors who argue that we cannot treat all pieces of legislation in the
EP as equal (Carruba et al. 2006; Lauderdale 2010). Significant substantive differences exist
across legislative behavior that is conditional on both the type of legislation (consequential vs.
inconsequential) and the policy area of the legislation. The centralization of organization
increases congruence at a higher rate when MEPs are voting on consequential legislation
(legislative acts) than on inconsequential legislation. Second, the analysis agrees with the
current state of the literature on national party influence (Coman 2009; Hix and Marsh
2007; Hix, Noury and Roland 2005), determining that national parties are in fact influential
in their MEPs behavior. However, it also extends our understanding of this relationship by
highlighting the conditional nature of national party influence. Providing further evidence
for the argument set forth by Coman (2009), the results suggest that variation in party types
drives variation in the relationship between parties and their MEPs. In addition to variation
in national party influence with respect to the electoral goals of parties, the analysis also
highlights important differences across electoral systems and member state institutions, a
common theme throughout the dissertation.
The results of the empirical tests reported here do allow for some interesting conclusions
with respect to representation in the EU through the EP. If we assess the overall impact of the
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results, it is clear that representation is not equal across parties nor is it equal across policy
areas. The strategic incentives created through the electoral and party system conditions
across the EU create different incentives for behavior in both parties and individuals. Some
parties are organized to encourage more policy congruence between their national preferences
through their treatment of MEPs, while others are not. This gives us cause to think about
the way we approach questions of democratic legitimacy more broadly. Perhaps shifting
our approach in the assessment of democracy to the examination of differences across policy
areas and member states can provide more insight into how, when, or why the EU appears
more democratic in some instances than others.
By modeling the relationship between party organization and legislative behavior, I
sought to investigate whether or not political parties have created mechanisms for the se-
lection and supervision of their MEPs that may be able to provide accountability in the
EU when citizen accountability is lacking. It appears that centralized decision making with
respect to candidate selection helps to ensure more accurate representation of national in-
terests through the use of this ex-ante mechanism. However, it also appears that national
parties do not have a strong internal accountability mechanism if it is not present at the
time of candidate selection, even when these MEPs are included in their leadership.
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6.0 CONCLUSION
Encouraging legislator behavior compatible with party interests in legislative institutions is
an essential skill for effective party representation. Understanding how some parties are able
to successfully encourage desirable behavior is critical for the understanding of representation
in democratic societies. One way parties are able to structure behavior is by organizing to
create the correct incentives for their members serving in government institutions. The
organization of power within political parties creates incentives for members to be more or
less loyal given their individual goals and the goals of the party. For this dissertation, the
EP provided a unique laboratory in which to observe legislator behavior under a variety of
conditions created by variation across party organizations and national institutions. Situated
between broad cross-national party studies and narrow, single institution, country studies,
this research uses the opportunity created by the structure of the EP to approach party
organization and its consequences in a novel way.
6.1 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION
In this dissertation, I provide a unique way of comparing and contrasting the relationship
between national parties and MEPs. I theorized the relationship is structured by three
factors: the organization of parties with respect to selecting and supervising MEPs, the
electoral goals of parties, and the goal of the individual legislator. National institutions
and electoral experience shape organization within a party, which determines the power
relationship between MEPS and their national party leaders. Parties that centralize selection
are better able to control their legislators because they are better able to select appropriate
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candidates for office and have greater control over these candidates and their political futures.
Similarly, parties that incorporate legislators into their executive leadership increase the ease
of communication between the EP and the party which increases both understanding of what
the party wants from the EP and what the MEP can, and will, do in the legislative process.
What the party wants is determined in part by their electoral goals.
Parties have office seeking, vote seeking, and policy seeking goals which are determined
by their experience in national elections. Office seeking parties maximize the number of
party members that they can place in elected office. In European elections, parties will have
office seeking goals if they have limited opportunities at the national level. The limits on
opportunity could be caused by a recent electoral loss at the national level or a history of
little representation entirely. I theorized that when parties have just lost an election, they
may seek to place otherwise “national" politicians in the EP so that they can continue to
hold office. Alternatively, they may place political newcomers in office in order to distance
themselves from a recent, but unsuccessful, national campaign. The results of the analysis
show that this second scenario is much more likely in the EP and office seeking goals predict
the selection of new politicians for the EP.
In contrast to office seeking parties, vote seeking parties simply wish to maximize the
number of votes they receive in an election. While many scholars would argue vote seeking
is only an instrumental goal held as a means to achieve other office or policy goals (Strom
1990), vote seeking in European elections can be advantageous to two types of parties. First,
parties in the majority and/or governing at the national level may be vote seeking (even
without office or policy goals ) because they seek to “win" the election. Given the second
order nature of elections, maximizing the amount of votes won by the majority can provide
valuable leverage for the party to continue governing with the perceived will of the people.
Second, parties that serve as the main opposition may gain domestically by maximizing votes
in European elections. Maximizing votes and winning more than the ruling party or coalition
provides leverage for this party to delegitimize the status quo government and provides a
protest option for dissatisfied voters. In either case, these vote seeking parties will choose to
nominate candidates that are well known nationally and will attract voters. Politicians with
mostly national experience will serve these parties in the EP.
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Policy seeking parties wish to change public policy to reflect their ideological and policy
preferences. Nearly all national parties will have policy goals at the national level, but this
is not so clear at the European level. National parties have several avenues through which
to pursue policy, even at the European level, which makes the concentrated effort necessary
to effectively legislate in the EP unattractive to some parties. Those that will pursue their
goals through the EP are those that are committed to policy changes in areas that are largely
the purview of the EP and the Council of Ministers (i.e. fisheries, the environment, single
market issues, etc.) or hold very strong view toward European integration. These parties
will nominate European ambition politicians that may or may not have experience, but will
likely not have had long national careers.
The final party of the theory argued that individual goals, either those based on a national
career or those hoping to achieve prominence in the EP, will effect the choices legislators
make in the EP and the way they view their role in their party. I argued, along with the
literature on career ambition in the EP (see Pemstein, Meserve and Bernhard (2015)) that
EP ambitious politicians will cater to their European party groups and their EP peers more
than the preferences of their national parties in order to advance their career in the EP.
Nationally ambitious politicians wish to return to national politics so they will be better
agents for their national party in order to increase the likelihood the party will nominate
them for advanced position in their national legislature or government. I hypothesized that
centralized parties choosing nationally ambitious politicians will experience highest level
of congruence. However, in contrast to the previous literature, I find no difference across
politician types.
6.2 MEPS AND THEIR NATIONAL PARTIES
The results of this dissertation suggest legislator behavior in the EP is shaped in part by
the way parties treat their legislators and by the goals of parties for European elections.
National parties in the EU develop both their organizational structure and political goals
for European elections from their experiences at the national level. Complementing existing
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research on the democratic deficit, this research reinforces how national, not European, po-
litical calculus can determine both the choice for who serves in the EP and the behavior of
these chosen MEPs once in office. When organizing the structure of control over EP candi-
dates and MEPs, national governing and party institutions are the most powerful predictors
or centralization (or not) at the EP level. National parties that centralize their selection pro-
cesses for candidates at the national level will do so for European elections. The probability
of centralized candidate selection for European elections is also highest in countries that are
newer, unitary, member states in the Eurozone. These types of states are also more likely to
have parties that include at least one MEP in their leadership, thereby also centralizing the
supervision of their MEPs. The patterns across member states and parties with respect to
party organization for the EP reinforces the strong role of national politics in the EP.
In addition to party organization, Chapter 4 shows how national politics also play a
significant role in determining who is selected to serve national parties in the EP. When
parties think strategically about their goals in European elections, national politics are a
strong determinant of what kind of politician is chosen to represent that party. Vote seeking
parties seek to win the European election. Office seeking parties want to distance themselves
of recent national electoral defeat or train new politicians, while policy seeking parties may
wish to create an entirely separate class of European politicians. After empirically defining
European electoral goals in terms of national political strategies, I found that office and
policy seeking parties are more likely to choose new and inexperienced politicians while vote
seeking parties are likely to choose known national politicians and incumbents. The results
of Chapter 4 continue to support the claim that European elections are second-order national
elections by showing how electoral strategies are the result of national electoral experiences.
The chapter concludes that candidate selection choices are the result of national electoral
politics.
While the role of national political influence in EP elections and legislation is a common
theme throughout the dissertation, Chapter 5 combines the analysis of the previous chapters
to investigate legislative behavior. The results reinforce the role of national political en-
vironment but highlighting the important consequences of party choices over organization.
Parties that choose to centralized candidate selection are better able to enforce congruence
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among their MEPs. This effect is multiplied if parties choose to combine centralized selection
with the inclusion of MEPs in their leadership. The choice to simultaneously exercise control
over selection and actively supervise MEPs yields behavioral rewards in the EP legislative
process. However, if parties choose only to include MEPs in their leadership, the opposite
effect ensues. MEPs in leadership that are not centrally selected are more bold in their be-
havior in the EP and are less congruent than their peers. The chapter also finds that MEPs
in office seeking parties are less congruent than their policy seeking peers, suggesting that
the absence of any policy goals deters MEPs from providing congruent behavior. In sum,
the results of the dissertation sheds light on the way different strategic incentives are created
by the electoral and party system conditions national parties face, which creates variation
in the behavioral incentives of their MEPs. However, the way a party organizes control over
its MEPs can significantly effect the MEP-party relationship.
6.3 BROADER IMPACT
This dissertation contributes to the empirical and theoretical study of parties, legislators,
and legislatures by demonstrating how it is crucial to consider the goals and organization
of a political party when interpreting legislator behavior. The analysis of the dissertation
also contribute to the broader party literature by demonstrating the consequences of party
organization and electoral goals across a variety of conditions. The empirical measurement
and categorization of the treatment of MEPs across several parties participating in the EP
provides for a cross-national analyzes of the consequences of party choices across many insti-
tutional and electoral conditions. The data collected from party statutes and aggregated for
the purpose of studying legislative behavior in the EP provides a more cross-national, com-
parative study than the literature that has been restricted to one or two country studies (e.g.
Frech (2016); Kovár and Kovár (2013); Lundell (2004)). Testing the effect of organization
on legislator behavior gives us the ability to observe variation across parties and member
states in the EU in terms of the level of accountability their internal structures provide. In
addition, the separation of MEP voting behavior across legislation types and policy areas,
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along with variation in outcomes in the analysis, demonstrates an important alternative way
to examine legislative behavior. Taken together, these two empirical characteristics of the
dissertation suggest that instead of continuing to study legislative behavior within the EP
in a “one size fits all" manner, where strategic behavior is expected to be universal across all
MEPs and parties, we should begin look at the incentives created by national parties across
a variety of external conditions.
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Table 24: Coded Statutes by Country
Country Party # of MEPs 
Austria Österreichische Volkspartei 6 
 Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs 5 
Bulgaria Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria 7 
Czech Republic Ob anská demokratická strana 9 
France Mouvement Démocrate 6 
 Nouveau Centre 22 
 Parti socialiste 16 
 Partitu di a Nazione Corsa 15 
Germany Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 13 
 Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands 34 
 Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e.V. 7 
 DIE LINKE. 7 
 Freie Demokratische Partei 11 
 Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 22 
Greece Nea Demokratia 7 
 Panhellenic Socialist Movement 8 
Hungary Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Szövetség-Keresztény Demokrata Néppárt 14 
Italy Il Popolo della Libertà 27 
 'Io amo l'Italia' 7 
 Italia dei Valori - Lista Di Pietro 5 
 Lega Nord 9 
 Partito Democratico 22 
Netherlands Partij van de Arbeid 5 
Poland Platforma Obywatelska 24 
 Prawo i Sprawiedliwo?? 7 
Portugal Partido Social Democrata 8 
 Partido Socialista 6 
Romania Partidul Democrat-Liberal 10 
 Partidul National Liberal 5 
Slovakia SMER-Sociálna demokracia 5 
Spain Independent 23 
Sweden Arbetarepartiet- Socialdemokraterna 6 
United Kingdom Liberal Democrats Party 13 
  United Kingdom Independence Party 11 
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Table 25: Parties with no Formal Organization of MEPs
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen  
GERB 
Fidesz 
La Gauche moderne  
Panhellenic Socialist Movement  
Partido Socialista  
Partitu di a Nazione Corsa  
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands  
 
Table 26: χ2 Test of Association for Formal Organization of MEPs
Formal Organization Χ2 P-Value 
Left Party 1.990 0.158 
National Executive Selection 1.189 0.276 
Bicameral Legislature 6.140 0.013** 
Federalism 0.227 0.634 
State Financing 0.275 0.600 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 27: European vs. National Candidate Selection
Country Party European Selection National Selection Agreement 
Austria ÖVP Proposal by federal party chairman and federal 
party executive approval 
Composition of federal list (Bundesrat) 
decided by federal executive committee on 
recommendation of federal chairman 
Yes 
 SPÖ Composition of list decided by federal party 
council with consultation of regional and 
divisional organizations 
Composition of federal list (Bundesrat) 
decided by party executive of each state, 
"land,"  with agreement of the state 
parliamentary party and consultation of the 
state women's organization 
No 
Bulgaria GERB No formal mention of European Elections Mass election of candidates by members No 
Croatia HDZ Party presidency determines list Party presidency determines list Yes 
 SDP Candidate list decided by party president Party President chooses only a portion of 
candidates on the list 
No 
Czech 
Republic 
ČSSD The central executive committee approves 
proposals for candidate to the EP  
The central executive committee approves 
proposals for candidate to the Chamber of 
Deputies 
Yes 
 ODS Local assembly proposal of candidates and 
regional assembly approval 
Local assembly proposal of candidates and 
regional assembly approval 
Yes 
France EE Electoral lists for all external elections decided 
by ad hoc group  
Electoral lists for all external elections 
decided by ad hoc group  
Yes 
 LGM No Mention of MEP selection in statute but 
statue explicitly states all unassigned powers 
are subject to rules proposed by National 
Bureau 
No Mention of MP selection in statute but 
statue explicitly states all unassigned 
powers are subject to rules proposed by 
National Bureau 
Yes 
 MoDem Candidates for elections are determined by 
national party council 
Candidates for elections are determined by 
national party council 
Yes 
 NC National committee chaired by president of the 
party prepares list for EP elections and 
executive committee has final decision 
National committee chaired by president 
of the party prepares list for national 
elections and executive committee has 
final decision 
Yes 
 PNC The executive secretary has power to delegate 
the management of elections 
The executive secretary has power to 
delegate the management of elections 
Yes 
 PR The party bureau makes decisions on all 
candidate nominations 
The party bureau makes decisions on all 
candidate nominations 
Yes 
 PS (France) Candidates for elections are determined by 
national party council 
Candidates for elections are determined by 
national party council 
Yes 
 UMP Candidates for elections are determined by 
national party council 
Candidates for elections are determined by 
national party council 
Yes 
Germany  CDU Federal convention finalizes the list with a 
recommendation from the federal states 
(Länder) 
Lists decided at constituency level 
assemblies 
No 
 CSU Delegates from various groups and the party 
executive choose candidates 
Delegates choose candidates Yes 
 Die Linke Federal executive of the party determines the 
list of candidates 
Länder executive determine candidates No 
 Bundis 90/Die 
Grüne 
Not formally incorporated into statute but the 
party holds a national convention where 
members with support from their local/regional 
parties are allowed to compete for a spot on the 
list and  
Unknown N/A 
 FDP Meeting of national party congress votes on list meeting of national party congress votes 
on list 
Yes 
 SPD Not formally incorporated into the statute but 
the executive level of the party section the list 
Determination of the list if done at the 
constituency level 
No 
Greece PASOK No mention MEPs in party statute Central political committee decide No 
 ND Candidates are chosen by the president of the 
party  
Candidates are chosen by the president of 
the party  
Yes 
Hungary Fidesz No mention MEPs in party statute No mention of parliamentary elections in 
statute 
Yes 
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Table 28: European vs. National Candidate Selection Contd.
 
Country Party European Selection National Selection Agreement 
Italy IdV The party bureau approves candidates for 
European elections  
The party bureau approves candidates for 
national elections  
Yes 
 LN The federal council determines composition of 
list  
Each state council appoints a committee to 
construct the list for federal elections 
No 
 PD The selection of candidates occurs with a 
primary or broad democratic consultation at 
every level 
The selection of candidates occurs with a 
primary or broad democratic consultation 
at every level 
Yes 
 PDL 
Candidate for European elections  are 
established by the National President in 
consultation with the Bureau, and formalized by 
the National Political Secretary 
Candidate for national elections  are 
established by the National President in 
consultation with the Bureau, and 
formalized by the National Political 
Secretary 
Yes 
 UDC Regional committee submits proposals to the 
national council for European Elections 
Regional committee submits proposals to 
the national council for Parliamentary 
Elections 
Yes 
Netherlands CDA The party congress submits candidates for 
European elections 
The party congress submits candidates for 
national elections 
Yes 
 PVV The party is a professional election party and 
thus has no organization and no official 
members. The only member is the founder, 
Geert Wilders, and he makes all of the 
decisions 
The party is a professional election party 
and thus has no organization and no 
official members. The only member is the 
founder, Geert Wilders, and he makes all 
of the decisions 
Yes 
Poland PiS The regional committees submit a list to the 
political committee for approval 
The regional committees submit a list to 
the political committee for approval 
Yes 
 PO Regional party submits lists to national council 
for approval 
Regional party submits lists to national 
council for approval 
Yes 
Portugal PSD Many bodies can make proposals, national 
council approves 
Many bodies can make proposals, national 
council approves 
Yes 
 PS No mention of selection for European Elections List is put forth by political committee and 
members vote  
No 
Romania PD-L The national bureau approves candidates for the 
European Parliament 
The national bureau approves candidates 
for the national parliament 
Yes 
 PNL The national party leaderships chooses 
candidates 
The national party leaderships chooses 
candidates 
Yes 
 PSD-PC The selection of candidates for the EP is 
approved by the executive committee, which is 
a larger and more representative body than the 
national permanent bureau  
The selection of candidates for the senate 
and chamber of deputies is approved by 
the executive committee, which is a larger 
and more representative body than the 
national permanent bureau 
Yes 
Slovakia Smer National bureau approves list proposed by 
president 
National bureau approves list proposed by 
president 
Yes 
Spain PSOE Federal Committee has final approval power Federal Committee has final approval 
power 
Yes 
Sweden S Party executive chooses list for European 
Parliament 
A nomination committee prepares 
elections 
No 
UK Conservatives Members of regional party vote on the list of 
approved candidates 
Local constituencies choose candidates 
through selection panel 
No 
 Labour A Regional board makes a list that is put to vote 
at the local level  
Local constituency selects the list No 
 LibDems Regional candidate committee prepares list of 
parliamentary candidates and eligible voters in 
regional constituency vote 
State candidate committee of prepares list 
of parliamentary candidates and eligible 
voters in local  constituency vote 
No 
 UKIP Joint responsibility of region and national 
executive but the national executive has final 
say 
Joint responsibility of constituency and 
national executive but the national 
executive has final say 
No 
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Table 29: The Composition of Executive Leadership
    MEPs in the Executive Inclusive or Exclusive 
Austria ÖVP The head delegate serves in the federal 
party executive 
Inclusive 
  SPÖ  The federal executive is an elected body 
and does not automatically include a 
MEP nor is a MEP a member of the 
presidency 
Exclusive 
Bulgaria GERB The party executive committee is elected 
and does not automatically include a 
MEP  
Exclusive 
Croatia HDZ The presidency does not automatically 
include an MEP, certain other offices are 
automatically included as well as 10 
additional members 
Exclusive 
  SDP Members of the presidency are elected at 
the party congress so a MEP is not 
automatically included  
Exclusive 
Czech 
Republic 
ČSSD MEPs are included in the central 
executive committee (in an advisory 
capacity)  
Inclusive 
 ODS The executive board does not include an 
MEP 
Exclusive 
France EE The executive board is elected by the 
congress. Only the national secretary, 
treasurer, and two spokesmen/women are 
automatically include 
Exclusive 
 LGM The national bureau is elected on a 
proposal by the president, it does not 
automatically include an MEP 
Exclusive 
 MoDem The president appoints 30 members and 
the national council approves, a MEP is 
not automatically included although a 
few offices are 
Exclusive 
 NC The executive committee includes all 
MEPS 
Inclusive 
 PNC The 12 members of the executive 
secretariat are elected by the congress 
and do not automatically include a MEP  
Exclusive 
 PR The executive includes all MEPs Inclusive 
 PS (France) The federal council and secretariat are 
elected and do not automatically include 
a MEP 
Exclusive 
  UMP  The High Authority of the Union is 
elected by the bureau on a proposal of the 
president, it does not automatically 
include a MEP 
Exclusive 
Germany  CDU The federal board includes the president 
of the delegation to the EP and chairman 
of the EPP-ED group if they are a 
member of the CDU 
Inclusive 
 CSU The party board includes the chairman of 
the CSU group in the EP.  
Inclusive 
 Die Linke The party executive committee includes a 
representative of the parliamentary group 
of the EP 
Inclusive 
 Bundis 90/Die Grüne The federal executive does not 
automatically include an MEP  
Exclusive 
 FDP The federal board includes a member of 
the EP from the Liberal parliamentary 
group. 
Inclusive 
  SPD  The party executive includes a member 
responsible for the EU but does not 
explicitly state it is a MEP 
Exclusive 
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Table 30: The Composition of Executive Leadership Contd.
    MEPs in the Executive Inclusive or Exclusive 
    
Greece PASOK The political council includes the party 
president and the secretary of the central 
policy committee along with 13 elected 
members but does not automatically 
include an MEP 
Exclusive 
  ND The political council has 7 automatic 
members from party leadership and 14 
elected members with the only 
requirement that 7 of these be 
parliamentary but no specific 
requirement for an MEP 
Exclusive 
Hungary Fidesz MEPs have only an advisory role in the 
leadership group 
Exclusive 
Italy IdV The bureau does not include an MEP Exclusive 
 LN A representative of MEPs may 
participate but are not members of the 
federal council 
Exclusive 
 PD The national secretariat is appointed by 
the national secretary and does not 
automatically include any party 
politicians 
Exclusive 
 PDL The national council includes MEPs Inclusive 
  UDC  The national directorate includes the 
head of the EP delegation and the head of 
the delegation to the EPP 
Inclusive 
Netherlands CDA MEPs are not automatically included in 
the executive committee 
Exclusive 
 PVV The leader, Geert Wilders, is the sole 
leader 
Exclusive 
Poland PiS MEPs are included in the Political 
Committee 
Inclusive 
  PO MEPs are included in the national 
council 
Inclusive 
Portugal PSD  The group coordinator for the EP is 
included in the national council 
Inclusive 
  PS (Portugal) MEPs are not included in the national 
secretariat  
Exclusive 
Romania PD-L The leader of the EP delegation is 
included in the national permanent 
bureau 
Inclusive 
  PNL The permanent delegation of the party 
congress leadership includes MEPs 
Inclusive 
 PSD-PC The head delegate of the EP group is 
included in the permanent national 
bureau 
Inclusive 
Slovakia Smer MEPs are not automatically in the party 
leadership  
Exclusive 
Spain PSOE MEPs are not automatically included in 
the federal executive committee 
Inclusive 
Sweden S Members of the executive include in the 
party chair, party secretary, and five 
elected members so MEPs are not 
automatically included in the leadership 
Exclusive 
UK CONS The leader of the EP delegation is 
included in the party board 
Inclusive 
 Labour In addition to executive officers the party 
board includes 6 elected members but 
MEPs are not automatically included  
Exclusive 
 LDP The federal executive includes on MEP 
elected by the EP delegation 
Inclusive 
  UKIP The leader of the EP delegation has the 
responsibility to select two MEPs to 
attend the executive council meetings 
Inclusive 
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Table 31: Centralized Selection Logistic Regression with Country Random Effects
 (1) 
VARIABLES Selection Country 
Random Effects 
  
Executive National Selection 3.144 
 (1.923) 
Party Age 0.026* 
 (0.013) 
Relative Size of EP Delegation 7.625* 
 (4.343) 
Effective Number of Parties -1.500*** 
 (0.489) 
State Election Financing 2.705* 
 (1.626) 
Federalism -3.288*** 
 (0.705) 
Eurozone Member 6.991*** 
 (2.641) 
Membership (length in years) -0.161*** 
 (0.060) 
  
Observations 45 
Number of Countries 17 
Wald chi2 9.010 
Prob > chi2 0.341 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 32: Inclusive Leadership Logistic Regression with Country Random Effects
 (1) 
VARIABLES Inclusion Country 
Random Effects 
  
Party of the left -1.519 
 (1.038) 
Party Age -0.002 
 (0.010) 
Relative Size of EP Delegation -0.748 
 (1.652) 
Effective Number of Parties -1.438* 
 (0.862) 
State Financing of Election -1.882* 
 (1.118) 
Bicameral 4.708** 
 (2.266) 
Eurozone Member 2.463 
 (1.554) 
Membership (length in years) -0.068** 
 (0.028) 
  
Observations 45 
Number of Countries 17 
Wald chi2 6.617 
Prob > chi2 0.579 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX B
CANDIDATE SELECTION
B.1 ELECTORAL GOALS OF NATIONAL PARTIES
Table 33: Legislature Chambers in Election Data
Country Chamber Name  Bicameralism Score 
Austria Nationalrat National Council 2 
Bulgaria Narado Sabranie  National Assembly 1 
Croatia Sabor Parliament 1 
Czech Republic Poslanecká sněmovna Chamber of Deputies 2 
France Assemblée nationale National Assembly 3 
Germany Bundestag Parliament 4 
Greece Parliamet of the Hellenes Parliament 1 
Hungary Országgyűlés Diet  1 
Ireland Dáil Éireann Lower House 2 
Italy Camera dei Deputati Chamber of Deputies 3 
Netherlands Tweede Kamer House of Representatives 3 
Poland Sejm Lower House 3 
Portugal Assembleia da República Parliament 1 
Romania Camera Deputaților Chamber of Deputies 3 
Slovakia Národná rada National Council 1 
Spain Congreso de los Diputados Chamber of Deputies 3 
Sweden  Riksdag Legislature 1 
United Kingdom House of Commons Lower House 2.5 
Index of bicameralism according to Lijphart (1999) 
1 - unicameralism; 
2 - weak bicameralism (asymmetrical and congruent chambers); 
3 - medium strength bicameralism (asymmetrical and incongruent or symmetrical and congruent); 
4 - strong bicameralism (symmetrical and incongruent). 
Data  and index wording from the Comparative Political Dataset III which was reproduced in Czesnik, 
Kotnarowski and Marowski (2010. 
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Table 34: Timing of National Elections Preceding June 2009 European Election
Country Month Year 
Austria September 2008 
Bulgaria June 2005 
Croatia November 2007 
Czech Republic June 2006 
France June 2007 
Germany September 2005 
Greece September 2007 
Hungary April 2006 
Ireland May 2007 
Italy April 2008 
Netherlands November 2006 
Poland October 2007 
Portugal February 2005 
Romania November 2008 
Slovakia June 2006 
Spain March 2008 
Sweden September 2006 
United Kingdom May 2005 
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Table 35: Change in Seat Share in National Elections Preceding June 2009 European Election
Country Party 
 ∆ in 
Seats 
 ∆ in 
Seats % 
Last 
Election 
Second 
Election 
Austria Österreichische Volkspartei -15 -22.7% 2008 2006 
  Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs -11 -16.4% 2008 2006 
Bulgaria Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria 0 NA 2005 2001 
Croatia Hrvatska Demokratksa Zajednica 0 0.0% 2007 2003 
  Socijaldemokratska Partija Hrvatska 22 64.7% 2007 2003 
Czech Republic Czeska strana socialne demokraticka 4 5.7% 2006 2002 
  Obczanska demokraticka strana 23 39.7% 2006 2002 
France Europe Écologie (Les Verts) NA NA 2007 2002 
 Mouvement Démocrate 0 NA 2007 2002 
 Parti socialiste 46 32.9% 2007 2002 
  Union pour un Mouvement Populaire -44 -11.0% 2007 2002 
Germany Bundnis 90/Die Grunen -4 -7.3% 2005 2002 
 Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands -10 -5.3% 2005 2002 
 Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e.V. -12 -20.7% 2005 2002 
 DIE LINKE. 52 NA 2005 2002 
 Freie Demokratische Partei 14 29.8% 2005 2002 
  Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands -29 -11.6% 2005 2002 
Greece Nea Demokratia -13 -7.9% 2007 2004 
 Panhellenic Socialist Movement -15 -12.8% 2007 2004 
Hungary Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Szövetség-Keresztény Demokrata Néppárt -24 -12.8% 2006 2002 
Ireland Fine Gael Party 19 61.3% 2007 2002 
Italy Il Popolo della Libertà 0 NA 2008 2006 
 Italia dei Valori - Lista Di Pietro 13 81.3% 2008 2006 
 Lega Nord 34 130.8% 2008 2006 
 Partito Democratico 246 NA 2008 2006 
  Unione dei Democratici cristiani e dei Democratici di Centro -3 -7.7% 2008 2006 
Netherlands Christen Democratisch Appèl -3 -6.8% 2006 2003 
 Partij van de Arbeid -9 -21.4% 2006 2003 
  Partij voor de Vrijheid 9 NA 2006 2003 
Poland Platforma Obywatelska 78 58.6% 2007 2002 
 Polska Jest Najważniejsza 0 NA 2007 2002 
 Prawo i Sprawiedliwość 11 7.1% 2007 2002 
 Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej -2 -3.6% 2007 2002 
  Solidarna Polska 0 NA 2007 2002 
Portugal Partido Social Democrata -30 -28.6% 2005 2002 
  Partido Socialista 25 26.0% 2005 2002 
Romania Partidul Democrat-Liberal 48 71.6% 2008 2004 
 Partidul National Liberal 5 8.3% 2008 2004 
  Partidul Social Democrat -10 -8.1% 2008 2004 
Slovakia SMER-Sociálna demokracia 25 100.0% 2006 2002 
Spain Partido Popular 6 4.1% 2008 2004 
  Partido Socialista Obrero Español 5 3.0% 2008 2004 
Sweden Arbetarepartiet- Socialdemokraterna -14 -9.7% 2006 2002 
United Kingdom Conservative Party 32 19.3% 2005 2001 
 Labour Party -57 -13.8% 2005 2001 
 Liberal Democrats Party 10 19.2% 2005 2001 
  United Kingdom Independence Party 0 NA 2005 2001 
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Table 36: Percent of Party Supporters Interested in European Elections
Country Party Abb. % 
Austria Österreichische Volkspartei ÖVP 65.69 
 Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs SPÖ 50.99 
Bulgaria Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria GERB 0.00 
Croatia Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica HDZ - 
 Socijaldemokratkska Partija Hrvatske SDP - 
Czech Republic Česká strana sociálně demokratická  CSSD 30.43 
 Ob anská demokratická strana ODS 38.71 
France Europe Écologie EE 57.14 
 La Gauche moderne LGM 50.91 
 Mouvement Démocrate MoDEM 61.7 
 Nouveau Centre NC 50.91 
 Parti Radical PR 50.91 
 Parti socialiste PS (France) 57.99 
 Partitu di a Nazione Corsa PNC 57.14 
 Union pour un Mouvement Populaire UMP 50.91 
Germany Bündnis 90/Die Grünen B90/GR 62.75 
 Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands CDU 57.29 
 Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e.V. CSU 63.33 
 DIE LINKE. Die Linke 50.55 
 Freie Demokratische Partei FDP 37.97 
 Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands SPD 53.01 
Greece Nea Demokratia ND 71.72 
 Panhellenic Socialist Movement PASOK 70.08 
Hungary Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Szövetség-Keresztény Demokrata Néppárt FIDESZ 58.06 
Ireland Fianna Fáil Party FF 75.98 
Italy Il Popolo della Libertà PDL 53.85 
 Italia dei Valori - Lista Di Pietro IdV 54.55 
 Lega Nord LN 48.84 
 Partito Democratico PD 62.5 
 Unione dei Democratici cristiani e dei Democratici di Centro UDC 54.76 
Netherlands Christen Democratisch Appèl CDA 61.47 
 Partij voor de Vrijheid PVV 18.18 
Poland Platforma Obywatelska PO 44.41 
 Prawo i Sprawiedliwość PiS 36.25 
 Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej SLD-UP 40.00 
Portugal Partido Social Democrata PSD 47.41 
 Partido Socialista PS (Portugal) 47.06 
Romania Partidul Democrat-Liberal PD-L 76.44 
 Partidul National Liberal PNL 75.53 
 Partidul Social Democrat PSD-PC 68.81 
Slovakia SMER-Sociálna demokracia Smer 46.45 
Spain Partido Popular PP 59.78 
 Partido Socialista Obrero Español PSOE 53.16 
Sweden Arbetarepartiet- Socialdemokraterna S 46.96 
United Kingdom Conservative Party CON 42.67 
 Labour Party Labour 44.95 
 Liberal Democrats Party LDP 52.00 
 United Kingdom Independence Party UKIP 57.14 
    
Min: 0%  Max: 76.4% Mean: 53.85% 
75th Percentile = 61.47% 
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Table 37: Pro and Anti Integration Score from Manifestos
Country Party Abb. Pro vs. Anti 
Integration 
Absolute 
Distance from 
Mean 
Austria Österreichische Volkspartei ÖVP 15.0 11.3 
 Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs SPÖ 2.0 1.9 
Bulgaria Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria GERB 1.3 2.6 
Croatia Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica HDZ . . 
 Socijaldemokratkska Partija Hrvatske SDP . . 
Czech Republic Česká strana sociálně demokratická  CSSD 5.6 1.7 
 Ob anská demokratická strana ODS -2.8 6.7 
France Europe Écologie EE 5.2 1.3 
 La Gauche moderne LGM 20.0 15.9 
 Mouvement Démocrate MoDEM 12.0 8.1 
 Nouveau Centre NC 20.0 15.9 
 Parti Radical PR 20.0 15.9 
 Parti socialiste PS (France) 4.7 0.8 
 Partitu di a Nazione Corsa PNC 5.2 1.3 
 Union pour un Mouvement Populaire UMP 20.0 15.9 
Germany Bündnis 90/Die Grünen B90/GR 6.6 2.8 
 Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands CDU 15.0 11.0 
 Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e.V. CSU 3.3 0.5 
 DIE LINKE. Die Linke 0.2 3.6 
 Freie Demokratische Partei FDP 5.2 1.3 
 Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands SPD 11.0 6.9 
Greece Nea Demokratia ND 11.0 7.5 
 Panhellenic Socialist Movement PASOK 17.0 13.0 
Hungary Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Szövetség-Keresztény Demokrata Néppárt FIDESZ 11.0 7.1 
Ireland Fianna Fáil Party FF 9.3 5.4 
Italy Il Popolo della Libertà PDL 4.4 0.5 
 Italia dei Valori - Lista Di Pietro IdV 0.0 3.9 
 Lega Nord LN -3.6 7.5 
 Partito Democratico PD 13.0 9.2 
 Unione dei Democratici cristiani e dei Democratici di Centro UDC 0.0 3.9 
Netherlands Christen Democratisch Appèl CDA . . 
 Partij voor de Vrijheid PVV 9.8 5.9 
Poland Platforma Obywatelska PO 9.1 5.2 
 Prawo i Sprawiedliwość PiS 6.3 2.4 
 Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej SLD-UP 6.7 2.9 
Portugal Partido Social Democrata PSD 16.0 12.2 
 Partido Socialista PS (Portugal) 14.0 9.7 
Romania Partidul Democrat-Liberal PD-L 18.0 14.5 
 Partidul National Liberal PNL 16.0 12.6 
 Partidul Social Democrat PSD-PC . . 
Slovakia SMER-Sociálna demokracia Smer -2.4 6.2 
Spain Partido Popular PP 7.6 3.8 
 Partido Socialista Obrero Español PSOE 2.2 1.6 
Sweden Arbetarepartiet- Socialdemokraterna S 1.4 2.5 
United  Conservative Party CON -8.5 12.4 
Kingdom Labour Party Labour 9.4 5.5 
 Liberal Democrats Party LDP 18.0 13.7 
 United Kingdom Independence Party UKIP -77.0 80.8 
        
Min: -77.0 Max: 20.0 Mean: 3.87  
75th percentile for absolute distance from mean = 11.11 
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Table 38: Party Classification by Goals
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B.2 PARTY GOALS AND SELECTION
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Figure 18: Predicted Probability of Type in Office and Policy Seeking Parties
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Figure 19: Predicted Probability of Type in Office and Vote Seeking Parties
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Table 39: Goals by Parts and National Politician Type
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 VARIABLES Regional and 
National Gov 
No Gov 
Exp 
National Party 
Experience 
No Party 
Exp 
      
Office Seeking Experienced Significant Loss -0.141** 0.074* -0.038 0.048 
  (0.057) (0.043) (0.066) (0.043) 
Vote Seeking Majority Minority Party 0.136** -0.120*** -0.095 -0.106 
  (0.069) (0.040) (0.123) (0.068) 
 Government Party 0.123* -0.088 -0.099 -0.086** 
  (0.064) (0.054) (0.095) (0.040) 
Policy Seeking  EU Salient 0.034 -0.026 0.037 0.094 
  (0.076) (0.042) (0.106) (0.058) 
 Strong Pro or Anti Sentiment -0.149*** 0.119* 0.014 0.036 
  (0.040) (0.063) (0.082) (0.050) 
 Party Age -0.002** -0.000 -0.001 0.002** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
 Time since last election -0.007** -0.001 -0.003 0.004** 
  (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
 Bicameral -0.129 0.022 0.017 0.098 
  (0.112) (0.082) (0.121) (0.072) 
 Federalism 0.002 0.024 -0.081 -0.206*** 
  (0.076) (0.034) (0.094) (0.057) 
 Effective Number of Parties -0.046 0.027 0.015 -0.048 
  (0.029) (0.017) (0.039) (0.041) 
 Eurozone 0.005 0.077** 0.076 -0.037 
  (0.084) (0.038) (0.072) (0.053) 
 Advanced Education 0.037 -0.026 0.010 -0.027 
  (0.060) (0.037) (0.041) (0.034) 
 Age 0.013*** -0.014*** 0.001 -0.004** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
 Incumbent -0.000  0.138***  
  (0.041)  (0.050)  
      
 Observations 514 514 514 514 
 Pseudo R-sqaure 0.130 0.140 0.0463 0.0624 
 Wald chi2(12) 754.7 508.0 250.6 300.9 
 Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std. Err adjusted for 18 clusters 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 40: Goals by Parts and European or New Politician Type
  (5) (6) (6) 
 VARIABLES Incumbent EP Party Exp New 
     
Office Seeking Experienced Significant Loss -0.001 -0.038 0.057*** 
  (0.039) (0.049) (0.021) 
Vote Seeking Majority Minority Party 0.126* 0.069 -0.072** 
  (0.069) (0.052) (0.030) 
 Government Party 0.101 0.093* -0.030 
  (0.062) (0.055) (0.028) 
Policy Seeking  EU Salient 0.033 -0.090 0.044 
  (0.064) (0.079) (0.034) 
 Strong Pro or Anti Sentiment -0.054 -0.026 0.042 
  (0.057) (0.065) (0.029) 
 Party Age 0.001** -0.004*** 0.001 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
 Time since last election 0.003 -0.003 -0.000 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
 Bicameral -0.002 -0.082 0.005 
  (0.072) (0.092) (0.044) 
 Federalism 0.014 0.354*** -0.052* 
  (0.054) (0.095) (0.031) 
 Effective Number of Parties -0.004 0.031 -0.012 
  (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) 
 Eurozone -0.128** -0.046 0.049*** 
  (0.060) (0.051) (0.018) 
 Advanced Education 0.030 -0.021 -0.023 
  (0.060) (0.024) (0.029) 
 Age 0.016*** 0.003 -0.005*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) 
 Incumbent  0.273***  
   (0.041)  
     
 Observations 514 514 514 
 Pseudo R-sqaure 0.0995 0.152 0.0715 
 Wald chi2(12) 3025 719.2 872.5 
 Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Std. Err adjusted for 18 clusters 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX C
ELECTORAL GOALS, ORGANIZATION, AND LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR
C.1 VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION
C.1.1 Dependent Variable: IDEAL Points
Modeling outcomes in the EP has been a highly contested area of analysis since the first
appearance of NOMINATE scores. Several empirical studies have explored this relationship
between the voting behavior of individual MEPs within and among the EPGs and their
national parties(Hix and Lord 1997; Hix 1999; Hix, Noury and Roland 2007). However,
measuring party discipline, influence, or party effect on voting is incredibly difficult. In fact,
extracting the effect of party organization and power from individual behavior in voting is
nearly impossible (Hix 2002). Empirical evidence has provided only controversial conclu-
sions about the direct measure of party influence (Krehbiel 1993; Snyder and Groseclose
2000; Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart 2001; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2001; Sny-
der and Groseclose 2001). Several criticisms have been made against the empirical testing
of party influence because of the difficulty of detangling the role of parties from ideology
(Snyder and Groseclose 2000) and identifying instances of strategic party voting remains
tricky Denzau, Riker and Shepsle (1985). The main problem constraining the measurement
of party influence is the inability to accurately separate legislators’ ideological preferences
from party voting. Instead of attempting to derive and explore the mechanisms that induce
party voting in individuals, this paper instead seeks account only for the distance between
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an MEP and the calculated position of their national party taken from exogenous accounts
of party preference.
The first step in the creation of the dependent variable is estimating several sets of
distinctive ideal points from the available roll call data. This data provides the vote choices
for each MEP (or their absence) on the set of roll-call votes between the beginning of the
EP term in July 2009 and March 2013. It identifies every individual by a unique MEP
identification number, and tracks membership in the EPGs (Hix, Noury and Roland 2006;
Hix and Marsh 2007). This data set provides 802 MEPs and sets of votes from each of
the EPâĂŹs main committee; however, the data used includes a set of all legislative votes
and all non-legislative votes, as well as all votes where the main policy areas are economic
and monetary policy (economic), the foreign affairs and security policy (foreign), and the
employment and social policy (employment). Ideal points were calculated for all committee
areas however, not all areas experience a substantial amount of legislation that is necessary
to construct reliable ideal points nor are they easily matched to manifesto data to connect
the individual and party preferences. Total number of votes for each area is listed in Table
41.
The ideal points are calculated for each MEP using the IDEAL Bayesian estimation
process (Clinton, Jackman and Rivers 2004). The MCMC simulation process first identifies
prior values for the parameters Îś and Îš for all roll call votes for all MEPs using Bayesian
estimation and then repeats the process per its specification (Clinton, Jackman and Rivers
2004; Han 2007). The simulations then produce mean values of x along with their stan-
dards errors. These measures were estimated in one dimensions only with all contested (not
unanimous) votes and MEPs voting less than 25 times removed and each simulation was run
10,000 times.
174
Table 41: Votes in the 7th EP Session by Committee
Committee # of Votes 
Agriculture and Rural Development 352 
Budgets 488 
Budgetary Control 295 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home affairs 254 
Constitutional Affairs 80 
Culture and Education 34 
Development 64 
Economic and Monetary Affairs 367 
Employment and Social Affairs 167 
Environment, Public Health, and Food Safety 391 
Fisheries 148 
Foreign Affairs 449 
Women's Right and Gender Equality 143 
Industry, Research, and Energy 177 
Internal Market and Consumer Protection 56 
International Trade 234 
Legal Affairs 45 
Petitions 12 
Regional Development 70 
Transport and Tourism 70 
 
 
 
  # of Votes % of Total 
Economic and Monetary Affairs Legislative 186 51.38 
 Non-legislative 176 48.62 
    
Employment and Social Affairs Legislative 39 23.35 
 Non-legislative 128 76.65 
    
Foreign Affairs Legislative 16 3.56 
 Non-legislative 433 96.44 
    
All votes Legislative 989 24.82 
 Non-legislative 2580 64.74 
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C.1.2 Dependent Variable: Party Preference
As stated in the text, in order to construct the measures of preferences, the manifesto
scores for several variables have been aggregated to produce preference scales for all parties.
The creators of the manifesto project have categorized manifesto text into many different
areas on the levels of local, regional, national, and global and have also indicated whether
the particular coded statements are representative of leftist views or rightists views. I use
these indicators of left and right to construct a left/right scale for preferences in external
relations (foreign Policy), economic policy, and employment policy along with a general
measure of left/right placement. The following example will illustrate how these measures
were constructed.
The manifesto data uses a coding scheme that identifies rightist and leftist statements of
a party. For example, when coding statements about the military that appear in a party’s
manifesto, positive statements are identified as rightist votes while negative statements are
leftist votes. Similarly, negative statements on economic protectionism are considered rightist
and positive statements are considered leftist. To create the right left index, the sum of
rightist codes is subtracted from the sum of leftist codes, leaving a range of possible outcomes
that rank parties from left to right. The data ranges from about -25 to 21 with Germany’s Die
Linke as the party at the farthest point left, Greece’s Nea Demokratia at the furthest right,
and the British Labour party at the median. This same process was used to construct the
individual measures of foreign policy rankings, economic policy rankings, and employment
policy ranking. The summary statistics are as follows:
Table 42: Policy Measures for Parties
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Right-Left Aggregate -4.46 9.311 -24.63 20.18 
Economic Policy 2.80 2.71 -4.05 11.33 
Foreign Policy -4.38 3.71 -12.54 7.84 
Employment Policy -1.98 2.68 -15.97 0.00 
 
176
C.2 INVERSE CONGRUENCE
Table 43: Mean Inverse Congruence by Party Across Legislation Type
Country  Party Legislative Acts Non-legislative Acts 
Austria Österreichische Volkspartei 0.3242 0.4088 
 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs 0.5567 0.5015 
Bulgaria Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria 0.8363 0.1931 
Czech Republic Česká strana sociálně demokratická  0.1872 0.1444 
 
Ob anská demokratická strana 1.1531 0.2949 
France Europe Écologie 1.0590 3.0967 
 
La Gauche moderne 0.3828 0.8824 
 
Mouvement Démocrate 0.1163 0.5086 
 
Nouveau Centre 1.1674 0.9297 
 
Parti Radical 1.7710 1.0113 
 
Parti socialiste 0.4847 0.2515 
 
Partitu di a Nazione Corsa 1.0520 2.6973 
 
Union pour un Mouvement Populaire 1.7587 0.9736 
Germany Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 0.8041 2.3248 
 
Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands 0.8717 0.0723 
 
Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e.V. 0.6911 0.2797 
 
DIE LINKE. 0.9101 0.4673 
 
Freie Demokratische Partei 0.2272 0.0648 
 
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 0.5821 0.7204 
Greece Nea Demokratia 0.1370 0.7483 
 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement 0.6372 0.5023 
Hungary Fidesz 1.0285 0.6846 
Italy Il Popolo della Libertà 1.1304 0.8226 
 
Italia dei Valori - Lista Di Pietro 1.1017 1.2641 
 
Lega Nord 1.0042 0.7036 
 
Partito Democratico 0.7323 0.6894 
 
Unione dei Democratici cristiani (UDC) 0.3510 0.2761 
Netherlands Partij voor de Vrijheid 1.5191 1.3913 
Poland Platforma Obywatelska 1.1022 0.3453 
 
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość 0.5305 1.1640 
 
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej 0.5820 0.2721 
Portugal Partido Social Democrata 0.6934 0.1888 
 
Partido Socialista 0.2272 0.1115 
Romania Partidul Democrat-Liberal 1.3823 0.3663 
 
Partidul National Liberal 0.1337 0.0600 
Slovakia SMER-Sociálna demokracia 0.6338 0.6012 
Spain Partido Popular 0.7404 0.1070 
 
Partido Socialista Obrero Español 0.5417 0.2902 
Sweden Arbetarepartiet- Socialdemokraterna 0.4393 0.1518 
United Kingdom Conservative Party 0.7019 0.9249 
 
Labour Party 0.6784 0.2350 
 
Liberal Democrats Party 0.4566 0.3154 
  United Kingdom Independence Party 2.2712 0.6789 
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Table 44: Mean Inverse Congruence by Party Across Policy Areas
Country  Party Economic policy Foreign Policy Employment Policy 
Austria Österreichische Volkspartei 0.6809 0.7213 0.8041 
 Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs 0.8948 0.5641 0.3162 
Bulgaria Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria 1.2164 0.8113 0.4152 
Czech Republic Česká strana sociálně demokratická  0.7474 0.4131 0.4038 
 Ob anská demokratická strana 0.9286 0.8029 1.1177 
France Europe Écologie 0.8325 1.3545 1.4719 
 La Gauche moderne 1.2160 0.2263 0.3249 
 Mouvement Démocrate 0.2971 0.4947 0.5809 
 Nouveau Centre 1.2078 0.5260 2.0209 
 Parti Radical 0.4060 0.7753 1.6973 
 Parti socialiste 1.0142 0.8303 0.1012 
 Partitu di a Nazione Corsa 0.8045 1.3455 1.3889 
 Union pour un Mouvement Populaire 0.9175 0.7743 1.6881 
Germany Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 0.7779 0.8663 1.2899 
 Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands 1.1714 0.9246 0.4681 
 Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e.V. 0.8446 0.8243 0.6159 
 DIE LINKE. 1.5426 1.1693 0.7713 
 Freie Demokratische Partei 0.6140 0.3356 1.0821 
 Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 0.8187 0.1492 0.8921 
Greece Nea Demokratia 0.1581 0.4333 0.1474 
 Panhellenic Socialist Movement 1.0033 0.6859 0.1855 
Hungary Fidesz 0.9668 1.4157 0.4834 
Italy Il Popolo della Libertà 1.0448 0.8771 1.4979 
 Italia dei Valori - Lista Di Pietro 0.2163 1.5823 0.1898 
 Lega Nord 0.9632 1.0613 0.1680 
 Partito Democratico 0.7585 0.3844 0.2292 
 Unione dei Democratici cristiani (UDC) 0.6013 0.8837 1.9983 
Netherlands Partij voor de Vrijheid 1.2742 1.0591 1.4111 
Poland Platforma Obywatelska 1.3087 1.6256 0.7600 
 Prawo i Sprawiedliwość 0.9461 0.3585 0.8093 
 Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej 0.8257 0.0632 0.1961 
Portugal Partido Social Democrata 0.6334 0.9841 0.7592 
 Partido Socialista 1.0391 0.3461 0.0663 
Romania Partidul Democrat-Liberal 1.2701 0.9108 1.1202 
 Partidul National Liberal 0.3231 0.5405 0.8261 
Slovakia SMER-Sociálna demokracia 0.9699 0.7898 0.1385 
Spain Partido Popular 1.3384 0.8014 1.0357 
 Partido Socialista Obrero Español 0.7592 0.2259 0.1067 
Sweden Arbetarepartiet- Socialdemokraterna 0.7475 0.9823 0.0336 
United Kingdom Conservative Party 0.9078 0.9939 0.8399 
 Labour Party 0.8014 0.3369 0.8693 
 Liberal Democrats Party 0.4524 0.1827 1.0337 
  United Kingdom Independence Party 1.4541 1.9605 1.9701 
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C.3 ELECTORAL GOALS AND ORGANIZATION INTERACTIONS
Table 45: Interactive Effects of Electoral Goals and Party Organization: Full Model
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Legislative 
acts 
Non-Legislative 
acts 
Economic 
Policy 
Foreign 
Policy 
Employment 
Policy 
      
Centralized Selection -0.174* 0.241*** 0.113 0.413*** -0.024 
 (0.104) (0.0513) (0.085) (0.074) (0.090) 
Centralized Selection*Office Seeking 0.707*** 2.675*** 0.438*** 1.028*** 0.781*** 
 (0.135) (0.172) (0.113) (0.152) (0.172) 
Centralized Selection*Vote Seeking -0.336*** -0.177** -0.012 -0.250** -0.734*** 
 (0.106) (0.0870) (0.089) (0.107) (0.126) 
Inclusive Leadership 0.269*** 0.0730 0.282*** 0.425*** 0.608*** 
 (0.075) (0.0513) (0.074) (0.079) (0.099) 
Inclusive Leadership*Policy Seeking -0.404*** 0.0285 -0.339*** -0.660*** -0.472*** 
 (0.101) (0.0670) (0.086) (0.106) (0.133) 
Inclusive Leadership*Vote Seeking -0.195** -0.196** -0.262*** -0.423*** -0.497*** 
 (0.085) (0.0761) (0.076) (0.092) (0.098) 
Party Switcher 0.105 0.194** -0.144 -0.189 0.085 
 (0.094) (0.0940) (0.112) (0.125) (0.126) 
National Politician -0.035 -0.0444 -0.035 -0.020 0.012 
 (0.044) (0.0322) (0.042) (0.054) (0.048) 
Incumbent -0.084* -0.0550 -0.048 0.009 -0.030 
 (0.045) (0.0345) (0.040) (0.052) (0.051) 
New Politician -0.064 0.0343 -0.037 0.076 -0.065 
 (0.066) (0.0575) (0.056) (0.078) (0.070) 
Office and Policy Seeking 0.872*** 0.244*** 0.446*** 0.810*** 0.285 
 (0.211) (0.0865) (0.121) (0.174) (0.178) 
Office and Vote Seeking 0.220** 0.0704 0.363*** -0.029 -0.015 
 (0.095) (0.0863) (0.102) (0.136) (0.151) 
Office, Vote, and Policy Seeking 0.382*** 0.215*** 0.164 0.252** 0.105 
 (0.111) (0.0664) (0.101) (0.111) (0.155) 
Vote Seeking 0.616*** 0.272*** 0.640*** 0.741*** 0.205 
 (0.091) (0.0975) (0.088) (0.126) (0.127) 
Vote and Policy Seeking -0.081 0.537*** 0.175** 0.134 -0.563*** 
 (0.090) (0.0761) (0.071) (0.112) (0.132) 
Open Electoral List 0.249*** 0.146*** 0.185*** 0.370*** 0.103* 
 (0.047) (0.0408) (0.054) (0.053) (0.058) 
Federalism -0.290*** -0.156** 0.271*** 0.276*** -0.544*** 
 (0.088) (0.0713) (0.074) (0.092) (0.110) 
Bicameralism -0.031 0.203** -0.098 -0.452*** 0.438*** 
 (0.091) (0.0796) (0.076) (0.093) (0.127) 
Eurozone -0.226*** -0.124** -0.413*** -0.830*** -0.176** 
 (0.060) (0.0530) (0.056) (0.074) (0.079) 
Membership 0.008*** 0.00234 0.011*** 0.020*** -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.00145) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 0.419*** -0.0241 0.257** 0.148 0.502*** 
 (0.109) (0.0917) (0.108) (0.134) (0.152) 
      
Observations 362 362 362 360 361 
R-squared 0.452 0.833 0.359 0.429 0.610 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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C.4 HECKMAN SELECTION MODEL FOR CONGRUENCE AND
PARTY ORGANIZATION
The data for the predictor variables of selection and supervision used in Chapter 5 include
only those parties for which party statutes explicitly mention the treatment of their MEPs.
This means that of the 436 observations I have for individual MEPs, 74 of them are ex-
cluded from the analysis because their party statutes do not provides enough information
to determine how their parties treat them in selection and supervision. This characteristics
of the data highlight a few important complications of the modeling process that must be
addressed. First, the amount of detail in party statutes varies widely across parties. As
Chapter 3 highlighted, there are parties that do not mention their MEPs at all, those that
mention MEPs but are vague, and there are those parties that provide full information,
addressing the EP and their selection procedures. If this information is missing in a party
statute, it is impossible to infer what the leadership of the party is thinking about the EP
or how they view their politicians in it. In order to make the most use of the unobserved in-
formation in this choice, I construct a five selection models to test whether or not legislative
behavior is independent of the choices made when writing party statutes in addition to the
modeling in Chapter 5. In other words, I test whether or not I can draw inferences about
selection and supervision that are independent of the choice to make statutes explicit when
it comes to the treatment of their MEPs. Not only does this allow me to flesh out even more
variation between parties, it also allows me to make the most use of my data.
These Heckman models incorporate factors that might contribute to the decision of a
party to formally address MEPs in a statute in a selection equation before constructing the
baseline model to test the hypotheses of Chapter 5. These models estimate these relationships
in a two-stage procedure that first tests a model to identify under what conditions parties
choose to incorporate the EP into their statutes, then it estimates a model on how formal
selection and supervision procedures influence congruence. The predictor variables for the
selection equation are taken from the theory of Chapter 3. However, it is important to
note that I did not find any patterns for why a party would or would not include this in
its statute in that analysis. The results of the models are reported in Table 46 and the
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important statistic to note is that of the Wald test of the independence of equations. This
statistic tells us whether the congruence equation is independent of the the inclusion or
exclusion of the formal mention of MEPs in the statutes. If this statistic is significant, then
a Heckman model is appropriate. As the tables report, this is only significant for models
of Legislative Acts (1) and and Non-Legislative acts(2). However, comparing the results of
these two models with those in the analysis of Chapter 5 shows that the results of Chapter
5 and its analysis are robust across the specifications.
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Table 46: Heckman Selection Model for Congruence and Party Organization in Legislation
 
                             (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Legislative 
Acts 
Non Legislative 
Acts 
Economic 
Policy 
Foreign 
Policy 
Employment 
Policy 
      
Centralized Candidate Selection -0.118* 0.586*** 0.087 0.620*** -0.188* 
 (0.063) (0.120) (0.056) (0.077) (0.099) 
Inclusive Leadership 0.302** 0.047 0.107 0.604*** 0.515*** 
 (0.151) (0.103) (0.114) (0.127) (0.099) 
Centralized Candidate Selection* Inclusive Leadership -0.285 -0.568*** 0.029 -0.668*** -0.134 
 (0.185) (0.156) (0.138) (0.156) (0.103) 
Office Seeking Goals 0.390*** 0.335*** 0.111* 0.262*** 0.650*** 
 (0.072) (0.094) (0.061) (0.074) (0.062) 
Vote Seeking Goals 0.059 -0.197*** 0.152*** 0.070 -0.299*** 
 (0.042) (0.049) (0.039) (0.055) (0.048) 
Policy Seeking Goals -0.174*** -0.008 -0.224*** -0.160*** -0.117** 
 (0.045) (0.065) (0.044) (0.048) (0.051) 
National Experience Only 0.038 0.020*** 0.084* -0.002 0.028 
 (0.061) (0.000) (0.048) (0.070) (0.066) 
European Experience Only -0.011 0.073*** 0.044 -0.015 0.001 
 (0.050) (0.000) (0.053) (0.071) (0.052) 
No Experience 0.037 0.137 0.075 0.155* -0.005 
 (0.050) (0.100) (0.054) (0.081) (0.061) 
Open Electoral Lists 0.001 -0.001*** 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Federalism 0.190*** 0.027 0.109* 0.369*** 0.190*** 
 (0.058) (0.065) (0.062) (0.068) (0.071) 
Bicameral Legislature -0.579*** -0.192** -2.222*** 0.058 0.015 
 (0.129) (0.641) (0.123) (0.120) (0.071) 
Eurozone Membership 0.555*** 0.205 -0.011 -0.253* -0.171 
 (0.084) (0.126) (0.442) (0.416) (0.121) 
Membership in EU in Years 0.034 0.036 1.152*** -0.510*** -0.193** 
 (0.109) (0.107) (0.340) (0.108) (0.078) 
Age of MEP -0.000 -0.006 -0.037*** -0.035*** 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Party Switcher 0.051 -0.067 -0.123 -0.349** 0.067 
 (0.098) (0.124) (0.115) (0.139) (0.138) 
Constant -0.005 -1.131*** -0.249 0.116 -0.639** 
 (0.156) (0.186) (0.231) (0.218) (0.270) 
Federalism -1.416*** -4.802*** 0.168 -2.235*** -2.902*** 
 (0.255) (0.075) (0.417) (0.429) (0.873) 
Bicameral Legislature 2.253*** 4.854*** 3.539*** 3.478*** 3.790*** 
 (0.271) (0.617) (0.124) (0.137) (0.630) 
Eurozone Membership 0.345 1.333*** -0.347*** 1.156*** 1.521*** 
 (0.283) (0.229) (0.091) (0.336) (0.283) 
Membership in EU in Years -0.005 0.004 0.007*** 0.013*** -0.028** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.013) 
Constant -0.362** 0.262* 0.432** -0.279 0.582*** 
 (0.160) (0.146) (0.172) (0.234) (0.204) 
Observations 436 436 436 434 435 
Censored 74 74 74 74 74 
Uncensored 362 362 362 360 361 
Wald chi2 290.9 . 115.8 212.6 388.9 
Prob > chi2 0.000 . 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Wald Test of Independence 29.42 19116.32 0.87 1.05 2.78 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.34797 0.3050 0.952 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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C.5 THE EFFECTS OF ELECTORAL GOALS TESTING MUTUALLY
EXCLUSIVE COMBINATIONS
Table 47: Congruence and Party Organization in Legislative and Non-Legislative Acts
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Legislative 
Acts 
Non-Legislative 
Acts 
   
Centralized Candidate Selection -0.328*** 0.266*** 
 (0.072) (0.0721) 
Inclusive Leadership 0.180 0.196** 
 (0.130) (0.0809) 
Centralized Candidate Selection*Inclusive Leadership 0.018 -0.292*** 
 (0.169) (0.112) 
Office Seeking 0.779*** 2.602*** 
 (0.110) (0.156) 
Office and Policy Seeking 0.871*** 0.160* 
 (0.225) (0.0822) 
Office and Vote Seeking 0.218** 0.0692 
 (0.103) (0.0706) 
Office, Vote, and Policy Seeking 0.417*** 0.207*** 
 (0.114) (0.0623) 
Policy Seeking -0.410*** -0.0686 
 (0.128) (0.0739) 
Vote Seeking 0.318*** -0.0130 
 (0.093) (0.0617) 
Vote and Policy Seeking -0.152 0.416*** 
 (0.106) (0.0773) 
National Experience Only 0.059 0.0534 
 (0.059) (0.0445) 
European Experience Only -0.007 0.0478 
 (0.049) (0.0335) 
No Experience 0.041 0.106** 
 (0.061) (0.0535) 
Open Electoral Lists 0.293*** 0.210*** 
 (0.053) (0.0428) 
Federalism -0.207 -0.252*** 
 (0.136) (0.0818) 
Bicameral Legislature -0.174* 0.210*** 
 (0.096) (0.0725) 
Eurozone Membership -0.264*** -0.0499 
 (0.098) (0.0670) 
Membership in EU in Years 0.011*** 0.00204 
 (0.003) (0.00177) 
Age of MEP 0.167* 0.186** 
 (0.100) (0.0862) 
Party Switcher 0.001 -0.00390*** 
 (0.002) (0.00136) 
Constant 0.385** 0.114 
 (0.151) (0.105) 
   
Observations 362 362 
R-squared 0.429 0.837 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 48: Congruence and Party Organization Across Policy Areas
 
 (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES Economic Policy Foreign Policy Employment Policy 
    
Centralized Candidate Selection 0.014 0.384*** -0.335*** 
 (0.057) (0.068) (0.101) 
Inclusive Leadership -0.007 0.477*** 0.471*** 
 (0.111) (0.108) (0.107) 
Centralized Candidate Selection*Inclusive Leadership 0.268** -0.335** -0.076 
 (0.135) (0.146) (0.135) 
Office Seeking 0.416*** 0.886*** 0.863*** 
 (0.090) (0.132) (0.147) 
Office and Policy Seeking 0.492*** 0.673*** 0.272 
 (0.142) (0.189) (0.190) 
Office and Vote Seeking 0.285*** -0.042 0.012 
 (0.107) (0.120) (0.148) 
Office, Vote, and Policy Seeking 0.196** 0.294*** 0.195 
 (0.088) (0.112) (0.160) 
Policy Seeking -0.242** -0.794*** -0.492*** 
 (0.101) (0.131) (0.165) 
Vote Seeking 0.500*** 0.278** -0.489*** 
 (0.072) (0.119) (0.121) 
Vote and Policy Seeking 0.152* -0.053 -0.727*** 
 (0.082) (0.123) (0.159) 
National Experience Only 0.066 -0.024 0.053 
 (0.046) (0.064) (0.068) 
European Experience Only 0.065 0.026 0.000 
 (0.049) (0.062) (0.055) 
No Experience 0.052 0.102 0.005 
 (0.049) (0.074) (0.069) 
Open Electoral Lists 0.162*** 0.456*** 0.216*** 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.066) 
Federalism 0.357*** 0.129 -0.444*** 
 (0.111) (0.125) (0.120) 
Bicameral Legislature -0.216*** -0.468*** 0.153 
 (0.082) (0.113) (0.145) 
Eurozone Membership -0.533*** -0.735*** -0.193** 
 (0.083) (0.105) (0.092) 
Membership in EU in Years 0.015*** 0.020*** 0.005* 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age of MEP -0.071 -0.156 0.196 
 (0.113) (0.120) (0.137) 
Party Switcher 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant 0.226* 0.122 0.625*** 
 (0.133) (0.179) (0.214) 
    
Observations 362 360 361 
R-squared 0.354 0.408 0.546 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX D
IDENTIFYING PARTY GOALS USING MODERATE AND STRONG
POLICY SEEKING PARTIES
Table 49: Frequency of Empirical Indicators By Party
Empirical Indicator # of Parties 
Significant Loss 17 
No Representation 4 
Majority Minority 14 
Government 19 
Strong Preferences 23 
Salience of Euro Election 27 
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LGM
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NC
Figure 21: Party Goals with Inclusion of Moderate Policy Seekers
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Table 50: Additional Policy Seeking Parties
Country Party Abb. 
Austria Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs SPÖ 
Bulgaria Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria GERB 
Czech Republic Ob anská demokratická strana ODS 
France Europe Écologie EE 
 Partitu di a Nazione Corsa PNC 
  Parti socialiste PS (France) 
Germany DIE LINKE. Die Linke 
 Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands CDU 
  Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands SPD 
Italy Il Popolo della Libertà PDL 
 Italia dei Valori - Lista Di Pietro IdV 
 Lega Nord LN 
  Unione dei Democratici cristiani e dei Democratici di Centro UDC 
Portugal Partido Social Democrata PSD 
  Partido Socialista PS (Portugal) 
Spain Partido Popular PP 
  Partido Socialista Obrero Español PSOE 
Slovakia SMER-Sociálna demokracia Smer 
Sweden Arbetarepartiet- Socialdemokraterna S 
United Kingdom Labour Party Labour 
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